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Abstract 
 
 
The primary focus of this thesis is to examine the extent to which New Zealand law 
enables effects of activities to be controlled for the purpose of preserving the integrity 
of an organic farm. In particular the thesis examines the impact of contaminant 
discharge, emanating from non-organic farming activities, in the form of 
agrichemicals and genetically modified organisms (“GMO”). Both types of discharge 
pose a serious threat to the continued existence and development of organic farms in 
New Zealand. The thesis explores the nature of the threats and possible approaches to 
resolving conflicts between organic and non-organic farming.  
The issues raised are of contemporary importance, and although land use conflict 
has been thoroughly considered by courts and commentators, this particular conflict 
has not received the same degree of attention. The increase in organic farming and the 
introduction of GMO into the New Zealand environment are factors, which give 
impetus to the need to explore ways in which to resolve any conflict. 
In New Zealand organic farms can be certified, pursuant to several different 
schemes, to provide an assurance that product has been produced in accordance 
certification standards. Those standards generally place restrictions upon the use of 
artificial substances and GMO. Organic farms are commonly located alongside non-
organic farms, and therefore organic farmers must ensure that there is no incursion by 
these substances across the boundary of an organic farm. 
The thesis examines the extent to which non-organic farmers can be constrained 
in relation to the emanation of contaminant discharge. It identifies internalisation of 
effects as being of critical importance to the continued existence and development of 
organic farming within New Zealand. Theoretical justifications are examined, and 
support for a requirement for internalisation of effects, which cause decertification, is 
identified from different sources including an economic approach, arguments from 
property rights, ethical duties to the environment and the tort liability theory of 
outcome responsibility. 
A critical issue that threatens the preservation and viability of the organic farm is 
whether the organic farm can be termed a sensitive activity, thereby reducing the right 
to protection by the law. At common law, sensitivity represents an obstacle to 
recovery for loss suffered in both negligence and nuisance. The thesis explores the 
 i
application of the concept of known vulnerability as a means by which to overcome 
the notion of sensitivity, as well as considering other theoretical justifications. It 
suggests evolution of the law, so as to preserve the opportunity to farm organically in 
New Zealand, and thus be in step with leading international initiatives to promote 
organic farming. 
 The research examines the statutory framework, and it is contended that in 
order to achieve integrated management of resources the RMA should be used in 
conjunction with HSNO to regulate the effects of hazardous substance and new 
organisms. The RMA is identified as a primary measure capable of providing 
effective protection of an organic farm. A requirement for internalisation of effects is 
recognised as the most flexible method to secure co-existence of conflicting activities. 
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Does New Zealand law protect organic production? 
 
Introduction 
 
New Zealand is widely perceived as a country with a unique and relatively unspoiled 
environment. Its isolation from the rest of the world, its distinctive biodiversity and 
large landscapes contribute to this perception. Internally the people of New Zealand 
have felt fortunate to enjoy the advantages of a small population and ready access to a 
proportionately large outdoors environment. National pride is imbued with notions of 
clean air, pristine waterways and lush vegetation. The nation’s assets and products are 
offered to the world in reliance upon a clean, green standard. Comparative to some 
other countries, claims to environmental health may be justifiable. However recent 
reports1 on the state of the nation’s environment reveal serious degradation of 
resources consequent upon human activity.  
To retain or enhance a healthy and functioning environment, rules governing 
resource use are essential. At some point a balance needs to be struck between 
resource use and resource protection. Traditionally the common law has provided 
limited remedies to control the impacts of activities upon others. As population 
pressure and resource degradation have increased, so has the need for environmental 
protection. Over time common law remedies have been complemented by statute. 
New Zealand in the 1990s made progress towards environmental protection by the 
passage of the Resource Management Act 1991 (“the RMA”), with a stated purpose 
of promoting the sustainable management of natural and physical resources. The 
legislation focuses on the control of adverse environmental effects, and uses resource 
management plans to achieve control. Non-regulatory methods, such as financial 
incentives or education may also be used to control effects. 
The central purpose of this thesis is to examine the extent to which New Zealand 
law enables adverse effects to be controlled for the purpose of preserving the integrity 
of an organic farm. Humans have farmed organically for centuries. However as a 
result of growing pressures on the environment, worldwide attention is turning to 
organic farming methods, as offering an option to assist in alleviation of that pressure.  
                                                 
1  For example: Ministry for the Environment, The State of New Zealand's Environment Ministry for 
the Environment, (1997) Wellington and OECD "Conclusions and recommendations-NEW 
ZEALAND" Conclusions and Recommendations approved by the Group on Environmental 
Performance at its May 1996 meeting. 
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Progressively, throughout the world, policy makers are recognising organic farming 
as a production method worthy of governmental support. An increased focus on 
environmental protection, growing concern for food security and recognition of the 
benefits provided by organic farming are driving the change. 
In considering whether New Zealand law is sufficiently well developed to 
adequately protect organic farms and keep pace with international developments, this 
thesis will first consider the current position occupied by organic farming in New 
Zealand. It will then identify threats posed to organic production and the ability to 
control those threats. In particular the thesis will concentrate upon threats posed from 
agriculture in the form of contaminant discharge, including impacts from 
agrichemicals and genetically modified organisms. The thesis will identify conflict 
between different forms of farming activities, and examine options for the resolution 
of that conflict. One of the options identified will be Outcome 1, which would require 
a contaminant-producing farmer to internalise effects that would result in 
decertification of an organic farm. Existing principles will be considered in order to 
determine the extent to which they justify or support Outcome 1. The common law 
will then be considered to measure the extent to which principles supporting Outcome 
1 are represented in the common law. Whether remedies in negligence and nuisance 
can effectively be used to preserve the integrity of an organic farm will be examined. 
The enquiry will then turn to the statutory framework. In particular the RMA will be 
examined to identify its potential for achieving internalisation of effects and 
preservation of the integrity of the organic farm. The relationship of the RMA with 
the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (“HSNO”) will also be 
considered. 
Although the thesis is written from the perspective of an organic farmer,2 it is not 
the intention to suggest that organic farming should necessarily be preferred over 
other farming methods. Rather, the purpose of the enquiry and the associated research 
is to consider how far the existing law and any modifications to it can ensure that 
organic farming can exist and develop in the context of New Zealand production 
today. 
 
                                                 
2 The author co-owns and manages a blueberry farm in the Waikato Region of New Zealand that is in 
its final transition year for organic certification with BIO-GRO. 
 2
I. Organic production in New Zealand 
 
1.1 Certified organic production units in New Zealand  
 
Organic production is recognised in common terms as agricultural and horticultural 
production carried out without recourse to artificial inputs. It is identified with natural 
and sustainable processes.3 Organic production encompasses terms such as biological 
husbandry, eco-agriculture and biodynamic.4 The aim of the ethic is to produce goods 
of optimum quality whilst maintaining a balanced and sustainable unit that creates as 
few negative impacts on the environment as possible. Farming practices are modified 
or maintained to align with the ethic. Methods employed to achieve organic 
production include: 
 
1. Fostering beneficial practices 
2. Reducing external inputs, and allowing inputs to work with natural processes 
3. Achieving nutrient flows which have as few losses as possible 
4. Sustaining the life supporting capacity of the resource 
5. Minimizing adverse effects 
6. Ensuring ethical treatment of animals 
7. Minimizing the use of non-renewable resources.5 
 
In practical terms, applying these principles supports the use of practices such as crop 
rotation, recycling through composts and liquid manure, and increasing plant and 
animal bio-diversity.6 Organic production is not a new phenomenon. In fact many of 
the practices employed in organic production stem from traditional practices, 
exercised down the ages.7 In pre-European New Zealand, Maori agricultural and 
horticultural activities were carried out without recourse to artificial inputs. The 
methods employed could generally be termed organic, although there is argument as 
                                                 
3 For a comprehensive definition see that adopted by the International Federation of Organic Agricultural 
movements (IFOAM) International Federation of Organic Movements <www.ifoam.org>. 
4 BIO-GRO New Zealand, BIO-GRO New Zealand Organic Standards (30 April 2001) cl.2.1. 
(Hereinafter referred to as BIO-GRO Standards). 
5 Ibid. 
6  The Bio Dynamic Farming and Gardening Association in New Zealand Incorporated "About 
Biodynamics" [22 May 2003] <http://www.biodynamic.org.nz>.  
7  Palmer, K "Origins and Guiding Ideas of Environmental Law" in Bosselmann, K and Grinlinton, D 
(eds) Environmental Law for a Sustainable Society (2002) 1 (New Zealand Centre for Environmental 
Law) 4. 
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to how sustainable some of the farming practices were.8 With the arrival of European 
and other colonists, new farming methods, plants, animals and products were 
introduced. But since that time there also continued a “persistent, if low profile, 
interest in organic farming in New Zealand”.9
Only in recent times has modern agriculture become dependent upon artificial 
inputs such as herbicides, pesticides and synthetic fertilizers.10 New Zealand’s 
dependence, which escalated in the mid twentieth century, was particularly marked.11 
This was largely due to the country’s rapid conversion from forest to grassland, and 
subsequent reliance on artificial substances to maintain productivity in the converted 
areas.12 As science advanced through the twentieth century, so too did pesticide 
technology. “First generation” pesticides, based on heavy metal compounds, such as 
lead arsenate used by early settlers, made way for “second generation” compounds the 
products of research undertaken during World War II. DDT was one such compound, 
as were the synthetic herbicides 2,4,D and 2,4,5,T.13
Recognition of problems resulting from this dependence has been mounting since 
the late 1950s.14 Publications such as Rachael Carson’s Silent Spring15 were 
harbingers of the growing environmental damage. However New Zealand farmers 
tended not to heed these warnings and persisted with chemical applications to enhance 
production.16 Eventually the Government partially redressed the problem, limiting 
first the use of, and then deregistering, some of the more toxic second generation 
pesticides.17 The last 30 years of the twentieth century produced a shift in global 
awareness of environmental problems and issues, and recognition of the finite nature 
                                                 
8  Anderson, A "A Fragile Plenty – Pre European Maori and the New Zealand Environment," in 
Pawson, E and Brooking, T (eds) Environmental Histories of New Zealand (2002) 19. 
9  Brooking, T, Hodge, R, and Wood, V “The Grasslands Revolution Reconsidered” in Pawson, E and 
Brooking, T (eds) Environmental Histories of New Zealand (2002) 179. 
10  For the purposes of this thesis, these substances will be referred to as agrichemicals. 
11  Brooking, supra, n 9 at 170. For example, the authors note that the application of superphosphate 
and an increasing number of variants (particularly serpentine) peaked at over 3 million tones in 1985, 
or about 2 per cent of the world’s total. 
12  Ibid, 171. As a result of the ‘grasslands revolution” by the mid 1970s, 51 per cent of New Zealand’s 
surface area had been converted to grasslands, far exceeding the world average of 37 per cent. 
13  Ministry for the Environment, Towards a pesticides risk reduction policy for New Zealand (2002) 
Wellington 56.  
14  Ibid, 58. 
15  Carson, R Silent Spring (1962).   
16  Brooking, supra, n 9 at 180. 
17 For example, the Pesticides Board deregistered DDT on 31 December 1989. For discussion see 
Ministry for the Environment (2002), supra n 13 at Appendix VII. Yet it took until 1997 to phase out 
use of Dichlorophenoxyacetic, or 2,4-D, see Brooking, ibid.  
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of resources.18 This has been reflected in various publications, reports and numerous 
international conventions.19 The modern environmental movement was driven by 
recognition of the interconnectedness of the environment, increased awareness of the 
relationship of the environment with human wellbeing and predictions that the 
continued exploitation of physical resources would result in an environmental crisis.20
As a result of the trend towards environmental awareness, organic production 
gained popularity in New Zealand and around the world. Concern for food safety 
contributed to the growth.21 Furthermore recognition of significant opportunities to 
supply overseas markets with organic produce complemented growth in organic 
production.22 This led to the entry into the organic market by corporates, such as 
Heinz Wattie Ltd and Zespri International Ltd, during the 1980s and 1990s.23  
In 2000, organic production involved between 1-5 per cent of the agricultural 
sectors of Western countries.24 The sector was growing at an average of between 25-
32 per cent per annum, and average organic price premiums were around 25 per 
cent.25 In terms of exports from New Zealand the organics sector has increased nearly 
ten-fold in the last decade.26 Currently the New Zealand organics industry earns 
approximately $70 million in export revenue annually and that figure is expected to 
rise to $500 million by 2007.27
Domestic demand has also increased. A recent survey of the Dunedin food 
market identified an overall increase in the certified organic retail market of around 
600 per cent between 1997 and 2002.28 The research also recognised a renewed foray 
by supermarkets into the organic market, such that the supermarkets’ share of the 
                                                 
18  Williams, D (ed.) Environmental and Resource Management Law (1997) 55. 
19  Ibid. 
20 Palmer, supra, n 7 at 11. 
21  Campbell, H and Fairweather, J The Development of Organic Horticultural Exports in New Zealand 
Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit, Lincoln University, Canterbury, (1998) 12.  
22 The Research and Development Group of the Bio Dynamic Farming and Gardening Association in 
NZ, A Review of New Zealand and International Organic and Land Management Research Bio 
Dynamic Farming and Gardening Association in NZ, (2002) 7. 
23 Campbell (1998), supra n 21 at 12. The research identifies the various factors that influenced entry 
by corporates to the organic sector. 
24 The Research and Development Group, supra n 18 at 7, referring to Ritchie, M, Campbell H, Sivak, 
L 2000 Assessing the Market for Organic Produce: Dunedin, New Zealand and the World, a paper 
presented to Organics 2020 Conference, Unitec, Auckland, May 2000. 
25  Ibid.  
26 Trade New Zealand “Industry Profile-Organics” [22 May 2003] <http://www.tradenz.govt.nz/. > 
27 Ibid. 
28 Campbell, H and Ritchie, M The Organic Food Market in New Zealand: 2002 Centre for the Study 
of Agriculture, Food and Environment, School of Social Sciences, University of Otago, (2002) 6.  
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market moved from one-half to two-thirds between 2000 and 2002.29 The gains in the 
domestic sector are approaching growth in the export sector, with the domestic retail 
figure in 2002 of $71 million surpassing the export retail figure for 2001.30
 
1.2 Certification Systems in New Zealand 
 
A concomitant development with the rising popularity of organics has been the 
increasing awareness of the need to protect the integrity of organic products and the 
production units from which they spring. In the past, organic products have been 
bought and sold “on trust”. Such products were generally sold from health food stores 
and cooperatives evincing an alternative philosophy to mainstream agriculture and 
horticulture.31 The adherents to this philosophy have been named “committed 
growers”, in contrast to the more recent arrival of “the pragmatic grower”,32 whose 
emergence can in part be attributed to the attraction of a price premium, and access to 
markets. The entry of the pragmatic grower, the rise in popularity of organic products 
and the resulting increase in the volume of sales led to the need for a new, more 
regulated approach with systems being developed to preserve the integrity of organic 
products. As noted by Campbell and Ritchie:33
 
“The ascendancy of the supermarkets is strongly premised on the legitimacy of third 
party certification and represents the final diminution of the “on trust” system of 
organic purchasing that formed the primary rationale of early organic food co-ops 
and specialist shops prior to the establishment of widespread certification systems.” 
 
Certification schemes are geared towards providing an assurance that the products and 
processes certified meet requisite organic production Standards. Increasingly, reliance 
is being placed on certification of organic goods and processes, to ensure access to 
markets.34 Currently New Zealand has 3 major certification systems, a fourth in 
development, and a further minor player. 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Campbell (2002), supra n 28 at 9.The authors however caution that the domestic retail figures do not 
reflect accurately the growth of local domestic organic production, as the retail figure includes sales of 
imported organic products. 
31 Campbell (2002), supra n 29 at 12. 
32 Campbell (1998), supra n 21 at para 8.3, 39. 
33 Campbell (2002), supra n 29 at 12. 
34  For instance, The Organic Products Exporters of New Zealand Inc (OPENZ) requires its members’ 
products to carry internationally recognised certification, see Organic Products Exporters of New 
Zealand Inc “About OPENZ” [16 June, 2003] <http://www.organicsnewzealand.org.nz >.  
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1.2.1 BIO-GRO 
 
BIO-GRO is the trading name of The New Zealand Biological Producers & 
Consumers Council Inc. It was originally formed as an umbrella organisation for 
organic agriculture. Its current activities include the setting of organic production 
Standards, certification of BIO-GRO Licensees and Licence Applicants and the 
promotion of organics and support for organic research and education.35 The 
certification system operates by the grant of a licence by BIO-GRO, to enable a 
producer to use the BIO-GRO trademark in relation to its products or processes. The 
BIO-GRO trademark acts as an assurance that the licensee is committed to production 
in accordance with the BIO-GRO Standards and has satisfied regular audits by BIO-
GRO’s audit service.36 BIO-GRO currently contracts AgriQuality to provide its audit 
service.37 When the BIO-GRO Standards were first prepared in 1984, they were slim, 
comprising only one page.38 In the past 19 years the Standards have evolved to 
become a complex manual detailing required practices and restrictions for diverse 
sectors ranging from mushroom production to aquaculture. 
The Standards detail guiding principles, recommendations and requirements for a 
certified organic production unit.39 In order to obtain a full licence, a licensee must 
first progress through a minimum 36-month certification process. This process is 
designed to ensure that conversion to organic production is well grounded. Soils, 
animals and vegetative material may have been compromised by an earlier regime 
that allowed artificial inputs and non-natural processes. The 36-month transition 
period gives time for chemicals to work their way out of the system, and for processes 
to be realigned to match the organic ethic. Residue testing may be carried out during 
annual audits to ensure compliance with the Standards. Initial and continued full 
certification is dependant upon meeting the Standards. This means that it is vital to 
secure the integrity of the unit against internal and external threats. 
                                                 
35  BIO-GRO Standards, 1.1. 
36 BIO-GRO Standards, 1.2.2. 
37 In late 2003 AgriQuality was contracted to provide audit services to BIO-GRO. Despite offering its 
own certification system, AgriQuality will audit BIO-GRO to BIO-GRO Standards. The change arose 
as result of perceived efficiencies in using a specialist audit service. For discussion see BIO-GRO New 
Zealand, BIO-GRO Certification Technical Bulletin, No.4. (December 2003).  
38 BIO-GRO Standards, 1.1.1. 
39 For ease of reference a certified organic production unit will be termed “an organic farm”, although it 
is acknowledged that not all organic production units are farms. 
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BIO-GRO is accredited by IFOAM, the International Federation of Organic 
Agricultural Movements40 and to the international ISO 1702/EN 45004 standard.41 
International Accreditation facilitates better access for organics exports to overseas 
markets, as some major retailers such as Sainsburys in the United Kingdom prefer to 
deal with IFOAM accredited certifiers only.42 In 2002 BIO-GRO obtained Third Party 
Agency Approval for the NZFSA Official Organic Assurance Programme.43 Access 
to the markets of Europe and the USA is now dependant upon approval pursuant to 
this programme and Japan is likely to follow suit shortly.44 Currently access to the 
Japan market, for edible plant produce, is through the Recognised Certification 
Organisation with ICS Japan.45
 
1.2.2 Demeter 
 
Demeter was the mythical Greek goddess of agriculture. She was the sister of Zeus 
and the mother of Persephone. From her happiness sprung bounty and from her 
sorrow spilt barren devastation. Hence the adoption of the name Demeter by an 
international biodynamic certification system. This system verifies that the products 
have been produced using biodynamic methods, and in New Zealand the certifier is 
The Biodynamic Association.46 Adherence to the Demeter Standards is arguably more 
rigorous than to BIO-GRO Standards, as adoption of a “whole farm” philosophy is 
required, together with the application of Biodynamic preparations and composts 
based on the research of Dr Rudolph Steiner.47 A conversion period is also required; 
this generally takes three years, however whole farm conversion may take up to seven 
years.48 Achieving and retaining Demeter certification is dependant upon the farm 
remaining secure from most artificial and off-farm inputs. 
 
                                                 
40 BioGro New Zealand, Annual Report, (2003) Wellington, 1. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Bio-Gro New Zealand “Organic Overview” <http://www.biogro.co.nz/files/Organic_Overview.pdf>. 
43 BIO-GRO New Zealand, BIO-GRO Certification Technical Bulletin, No.4. (December 2003). 
44 BIO-GRO Standards, 4.9 as amended by variation dated 23.7.03. 
45 BIO-GRO New Zealand, BIO-GRO Certification Technical Bulletin, No.4. (December 2003) . 
46 The Bio Dynamic Association, supra n 7. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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1.2.3 AgriQuality New Zealand Ltd (“AgriQuality”) 
 
AgriQuality is a State Owned Enterprise that had its genesis in November 1998. Its 
precursors include MAF Quality Management and the New Zealand Department of 
Agriculture. The New Zealand Government is the owner with there being two 
shareholders, the New Zealand Ministers of State Owned Enterprises and Finance.49 
AgriQuality has developed a system for organic produce that certifies that products 
carrying its brand have been produced in accordance with the AgriQuality Standard. 
The AgriQuality Standard was developed in 2000 and is based on the international 
Codex Alinorm 99/22.50 AgriQuality uses the independent agency Certenz as a 
certifying agency to ensure that all products carrying the brand comply with the 
AgriQuality Standards. Certenz has obtained, inter alia, ISO 9000 and 14000 
accreditation. It has also been accredited by the Joint Accreditation System Australia 
New Zealand (JAS-ANZ), which has signed a bi-lateral agreement with the European 
Union for product certification.51 AgriQuality is attracting support from organic 
growers, and as at 2001 there were approximately 170 certifications pursuant to the 
scheme.52 The certification of any product by Certenz is dependant upon the product 
being free of any of the prohibited inputs referred to in the Standards, and in 
compliance with the Standards. 
 
1.2.4 Te Waka Kai Ora 
 
Te Waka Kai Ora is an umbrella organisation established to represent Maori within 
the organic sector and government departments. The name translates to carrier of 
healthy foods, and Te Waka Kai Ora is seen as a vehicle to strengthen Maori 
participation in the organic sector. Te Waka Kai Ora has been involved in the working 
group on the NZ National Standard for Organics. In addition it is a goal of the 
organisation to produce Maori organic Standards pursuant to which products could be 
independently certified.53
 
                                                 
49 AgriQuality New Zealand "AgriQuality Who We Are" [2003] <http://www.agriquality.co.nz>.  
50 AgriQuality New Zealand "Going Organic with AgriQuality" [2003] 
<http://www.agriquality.co.nz>.  
51 AgriQuality New Zealand "Certification by Certenz" < http://www.agriquality.co.nz/ >.  
52 AgriQuality New Zealand "AgriQuality -Organic Facts and figures" <http://www.agriquality.co.nz >.  
53 Roskruge, N "Maori Organics" [2002] <http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/ -05.htm>.  
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1.2.5 Organic Farm NZ 
 
This scheme can be differentiated from the other schemes in that it is aimed at small-
scale growers producing organic product for the local market. The label has funding 
from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and was set up by the Soil and Health 
Association of New Zealand. Product integrity and quality is to be assured via audits 
by BIO-GRO. 
 
1.2.6 Government Assurances and Standards 
 
Where goods are to be exported, certifiers must also ensure that standards meet or 
exceed the regulatory requirements of overseas markets.54 These requirements will 
vary according to the market accessed. By way of example, the European Union 
pursuant to European Council Regulation 2092/91, requires all imports of organic 
products from third countries to be accompanied by assurances provided by the 
government’s competent authority that the product has been produced in accordance 
with the rules of production laid out in the regulation.55
In order to meet this requirement and preserve access to markets, the New 
Zealand Food Safety Authority (NZFSA) established the Official Organic Assurance 
Programme (OOAP), and thus avoided the need for exporters to obtain import 
licenses to individual states within the Union. Under the programme the NZFSA gives 
government-to-government assurances for consignments of organic products exported 
to the European Union. In conjunction with OOAP the NZFSA has also developed a 
programme for the recognition of organic certifying bodies, whereby accredited 
certifiers are granted “Third Party agency” status.56 BIO-GRO and Certenz are the 
two certifiers currently accredited as recognised Third Party Agencies (TPA). As such 
they can issue certificates that the producer has complied with the separate NZFSA 
Standard.57 The Standard was originally developed with access to the European Union 
                                                 
54 BIO-GRO Standards, 1.1.1. 
55 New Zealand Food Safety Authority “NZFSA Official Asssurance Programme for Organic Products” 
<http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/organics/about/overview.htm>. 
56 Food Assurance Authority "Accreditation, Recognition, and Performance Measurement Criteria for 
Third Party Agencies and their Personnel - Organic Products  (OP1)," [March 2001] 
<http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/organics/framework/op1.pdf>  
57 Standard OP3 includes criterion relating to Technical rules for Organic Production, and Registration 
and performance measurement for organic operators – Food Assurance Authority  “Registration and 
Performance Measurement Criteria for Operator - Organic Products (OP3)” [March 2001] 
<http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/organics/framework/op3.pdf> and New Zealand Food Safety Authority 
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in mind, and tailored to meet Regulation 2092/91. The Standard has subsequently 
been amended to also align with the Unites States National Organic Programme.58 
The NZFSA has recognition from the United States of America for approval of 
TPAs.59 Japan has prepared its own organic standard to a large extent relying upon 
Codex Alinorm requirements, and subsequently entered arrangements with private 
certifiers in New Zealand to undertake certification activities.60
 
1.2.7  New Zealand National Organic Standard NZS 8410:2003 (NZOS) 
 
In April 2003 the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry released the Organic Sector 
Strategy.61 The Strategy promotes a vision whereby the organic sector in New 
Zealand would be recognised internationally as a world leader in organic systems and 
products. It targets a total of $1 billion sector sales by 2013. Strategic issues that the 
Sector needs to address to achieve this goal are identified. These include the need for 
a new and well-resourced national organisation to lead the sector. A series of changes 
is envisaged to strengthen and reposition the sector.62 Allied to these changes was the 
preparation of a National Draft Standard for the sector, which was released in 
November 2003. 
The Standard was prepared by Standards New Zealand with the aim of setting out 
minimum Standards for organic production. The NZOS will now represent the 
minimum production rules used for domestic organic product. For the meantime, 
organic products for export will continue to be assessed against the NZFSA Technical 
Rules for Organic Production. In time there is an expectation that the two will 
combine.63 This move by Central Government into the area of organic Standards is a 
sign of the “coming of age” of the organic production sector. As National Standards 
are promulgated, private certifiers move to align their Standards with the National 
Standard. This will potentially standardize some organic production practices that 
have previously been regulated in an ad hoc fashion, and dependent upon the certifier 
of choice. This does not mean however, that a producer cannot choose a more 
                                                                                                                                            
“MAF Standard OP3, Appendix Two: NZFSA Technical Rules for Organic Production” [November 
2002] <http://www.nzfsa.govt.nz/organics/framework/op3.pdf>  
58 Supra, n 55. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Martech Consulting Group, Organic Sector Strategy (March 2003).  
62 Ibid, iii. 
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stringent regime, such as Demeter. A National Standard simply creates a benchmark 
that a producer may not fall below. Producers for the domestic market are not 
currently obliged to comply with the National Standard, and consumers will continue 
to rely on an individual certifier or producer assurance.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Certified organic production units may have their products guaranteed by a range of 
systems in New Zealand. These systems generally rely upon production Standards and 
an external review in terms of adherence to the Standards. Failure to comply with the 
rules results both in a loss of integrity and if detected, decertification. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
63 From information supplied by Jamie Miller, Technical Advisor, (Plant and Organic Products), 
NZFSA, 7 August 2003. 
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II. Threats to a organic farm 
 
2.1 The organic farm 
 
2.1.1 Essential elements of a certified organic production unit (“an organic farm”) 
 
Understanding how the integrity of an organic farm may be lost or compromised 
necessitates an examination of a farm’s essential elements. The Standards to which an 
organic producer must adhere will vary, dependant upon the certifier used and the 
market accessed. For the purpose of this research, BIO-GRO has been selected as 
representative of New Zealand organic production Standards, and will thus be used in 
discussion.64 Clause 2.2 of the BIO-GRO New Zealand Organic Standards (“the 
Standards”) defines the parameters of organic agriculture in general terms: 65
 
Organic agriculture is based on appropriate stocking rates, consideration of animal 
welfare, sound rotations using diverse stock and cropping strategies with the 
extensive but rational use of animal manure and other vegetative residues, and the 
use of appropriate cultivation techniques. It avoids the use of soluble mineral salt 
fertilizers, nearly all chemical pesticides and all genetically modified organisms. 
Similar considerations apply, where appropriate, to aquaculture, fishing and wild 
harvesting. 
 
Chapter 5 deals with Principles of sustainable land management. The introduction 
states:66
 
Through an absence of artificial inputs, organic production aims to minimize the 
potential adverse effects of farming on the environment, both on-farm and off-
farm… 
 
The actions required to remain within these parameters are then set out in detail in the 
subsequent chapters of the Standards. The Standards are divided sectorally, but also 
have general chapters that apply to all sectors. Each chapter contains separate 
modules, which detail Production specifications by topic. In turn each module 
                                                 
64 BIO-GRO was chosen mainly due to its strong presence in the market place, and to its rapid 
alignment with international conditions. 
65 BIO-GRO Standards 2.2. 
66  Ibid, 5.1. 
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provides: Guiding principles, Recommendations and Requirements of the Standards.67 
The requirements imposed are extensive and include by way of example prohibition 
of the use of chemical herbicides, prohibition of the use of synthetic fertilizers, 
retention of water source purity and prohibition on the use of GMOs. The 
Requirements also restrict excessive rates of nitrogen from natural sources and raw 
manures, and detail lists of permitted inputs such as calcium sulphate (gypsum), only 
of natural origin, feldspar, approved forms of elemental sulphur, rock minerals and 
seaweed and fish products containing only BIO-GRO approved ingredients.68 In 
addition to the sectoral information, Annex Three of the Standards contains a 
schedule that lists Permitted and Restricted Materials and Practices and is cross-
referenced to the Requirements of the Standards. 
An Environmental Management Plan69 is used as a means to guard against 
incursions of unwanted substances. Where there is likelihood of prohibited materials 
entering from neighbouring properties the plan must detail natural and physical 
barriers. The plan must also provide details of written communication informing 
neighbours of the potential loss of certification should a contamination event arise. 
Farms are subject to residue testing at the discretion of the auditor to determine 
whether the controls required in the plan have prevented drift. 
 
2.1.2 Enforcement of the Requirements of the Standards 
 
The Requirements of the Standards gain effect via the operation of a Licence 
Agreement and Code of Practice.70 Any organic producer, who wishes to obtain the 
right to use BIO-GRO’s trademark must sign the Licence Agreement and agree to be 
bound by its terms. One of those terms is that the parties abide by the Code of 
Practice for Organic Production.71 That Code contains a provision requiring the 
licensee to comply with the current version of the BIO-GRO Organic Production 
Standards.72
                                                 
67 By way of example see Orchard Production Standard in BIO-GRO Standards, Module 4.1, 6. 
68 BIO-GRO Standards, 3.4.3.h, 3.5.3.h, 3.2.3.a, 3.1.3.l, 3.1.3.f., 3.1.3.m, 4.2.6.b. 
69 BIO-GRO Standards; the plan is prepared upon application and revised for annual audit. 
70 BIO-GRO Standards, Annex 5. 
71 BIO-GRO Standards, 3.1. 
72 BIO-GRO Standards, cl 6 (a), First Schedule, Annex 4. 
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The Code of Practice allows for suspension or withdrawal of certification in the 
event of a breach by the licensee of the Standards.73 There is accordingly a wide range 
of situations that can lead to revocation of certification. Interestingly, an examination 
of recent suspensions BIO-GRO indicates the majority arose as a result of breaches 
“internally” by the licensee, as opposed to instances of breaches arising from external 
forces.74 The typical instance attracting suspension was use of a prohibited input on 
certified land or premises. In many instances the effect of suspension will be the 
decertification of the area affected for a nominated period to deal with the impact of 
the unauthorised substance. Certification may be regained once that period has 
elapsed. The major consequences of suspension or withdrawal of certification will be 
denial of entry into an intended market, failure to attain a price premium and loss of 
reputation and goodwill in the marketplace. Possible liability for forward contracts 
may also be affected. Having identified the essential elements of an organic farm, it 
becomes necessary to consider what constitutes a threat to those elements. 
 
2.2 Threats to an organic farm 
 
2.2.1 Internal threats 
 
Internally a licensee may guard against these consequences by understanding and 
carefully adhering to the relevant Standards. Ensuring that all employees and 
contractors are well informed of the requirements of the Standards is vital to attaining 
compliance. The vigilance of the relevant certifier will affect the rigor of the system. 
Lax audit and residue testing procedures can lead to undetected breaches of 
Standards. This problem is heightened in an organic industry where some pragmatic 
members are attracted by commercial gain rather than commitment to the organic 
ethic. The value of an organic trademark or licence is predicated on the reliability of 
its audit processes. Undetected breaches of Standards by one producer, could lead for 
instance, to rejection of an export consignment, and a loss of faith in the producer and 
the certifier. It is therefore in the best interests of all producers to ensure that the 
chosen organic certifier adopts rigorous and universal audit procedures.  
 
 
                                                 
73 BIO-GRO Standards, c 16 and c 17. 
74 From information supplied by former BIO-GRO CEO, Seagar Mason, October 2002. 
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2.2.2 External threats 
 
External threat can be defined as any element arising outside of an organic farm that 
upon incursion of the boundaries of the organic farm could result in a breach of the 
relevant Standards. In New Zealand threats posed to an organic farm can be divided 
into four groups: 
 
1. Contamination from a non-organic farming point source, for example, 
agrichemical drift to land, air or water, wandering stock, or release of 
genetically modified organisms. 
2. Contamination from a non-organic farming non-point source, for example, 
diffuse land or water contamination from farm run-off, or from a genetically 
modified organism where the source cannot be ascertained. 
3. Contamination from the exercise of a government power, for example, road 
side weed control spraying, use of aerial pesticides for insect and possum 
control pursuant to the Biosecurity Act 1992. 
4. Contamination from other sources such as domestic weed control by an 
adjacent or neighbouring land use. 
  
2.3 Threats 1 and 2 - Contamination from farming 
 
2.3.1 Organic Farming and the interface with a non-organic farming 
 
Organic producers make choices that set them apart from other producers in the 
agricultural and horticultural sectors. They choose to farm by limiting artificial inputs, 
reducing polluting outputs, and increasing biodiversity and the health of the whole 
system. Where possible they attempt to avoid adverse effects and limit the impact on 
the environment resulting from production methods. As a result of these practices 
negative externalities are less likely to occur and more readily internalised than with 
non-organic farming methods. 
Although organic farmers may be ideologically separate from many other 
farmers, their landholding may not achieve the same degree of separation. In New 
Zealand organic farms often adjoin non-organic units. This lack of physical separation 
can constitute a threat to the integrity of an organic farm. 
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Many “non-organic” farmers adhere to an ethos similar to organic farmers, and 
work hard to act as good stewards of the land. Farmers by virtue of place and 
employment develop an intimate relationship with resources farmed and stewarded. In 
many instances they have the incentive of a family tradition to uphold. There are 
outstanding examples throughout New Zealand of forward thinking farmers acting to 
conserve biodiversity and limit the impact of farming on natural resources. Farmers 
are also choosing to modify existing farming practices by implementing schemes such 
as integrated pest management strategies (IPM) and fertilizer targeting. 
Despite these improvements and gains, farming practices continue to contribute 
to various environmental problems.75 Some commentators even view the impacts of 
industrial agriculture as threatening the sustainability of the biosphere.76 Many of 
these impacts also manifest a serious threat to the integrity of organic production 
methods.  
 
2.3.2 Farming in New Zealand  
 
New Zealand in recent history has been heavily reliant upon primary production. 
Agriculture, horticulture and forestry account for about 15 per cent of New Zealand’s 
gross domestic product, employ roughly 13 per cent of the total labour force and 
make up around 63 per cent of the value of all merchandise exports.77 The proportion 
of the country converted to farmland is large by world standards.78 Pastoral 
agriculture is the country’s main land use.79 By contrast the amount used for crops 
and horticulture is a much smaller proportion.80 The soils in New Zealand are diverse 
but tend to be thin and prone to acidification, with low nutrient levels.81 The 
combination of the conversion of native forest to pasture, the extent of the land use by 
                                                 
75 Parminter, T “Policy Strategies for Natural Resource Management” MAF Technical Paper No: 
2003/1 <http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/. > 
76  Kimbrell, A (ed.) The Fatal Harvest Reader, The Tragedy of Industrial Agriculture (2002) 3. 
77 Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry “Submission to the Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification” <http://202.78.129.207/mafnet> 2. 
78 Ministry for the Environment, The State of New Zealand's Environment Ministry for the 
Environment, (1997) Wellington 8.6. The Report states that 52 per cent of land is converted to 
farmland, compared to the world’s 37 per cent average in 1993. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. The area used for crops and horticulture is only 2 per cent of the available land, compared to 11 
per cent worldwide. 
81 Ibid, 8.19. 
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agriculture and the need for pastoral improvement has created pressure on soil and 
vegetation.82
The country supports a range of farming activities varying from extensive to 
intensive production.83 Approximately 12 million hectares (44 per cent of the total 
land area) is used for extensive farming, mainly sheep and some cattle, where there 
are few animals carried per hectare and the inputs in terms of fertilizer and grass seed 
are modest.84 Intensive farming, for instance dairying, covers a much smaller 
proportion of the land, but requires greater levels of inputs and thereby creates a 
greater risk of contamination of soil and water.85
As a result of removal of government subsidies in the mid 1980s, there has been a 
move away from extensive farming to more intensive farming, with dairying 
capturing a large portion of this trend.86 Coupled with this trend has been an increased 
use of nitrogen fertilizer to boost grass growth for herd fodder. High levels of nitrogen 
lead to soil acidification, and are also associated with ground and surface water 
contamination in conjunction with other artificial inputs.87 The dramatic decline in 
water quality in some Lakes in the Central North Island is due at least in part to 
agricultural practices on farms in the vicinity of the lakes.88 Agricultural pollution is 
generally recognised as the main source of ground water contamination throughout 
OECD countries, and is of increasing concern.89 In addition to an increase in dairying, 
the decline in extensive farming led to a rise in plantation forestry, an activity which 
is reliant upon herbicide use during establishment phase.90 Although pesticides are 
used widely in the New Zealand environment, recent studies indicate a trend towards 
decrease in use.91 A comparison study concluded:92
 
Although there were some uncertainties as to the full comparability of the data sets, 
the overall conclusions were that total pesticide use (excluding mineral oil) grew 
                                                 
82 Ibid, 8.32. 
83 Ibid, 8.32. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid, 8.33. 
87 Ibid, 8.35. 
88 Parminter “Policy Strategies for Natural Resource Management” MAF Technical Paper No: 
2003/1<http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet >21. 
89 Fogh Mortensen, L et al, and “OECD Environmental Outlook” The report was prepared by a 
horizontal task force in the Environment Directorate of the OECD <http://www.oecd.org  > 19. 
90 Supra, n 82 at 8.33. 
91 Holland, P and Rahman A, “Review of Trends in Agricultural Pesticide Use in New Zealand” MAF 
Policy Technical Paper 99/11 [24 September 2002] <http://202.78.129.207/mafnet. > 
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between 1984 and 1994 reaching a peak of about 3700 tonnes of active ingredient 
per annum and has declined to the 1998 total of 3300 tonnes. Herbicides continue to 
dominate pesticide use (68 per cent) followed by fungicides (24 per cent) and 
insecticides (8 per cent). 
 
The studies also tracked changes in the classes of herbicide used and found that there 
were changes which could be attributed to trends in land use (more forestry), cost 
effectiveness and adoption of IPM.93 Pesticide use is spread across sectors, with some 
more reliant upon use than others. Orchard crops tend to have high pesticide usage,94 
although pip fruit and kiwifruit are now well represented in terms of the composition 
of organic exports.95 Pastoral farming focuses on herbicides for broad leaf and brush 
weed control.96 Process vegetables and plantation forestry tend to use herbicides for 
weed control at establishment phase, whereas fresh vegetables tend to rely on 
intensive spray programmes throughout the growing season.97 The application modes 
for pesticides vary according to topography and land use. Application by air, machine 
and hand is common. 
In addition to current practices, past practices continue to have an impact on the 
health of the land. The historical use of sheep dips and the creation of landfills on 
farms have potentially contaminated several thousand farms, orchards and market 
gardens. The use of persistent pesticides such as DDT, and fungicides containing 
heavy metals has also bequeathed a legacy of toxic residue on some lands.98  
Recently a fresh technological innovation has appeared in the farming context. In 
the 1970s researchers discovered how to transfer a particular piece of genetic code 
from one organism to the other.99 This opened the door to the development of a new 
genetically modified (“GM”) organism (“GMO”).100 By the mid 1990s the technology 
                                                                                                                                            
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Koops S, New Zealand Organic Products and Situation Outlook 2002, GAIN report # NZ2023 
prepared by USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, (2002). In the year 2000/2001 71 per cent of New 
Zealand’s organic exports by value consisted of fresh fruits. This category consists of roughly 50 per 
cent pip fruit and 50 per cent kiwifruit, accounting for NZ$40 million worth of organic exports. 
96 Supra, n 91. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Supra n 82 at 8.6. 
99 Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, Caught in the Headlights: New 
Zealanders' Reflections on Possum Control Options and Genetic Engineering (2000) Wellington 2.5.1. 
100 As defined by s 2 HSNO. 
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had advanced sufficiently for the first significant commercial sowings to occur.101 The 
United States led the way and agricultural production sectors in the States and 
elsewhere adopted the new technology with a view to obtaining production gains, 
reducing reliance on pesticides and support chemicals and increasing tolerance to 
herbicides and resistance to virus.102 A small proportion of crops are also grown for 
quality traits such as high oleic soybeans and canola.103 In 2001 it was estimated by 
USDA that GMO crops cover a global area of 52.6 million hectares, grown by 5.5 
million farmers.104 The United States, Argentina, Canada and China, grow the 
majority of GMO crops worldwide, with soybeans, cotton, corn and canola being the 
main crops grown.105
The adoption of biotechnology has not been without controversy. In the 
international context, some countries have failed to embrace the use of GMO 
technology in the production of food with the same enthusiasm, and as a result the 
trade performance of GMO crops has at times been affected.106
In New Zealand the public opinion in respect of GMO technology has been 
sharply divided. There is strong support for the technology from some sectors due to 
perceived economic and health benefits flowing from its application.107 In contrast, 
others are vehemently opposed to the introduction of GMO to the food chain. The 
issues raised include concerns relating to the technology itself, lack of information 
regarding the workings of the science, concern about potential unintended adverse 
effects, (including awareness of effects of earlier technological introductions), and 
distrust of organizations and agencies responsible for the development and release of 
GM technology into fields and markets.108  
Public concern relating to GM technology and application resulted in the Royal 
Commission on Genetic Modification (“the Commission”) being appointed in May 
                                                 
101 The European Commission "Economic Impacts of Genetically Modified Crops on the Agri-Food 
Sector-A SYNTHESIS" [2000] A working document produced by Directorate-General for Agriculture 
<http://europa.eu.int. > 
102 Ibid, 5. 
103 Ibid, 10. 
104 Campbell, H, et al, “Economic Risks and Opportunities from the Release of Genetically Modified 
Organisms in New Zealand, Appendix 1,Background Literature Review” A report to the Ministry for 
the Environment [March 2003] <http://www.mfe.govt.nz/ > 17. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid, 18. 
107 See generally, by way of example, the Interested Person submission of the New Zealand 
Biotechnology Association [IP47] to the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 2001. 
108 Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, Caught in the Headlights: New 
Zealanders' Reflections on Possum Control Options and Genetic Engineering (2000) Wellington 2.5.1. 
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2000. The warrant establishing the Commission directed it to consider the strategic 
options available to New Zealand in response to issues raised by the arrival of GM 
technology.109 The Commission undertook a lengthy process of public consultation, 
submissions and hearings prior to releasing its report and recommendations in July 
2001.110 The Commission concluded inter alia:111
 
Genetic Modification has been freely used in New Zealand for more than a decade 
as a research tool, for medical purposes and in food ingredients. It holds exciting 
promise, not only for conquering diseases, eliminating pests and contributing to the 
knowledge economy, but for enhancing the international competitiveness of the 
primary industries so important to our country’s economic well being… 
…Our major conclusion is that New Zealand should keep its options open. It would 
be unwise to turn our back on the potential advantages on offer, but we should 
proceed carefully, minimizing and managing risks. At the same time, continuation 
of the development of conventional farming, organics and integrated pest 
management should be facilitated. 
 
In general terms the Commission concluded that opportunities should be preserved to 
allow for the adoption of GM technology in New Zealand. It assessed the existing 
regulatory framework and concluded that with some modification it could adequately 
address the biotechnology issues.  
The Government subsequently issued its initial response to the Report, and 
supported the overall strategy of preserving opportunities. It however legislated to 
extend a negotiated moratorium on the commercial release of GMOs into the 
environment.112 The moratorium expired on 29 October 2003, and consequently 
applications can now be made to ERMA, the responsible authority, to release GMOs 
into the environment. On 18 December 2003 ERMA approved with controls, 
application GMF03001, by New Zealand Institute for Crop & Food Research Limited 
to field test onions genetically modified for tolerance to the herbicide glyphosate. 
 
                                                 
109 Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification: Report and Recommendations (July 2001) 6. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid, 2. 
112 Ministry for the Environment, Public discussion Paper-Improving the Operation of the HSNO Act 
for New Organisms The Ministry, (September 2002) Wellington 4. 
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2.3.3 Contamination of an organic farm from farming 
 
Farming produces contaminants. Nevertheless, technically, and often in reality, 
organic and non-organic farms are completely compatible land uses provided the non-
organic farm does not produce contaminants which extend beyond its boundaries.113 
Where a neighbouring land use fails to internalise adverse effects there is a strong 
likelihood that the integrity of an organic farm will be affected. From the perspective 
of the organic farmer, it is not vitally important how the neighbour internalises the 
threatening effects. What is important is that the adverse effect is internalised. 
To an extent, organic Standards employed in New Zealand recognise that it is 
impossible to be completely free from residual chemicals in an environment where 
chemical use is, and has been, pervasive.114 The BIO-GRO Standards state that the 
trademark/logo is:115
 
…a guarantee that the product has been produced according to the BIO-GRO 
Standards. It is not a guarantee that the product is free from all environmental 
pollution residues, as background contamination is now so widespread that such an 
assurance could be misleading. 
 
Accordingly the Standards allow for maximum residue levels in the soil based on 10 
per cent of the maximum levels for food listed in the New Zealand (Maximum 
Residue Limits of Agricultural Compounds) Mandatory Food Standard 2002.116 BIO-
GRO also reserves the right to residue test soil and water if concerns exist due to 
previous or current practices on the property and/or practices on neighbouring 
properties.117 In addition to allowable residues in soil, provision is also made for 
pesticide residues and heavy metal levels in food products and water.118 Detection of 
                                                 
113 It has however been noted that there are inherent difficulties in constructing “healthy” organic farms 
in degraded landscapes. For discussion see Kimbrell, A (ed.) The Fatal Harvest Reader, The Tragedy 
of Industrial Agriculture (2002) 310. 
114 See for example, BIO-GRO Standards, Annex 2, Residue levels in Certified Products, Water, Soil 
and Composts. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid, 4.2 and Table 2: Maximum permitted residue and heavy metal levels in food or water. For 
example, the New Zealand Food Standard maximum for DDT (including all isomers) in meat is 5.0 
mg/kg. Consequently the BIO-GRO Standard is 0.5 mg/kg. 
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contamination in excess of background levels will preclude a property or product 
from certification.119
 
2.3.3.1 Contamination by agrichemicals 
 
Contamination of an organic farm by agrichemicals results when a chemical 
application travels off-target. Off-target effects can occur by the chemical travelling 
through the air, through the ground and soil, and by water.120 In New Zealand the 
majority of all documented events occurred via air,121 although contamination by 
water has received recent attention in the Privy Council.122 Widespread contamination 
from non-point sources is increasingly being recognised as a source of pollution.123
 
2.3.3.2 Contamination by GMO 
 
Under current organic certification systems, latitude in terms of background 
contamination by GMOs is not entertained. Genetically engineered varieties and seeds 
are expressly prohibited, and as such, any contamination will result in decertification 
of product and /or land.124
A recent recommendation by the Commission of the European Communities125 
recognises that contamination from adventitious mixture between GMO and non-
GMO crops can arise in several situations including: 
 
(a) pollen transfer between neighbouring fields, whether over shorter or greater 
distances (depending on the species and other factors that may affect gene 
transfer); 
(b) mixing of crops during harvest and post-harvest operations; 
(c) transfer of seed or other viable plant material during harvest, transport and 
storage, and to some extent by animals; 
                                                 
119 Supra n 114, Annex 2: Residue levels in Certified Products, Water, Soil and Composts. 
120 Agrichemical Trespass Ministerial Advisory Committee, Final report to the Minister of the 
Environment Ministry for the Environment, (2002) Wellington 3. 
121 Ibid. These events are not organic specific. 
122 Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2002] 3 NZLR 308 (PC). 
123 See discussion, supra at para 2.3.2. 
124 Supra, n 68. 
125 Commission of the European Communities “Guidelines for the development of national strategies 
and best practices to ensure the co-existence of genetically modified crops with conventional and 
organic farming” Recommendation of the Commission of the European Communities [23.07.03] 
<http://europa.eu.int/ > 11. 
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(d) volunteers (seeds remaining in the soil after harvest and producing new 
plants in successive years). The source of admixture may be more important 
in some crops (e.g. in oilseed rape) than in others, depending inter alia on 
climatic conditions (e.g. in maize seeds may not survive frost); 
(e) seed impurities. 
 
The recommendation126 also noted that problems of coexistence might arise at 
different levels including: 
 
(a) GM and non-GM crops produced simultaneously or in successive years on a 
single farm; 
(b) GM and non-GM crops produced on neighbouring farms in the same year;  
(c) GM and non-GMO production types used in the same region, but on farms 
that are separated by some distance. 
 
Though the latter two categories pose a more likely threat to an organic farm, issues in 
relation to the first category may arise where land is in transition. This would be 
particularly so in relation to a threat from unharvested dormant seeds. In addition to 
the direct threat of contamination of a crop, the release of GMOs to the environment 
may give rise to the following potential hazards:127
 
(a) selective advantage conferred to a wild relative arising from the transfer of 
genes to sexually compatible plants; 
(b) pollen mediated allergenicity and toxicity; 
(c) increased survival, establishment and dissemination of GMO plants; 
(d) adverse effects on non-target organisms; 
(e) toxicity due to direct or indirect effects of the transgene.128 
 
The existence and extent of these hazards is the subject of debate, and further crop 
specific research is required. The measure of the threats will become more apparent as 
                                                 
126 Ibid. 
127 Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, U K “Guidance on Principles of Best Practice 
in the Design of Genetically Modified Plants” Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment: 
Sub-group on Best Practice in GM Crop Design [March 2001] <http://www.defra.gov.uk. > 4. 
128 Ibid, 22. Transgene is defined as: A gene introduced into an organism (usually originating from a 
different organism) using recombinant DNA technology. Recombinant technology is defined as: A 
range of biochemical techniques that enable the precise cutting and joining of DNA molecules (genes) 
at will in a test-tube and their subsequent introduction into organisms. 
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further GMO crops are introduced into the environment. By way of example, in 
western Canada problems with the existence of herbicide resistant canola volunteer 
plants have been confirmed as increasing.129  
Another area of concern for organic farmers is the use of the Bt toxin130 
engineered into crops, to reduce attacks by pests. Bt is a bacterium that occurs 
naturally in soil. Organic farmers employ it as a highly selective biological control131 
acceptable in organic systems. It is feared that the introduction and widespread use of 
Bt crops will create communities of pests resistant to the toxin.132 This would result in 
organic farmers being deprived of one of the few weapons in their arsenal to defeat 
those pests. The use of insect resistance management plans, which generally require 
the creation of refugia where non-resistant communities can continue to survive, has 
been propounded in order to overcome this problem.133 The implementation of these 
plans has not been without practical difficulties, and their effectiveness has been 
questioned.134
 
2.3.3.3 Instances of decertification. 
 
Due to the relatively recent commercial advent of organic farming, there are currently 
few New Zealand examples of loss of certification arising from the incursion of an 
external threat.135 However increasing conversion to organics is likely to trigger 
further cases of this kind, as organic and non-organic farmers deal with differences 
created at the interface. Decertification and its consequences, may be relatively novel, 
however resolution of conflict between neighbouring and spatially grouped activities 
is not. New Zealand had adopted a wide range of regulatory tools and created liability 
regimes to deal with many such instances. The common law doctrines of nuisance and 
negligence and the RMA are each employed to this end These tools are available to 
                                                 
129 Entz, M and Martens, G "Introduction to on-farm stewardship for co-existence of GM and non-GM 
crops" in Papers Presented at the 1st European Conference on the Co-existence of Genetically 
Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic Crops (13-14 November 2003) Helsingor, Denmark 
<http://www.agrsci.dk -03>.  
130 Bacillus thuringiensis. 
131 U.K Soil Association "Seeds of Doubt" <http://www.soilassociation.org> 18. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 A rare example is recorded in Anonymous "Spray drift case with a happy outcome" The NZ 
Commercial Grower September 2002 15.In this situation certified organic growers recovered damages 
in negligence for spray drift to their avocado crop, in proceedings before the Disputes Tribunal. Their 
land and crop had been decertified as a result of the incident. 
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organic farmers to resolve the issues presented by incursion, and in many instances 
the only difference in terms of recovery will be the question of the loss.136 The 
adequacy of available mechanisms to recover loss suffered by the organic farmer will 
be examined in detail in subsequent chapters. 
Internationally there are increasing instances of organic farms attempting to either 
protect themselves from the consequences of external threats created by farming,137 or 
alternatively recover for loss suffered.138 The rise of GMO technology has also given 
impetus to States to attempt to resolve the difficulties inherent in coexistence between 
GMO and non-GMO (including organic) crops.139 Courts are resolving cases relating 
to the inadvertent co-mingling of GMO product140 and cases where contamination by 
GMO has led to decertification of organic farms and product.141  
 
2.4 Threat 3 – Contamination from the exercise of a government power. 
 
2.4.1 Government powers  
 
Herbicides are used commonly by local authorities responsible for the maintenance of 
roads and verges in a district. Regional Councils also exercise powers pursuant to the 
Biosecurity Act 1993 to control pests.142 The definition of pests in the Act extends to 
include weeds, insects, mammals and other organisms.143 Regional Councils may 
prepare and execute a Pest Management Strategy.144 It is common for such a strategy 
to adopt pesticide applications as measures to control pests such as possums,145 stoats 
                                                 
136 For instance spray drift between non-organic farms will result in damage to property (crop), and 
may impact the ability to export. The same impacts would arise for an organic farm, the main 
differential being decertification, creating pure economic loss. 
137 For example see: Tomlinson v East Gippsland Shire Council [1998] VCAT 111, Gunns Ltd v 
Kingborough Council [2003] TASRMPAT 54 where the effects of plantation forestry upon organics 
farms in Victoria, and Tasmania, Australia, were examined.    
138 For example see: Hoffman v Monsanto Canada Inc., 2003 SKQB 174. 
139 For example see: Alcalde, E “Co-existence of GM maize in Spain” <http://europa.eu.int>; Christey, 
M, et al "Coexistence of genetically modified and non-genetically modified crops" Crop & Food 
Research Confidential Report No. 427, prepared for the Ministry for the Environment, 
<http://www.mfe.govt.nz >; Lee, M and Burrell, R "Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the 
"Victim"?" (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review.  
140 For example, Kramer v Aventis Cropscience USA Holding [2002] 212 F. Supp. 2d 828; 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 12791. 
141 For example, Hoffman, supra n 138. 
142 Biosecurity Act 1993, Part 5. 
143 Ibid, s 2. 
144 Ibid, s 71. 
145 Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, Caught in the Headlights: New 
Zealanders' Reflections on Possum Control Options and Genetic Engineering (2000) Wellington The 
principal poison used in New Zealand is sodium monofluoroacetate (1080) applied aerially or 
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and noxious weeds. The Department of Conservation adopts a similar approach with 
regard to the conservation estate. Pests, possums in particular, are identified as a 
serious risk to biodiversity, horticulture, forestry and agriculture. Pest control is 
accordingly viewed as a vital means of protecting the environment as well as being 
important for the economy.146
In addition to these functions, Part 7 of the Biosecurity Act 1993, provides 
Executive Government with emergency powers to carry out pest eradication, in 
situations where discharge permits would normally be required pursuant to the RMA. 
 
2.4.2 Contamination by government power  
 
No matter who executes the activity, introducing into the environment, chemicals 
designed to eradicate a species, carries with it the risk of unintended consequences. 
Government powers are as capable of creating external threats to an organic farm as a 
farmer or other citizen.147 Indeed the extent of government operations, and the 
concomitant amount of chemical used heighten the likelihood of incident. Affected 
communities throughout the country have loudly and consistently expressed concerns 
relating to contamination by 1080, particularly of water supplies. In part, these 
concerns have led to a search for alternative methods of possum control.148
Widespread aerial spraying for pests pursuant to an emergency power creates a 
strong threat to an organic farm. The exercise of emergency powers presents a 
particular problem, in that, in principle it leaves no room for manoeuvre. Whereas an 
organic farmer may be able to negotiate a solution with the district authority in 
relation to roadside spraying, it is unlikely that such an agreement would be 
forthcoming where complete eradication of a pest is intended.149 It is quite 
conceivable that the exercise of these powers could, within a very short time frame, 
effect decertification of an entire region’s organic property and crop. 
                                                                                                                                            
administered by bait stations on the ground. New Zealand uses 85-95 per cent of the 1080 produced in 
the world. Other poisons, such as cyanide, brodifacaoum and cholecalciferol, are used to a lesser 
extent. 
146 Ministry for the Environment, The State of New Zealand's Environment Ministry for the 
Environment, (1997) Wellington, Conclusions on the State of the Environment, 10.8. 
147 See for example, roadside eradication of broom gone wrong in Attorney-General v Geothermal 
Produce NZ Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 348, CA. 
148 Supra, n 145 at 2.2.3. 
149 In instances such as the 2002 Aerial spray Eradication Programme for the Painted apple moth in 
West Auckland and Waitakere City, and the 2003 Aerial Spray Eradication Programme for the Asian 
Gypsy Moth in Hamilton City. 
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A recent attempt in Hamilton, to prevent by way of injunction aerial spraying of 
the Asian gypsy moth under emergency powers failed.150 The Plaintiff, WATCH,151 
sought interim relief pursuant to the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 relying on 
causes of action based upon breaches of natural justice, legitimate expectation, and of 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990. Potter, J declined relief on the basis that the causes of 
action had not be made out; all necessary matters had been carefully weighed prior to 
the decision to spray, and the decision was not unreasonable. In reaching her decision 
the Judge took into account that to prevent the spray programme would be extremely 
detrimental to the New Zealand economy and the population at large.152
The organic sector needs to speedily devise a strategy for dealing with 
circumstances such as these. In the Hamilton example, the spraying affected 
approximately 1250 hectares of land in the western parts of the city. As such, effects 
upon organic farmers were limited. Affected organic producers were able to rapidly 
deploy temporary measures to ensure that organic product was covered, and not 
sprayed. Furthermore, comparative to some other pest eradication treatments, the 
application used (Foray 48B), represents a relatively benign form of treatment. In the 
event of a less responsive pest being discovered in a rural environment, affecting 
large-scale operations, where containment is not an option, the threat to the organic 
sector will be heightened. It is imperative that the organic sector enters into dialogue 
with responsible agencies to develop a contingency plan. In respect of introduced 
pests, particularly those that threaten horticultural crops, many organic growers will 
be in the unenviable position of needing to exclude both the pest and the treatment 
from their farms. Finding pragmatic ways of resolving these issues is a challenge for 
the sector. 
 
2.5 Threat 4 - Other activities 
 
Organic production units are scattered throughout all regions of New Zealand barring 
the Chatham Islands.153 Land use distribution for organic farms tends to resemble 
                                                 
150 WATCH v Attorney-General, unreported, HC, 29 October 2003, (CIV 2003-419-1265). Potter J. 
151 “Waikato Against Toxic and Chemical Hazards, Inc.” 
152 Ibid. 
153 Statistics New Zealand “2002 Agricultural Production Census (Final Results): June 2002,” [29 
October 2003] <http://www.stats.govt.nz > Hectares of Land certified as Organic by Region. 
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trends for non- organic production.154 Although there may be some niche areas, where 
organic production is prevalent, as in Nelson Marlborough, it appears that organic 
farming locations are more likely to be related to soil type, climate, topography and 
access to markets. As with non-organic farms this can result in an organic farm being 
confronted with a wide variety of neighbouring land use activities. Although zoning 
pursuant to the RMA is likely to apply in all districts, within such a framework there 
are many different permutations in terms of adjacent or neighbouring activities. The 
effects based nature of the RMA increases the possible permutations. Many different 
industrial and domestic activities release substances to the environment that if 
uncontrolled, could lead to decertification of an organic farm. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A wide range of external activities threatens organic farming. Potentially the most 
damaging of these are contamination by agrichemicals or GMO. Whether an organic 
farm can be shielded from these activities, and indeed whether it should be, and to 
what extent, is the subject of the next enquiry. 
 
 
                                                 
154 Ibid. This report shows the hectares of land certified as organic by Region. For example organic 
dairy farming is prevalent in the Waikato Region and arable cropping, horticulture and sheep and beef 
farming are prevalent in the Hawkes Bay region. 
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III. Protection of an organic farm 
 
3.1 To what extent can an organic farm be protected? 
 
3.1.1 Physical and scientific measures  
 
In answering this question, the spectre of the boy in the bubble is called to mind. In a 
world increasingly filled with contaminants and congestion, is it physically or 
technically possible to become or remain untainted? Organic standards restrict 
maximum residue levels (MRLs) to 10 per cent of the general level, and disallow 
GMO entirely. Before examining legal measures to enable protection of the organic 
farm, an initial enquiry is as to whether it is physically possible to protect an organic 
farm.  
 
3.1.1.1 Point source pesticide drift 
 
There is a wide range of practices available to potentially limit or eradicate the effects 
of spray beyond a property’s boundaries.155 These include:    
 
1. Minimising reliance upon pesticides via management practices such as 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) regimes. IPM techniques reduce the level 
of chemical use in agriculture and horticulture by targeted use of pesticides. 
Pest life cycles are analysed and beneficial interactions fostered.156  
2. Minimising and or eradicating drift by application technology and technique, 
including adherence to the GROWSAFE® CODE NZS 8409, and its 
successors.157 
3. Using set back or no spray areas. 
4. Use of live or inert buffer zones between properties and around water 
sources. 
5. Spray free zones. 
                                                 
155 See Agrichemical Trespass Ministerial Advisory Committee, Final report to the Minister of the 
Environment Ministry for the Environment, (2002) Wellington Appendix 9, 90, for discussion of best 
practice examples. 
156 Ministry for the Environment, Towards a pesticides risk reduction policy for New Zealand (2002) 
Wellington. 19. 
157 Standards New Zealand “Draft Standard for the Management of Agrichemicals - Draft Number: 
DZ8409” [2003] <http://shop.standards.co.nz >.  
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6. Notification of pesticide use. 
7. The use of spray plans, applied in particular to identify vulnerable areas. 
 
Similar techniques can be applied to fertilizer drift.158 That spray drift can be avoided 
is no longer the subject of much debate. Avoidance of drift is an accepted approach 
informing the Growsafe Code and several Regional Plans.159
 
3.1.1.2 Non-point source pollution 
 
Contamination by point source pollution is more receptive to the above measures than 
widespread pollution. Technically, however it is possible by employment of the above 
measures to also limit the impact of non-point source pollution.  
 
3.1.1.3 GMO 
 
GMOs present a more intractable problem, due to the high risk of widespread 
contamination. It has been argued that coexistence between organic farmers and GMO 
farmers is achievable in practice, provided organic certification systems can offer 
greater flexibility in terms of tolerance levels.160 A threshold value of 1 per cent in 
respect of adventitious presence of traces of GMO grain has been put forward as an 
attainable standard for organic farming.161  
The issue of whether or not coexistence is possible between GMO and organic 
crops was the subject of a report (“The European Report”) released by a working 
party for the European Union.162 The European Report concluded that it would be 
extremely difficult to achieve the minimal threshold of contamination required for 
organic agriculture.163 The European report also considered whether the adventitious 
presence of GMO crops in organic or conventional crops could be reduced below 
certain policy-relevant thresholds with changed farming practices.164 The thresholds 
                                                 
158 A common technique employed to limit drift by fertilizer is to apply it in slurry form. 
159 Chapters 7 & 8 will provide further discussion. 
160 Alcalde, E "Co-existence of GM maize in Spain" <http://europa.eu.int > 5.Organic Standards 
currently reflect a zero tolerance level for GMO. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Bock et al "Scenarios for co-existence of genetically modified, conventional and organic crops in 
European agriculture" A synthesis report prepared (IPTS - JRC) for the European Commission Joint 
Research Centre <http://www.jrc.cec.eu.int >(6.11.03). 
163 Ibid, vi. 
164 Ibid, 2. These policy relevant thresholds  (0.3 per cent and 1 per cent) have been integrated in 
European legislation (for the labelling of GMO food) or are being discussed in the context of future 
legislation (amendment of seed marketing directive). 
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applied were 0.3 per cent for seed production of allogamous species (rape) and 1 per 
cent for maize and potato crops (for food-feed uses). The results depended upon farm-
crop combinations, but the report found that the thresholds could be achieved, where 
supported in some instances by changed farm practices. In some circumstances a 
change to farm practices on neighbouring farms would also be required to achieve the 
policy relevant threshold. 
Farmers’ apparent ability in some scenarios to attain the lower policy related 
thresholds (1 per cent and 0.3 per cent) discussed above could present problems for 
organic farmers. Administrators and decision makers will be pressured to create a 
system whereby all options are preserved. It may be considered that the threshold of 1 
per cent, in the words of Lord Justice Simon Brown represents a perfectly reasonably 
point at which to strike the balance between the competing interests at play.165 Due to 
the difficulties of attaining a 0.1 per cent threshold (which mimics zero tolerance),166 
a pragmatic decision maker may be inclined to support the lower thresholds of 0.3 per 
cent or 1 per cent. That would leave organic farmers with the unhappy choice of either 
accepting the higher threshold or looking for other ways by which to retain integrity. 
Achievement of any of the thresholds discussed is plainly no easy matter. The 
influx of GMO technology and the advent of cross-contamination have given impetus 
to a flurry of research in relation to crop and location specific coexistence issues to 
identify wider impacts.167 These enquiries have acquired greater urgency as situations 
unfold revealing dire consequences for non-GM farmers as a result. 
The experiences of the prairie farmers in Western Canada are sobering.168 
Western Canada is comprised of vast tracts of arable land, supporting approximately 
                                                 
165 See the comments of Lord Justice Simon Brown, in R v Secretary of State for the Environment and 
MAF, ex parte Watson [1999] Env LR 310, in reference to an actual 2 km separation distance between 
crops, where a crop pollination risk had been assessed for a 200m crop separation distance at no greater 
than 1 GMO kernel in every 40,000. 
166 Supra, n 162 at 2. 
167 See generally: Lutman, P "Co-existence of conventional, organic and GM crops – role of temporal 
and spatial behaviour of seeds" in Papers Presented at the 1st European Conference on the Co-
existence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic Crops (13-14 November 
2003) Helsingor, Denmark, <http://www.agrsci.dk/GMCC-03/>; Oehen, B and Nowack-Heimgartner, 
K "GMO residues in organic farming products" in Papers Presented at the 1st European Conference 
on the Co-existence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic Crops (14-15 
November 2003) Helsingor, Denmark <http://www.agrsci.dk > ; Van Acker, R  et al "GM/non-GM 
wheat co-existence in Canada: Roundup Ready® wheat as a case study" in Papers Presented at the 1st 
European Conference on the Co-existence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and 
Organic Crops GMCC-03 (13th to 14th November 2003) Helsingor, Denmark <http://www.agrsci.dk>  
168 Entz, M and Martens G, "On-farm stewardship – the case of western Canada" in Papers Presented 
at the 1st European Conference on the Co-existence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional 
and Organic Crops (13-14 November 2003) Helsingor, Denmark, http://www.agrsci.dk>.   
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120,000 farms, with 1,060 certified organic farmers in the region. GMO canola was 
introduced to the area and adoption of the technology was widespread. However the 
adoption was not controlled by a coexistence plan and resulted in extensive 
contamination of non-GM farms. As a result organic farmers have virtually stopped 
growing canola.169 Litigation for damage suffered has proliferated, a class action has 
been filed on behalf of organic growers against Monsanto and Aventis to gain 
compensation for losing canola as a crop, due to genetic contamination, and to stop 
genetically engineered wheat.170 Other non-GM growers have also had their crops 
contaminated, with implications for market access and income loss.171 Significant 
levels of contamination of the pedigreed seed production system for canola have also 
been confirmed,172 which is of concern as the use of the pedigreed seed production 
system has been put forward as a method to procure coexistence. In addition 
biotechnology companies are suing farmers for infringement of patent rights arising 
from the contamination.173 As a result, serious questions are been raised about the 
possibility or otherwise of coexistence. A recent report to the Western Australian 
Government concluded:174
 
The committee is firmly of the view that if GMO canola is commercially released in 
WA, GMO and non-GM areas would need to be established to ensure the continued 
supply of non-GM canola from WA. 
 
In summary, the emerging research tends to suggest that the success of a coexistence 
programme will turn to a degree on the characteristics of the crops grown. Some crops 
will lend themselves more readily to coexistence than others.175 In the search to 
develop systems whereby opportunities are preserved and the benefits of all 
technologies reaped, a number of measures to secure coexistence have been advanced. 
These include:  
 
1. temporal separation,176 including suitable crop rotation systems 
                                                 
169 Ibid.  
170 Organic Agriculture Protection Fund "Latest News" <http://www.saskorganic.com/oapf>  
171 U.K Soil Association "Seeds of Doubt" <http://www.soilassociation.org> 5. 
172 Supra n 168 at 180. 
173 Supra n 171. 
174 Parliament of Western Australia "Report No.8 Gene Technology Bill 2001 and Gene Technology 
Amendment Bill 2001" [11 July 2003] <http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au >. 
175 See generally: Lutman, supra n 167. 
176 Ibid. 
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2. spatial separation 
i) GE Free zones177 
ii) isolation distances between GMO and non-GM fields of the same 
species and, if appropriate, of the same genera178 
iii) buffer zones, as an alternative or complement to isolation distances 
(including the possibility of farmland retirement and set-aside)179 
iv) pollen traps or barriers (e.g. hedgerows) 
3. on farm practices to limit contamination by seed and pollen180 
4. harvest and post-harvest field treatment to minimize seed loss and 
contamination.181 
5. dedicated supply chain from field to point of sale 182 
6. the use of technology to:183 
i) Avoid or minimize the inclusion of superfluous transgenes or 
sequences 
ii) Avoid or minimize superfluous expression of the transgene 
iii) Avoid or minimize the dispersal of transgenes in the environment184 
7. alternative forms of economic organisation such as a regional farmer’s 
organization, control by certification, and complex systems of traceability.185 
 
The effectiveness and practicality of several of these techniques is still emerging.186 
Having identified physical measures to protect organic farms, the next issue relates to 
                                                 
177 Hoppichler, J "GMO-free areas, nature conservation and organic farming- results of a survey of 
experts’ opinion" in Papers Presented at the 1st European Conference on the Co-existence of 
Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic Crops (13-14 November) Helsingor, 
Denmark, <http://www.agrsci.dk>. 
178 Commission of the European Communities supra n 125 at 3.2.1. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid, 3.2.2. 
182 Valceschini, E "GMO and GMO free products in Europe: problems of organization in the 
agricultural sector" in Papers Presented at the 1st European Conference on the Co-existence of 
Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic Crops GMCC-03 (13th to 14th November 
2003) Helsingor, Denmark, <http://www.agrsci.dk> 45. 
183 Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, U K "Guidance on Principles of Best Practice 
in the Design of Genetically Modified Plants" Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment: 
Sub-group on Best Practice in GM Crop Design [March 2001] <http://www.defra.gov.uk > 1. 
184 Ibid, 11.The report reviews emerging technology that may be applied in designing GMO crops to 
simplify the assessment of risks to the environment and to reduce the scope for unidentified hazards as 
well as identified hazards. The technology reviewed includes the use of marker genes, gene excision 
systems, techniques to control flowering and fertility in plants, seed sterility and plastid transformation. 
185 Valceschini, supra n 182 at 11. 
186 Defra, supra n 183 at 15. 
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whether in principle an organic farm should be protected. A related issue is who 
should be responsible for the cost of protection. 
 
3.1.1.4 Cost of protection 
 
We have established that there is a range of options available to reduce or avoid 
contaminant discharge affecting an organic farm. In relation to GMO the European 
report on coexistence notes that significant costs are attached to adopting such 
practices, monitoring them and insuring against the risk of contamination. The 
economic burdens will vary according to crop and farming scenario.187 Costs also 
attach to avoiding spray drift, but to a lesser extent. 
The European report did not reach a clear position, but noted that price premiums 
obtained for organic produce may help to offset the costs of protection. This 
inferentially places the burden of risk reduction on the shoulders of the organic 
farmer. Alighting on a price premium to solve an equity issue is troubling. Merely 
because organic product may currently fetch a price premium does not necessarily 
rationalize the burden of the cost falling upon the organic farmer. The premium exists 
because of market demand evidencing consumer preference and/or supply issues. One 
of the key reasons why consumers purchase organic goods is because they are 
perceived to be a healthier alternative, and one that represents a choice benefiting the 
environment. To penalize a sector intent on producing environmental gains appears to 
fly in the face of reason. It also overlooks the fact that the price premium may have 
already been allocated to offset the more labour intensive production methods 
employed by the organic sector. Furthermore, price premiums are notoriously 
fickle,188 and thus an unreliable basis upon which to found an equitable system of cost 
allocation. 
The aspect of who should be responsible for costs, in relation to GMO 
introduction, is the subject of a recent European Commission recommendation on 
                                                 
187 Bock, supra n 162 at 6. 
188 For instance in the Waikato region for the 2003/4 season organic blueberries are currently fetching a 
lower price than those grown non-organically, pers.comment Dan Peach, Chairman Blueberries New 
Zealand, January 2004.  
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guidelines for coexistence.189 The recommendation, rather than relying on price 
premium factors, adopts a first in time, first in right position:190
 
As a general principle, during the phase of introduction of a new production type in 
a region, operators (farmers) who introduce the new production type should bear the 
responsibility of implementing the farm management measures necessary to limit 
gene flow. 
 
Farmers should be able to choose the production type they prefer, without imposing 
the necessity to change already established production patterns in the 
neighbourhood. 
 
Farmers who plan to introduce GMO crops for cultivation on their farms should 
inform the neighbouring farmers about their intention. 
 
Provided a compatible policy threshold level was applied, this approach would be of 
benefit to established organic farmers in the short term. It does not however provide 
beneficial outcomes, in a future where GMO technology expands and establishes 
more rapidly than organic methods. Once the technology loses the “new” aspect, then 
others become responsible for limiting the gene flow. In terms of pesticides a first in 
time approach tends to support entrenched non-organic farmers and reinforce the 
status quo.191 The approach would result in the current prevalent use of pesticides in 
New Zealand overwhelming the burgeoning, and more benign organic sector. The 
approach has some parallels with the protection of existing use rights192 under the 
RMA, but lacks any of the overriding protections for the environment.193 For the 
organic farmer the better approach is to require the internalisation of effects that result 
in decertification, and to require the polluter to bear the cost of protection.  
 
                                                 
189 Commission of the European Communities, supra n 125 at 9. 
190 A similar argument is advanced in the Western Australian GMO context, see supra n 174, and also 
in relation to pesticides Agrichemical Trespass Ministerial Advisory Committee, Final report to the 
Minister of the Environment Ministry for the Environment, (2002) Wellington 93. 
191 Although it is arguable that non-chemical farmers were in fact first in time, it is likely that the 
approach would be employed in respect of existing practices. 
192 Sections 10,10A and 20. 
193 Such as those provided for by s 17 of the RMA. 
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3.2  Should an organic farm be protected? 
 
Is it reasonable for organic farmers to choose to farm free from the contaminants of 
another activity in the vicinity? To what extent should another be restrained from 
carrying out a legitimate and customary activity in order to protect the interests of the 
organic farmer? Are organic farmers simply hypersensitive ideologues out of touch 
with reality? 
In any situation where internalisation of adverse effects is sought, producers of 
those effects will feel threatened by demands for reduction. This is particularly so in 
situations where internalisation will be difficult and/or costly. The demands could 
indicate the need for change in accustomed farming practices and production 
methods. Some consider that organic farmers, by their refusal to accept GMO 
contamination, want to impose their system upon every one else.194 They consider this 
unfair. The irony in that is that in refuting the position of the organic farmer, they 
impose their own system on the organic farmer. In failing to internalise the adverse 
effects of their own production systems, they condemn organic farmers to a state of 
no choice. 
Herein lies the essence of the conflict. It becomes a question of freedom of choice 
and the shackling of that choice. The resolution of this conflict has several potential 
permutations: 
 
Outcome 1 - Non-organic farmer internalises effects that would result in 
decertification of an organic farm. The cost of internalisation falls on producer of 
effects. 
Outcome 2 - Non-organic farmer fails to internalise effects. The cost of 
neutralizing effects falls on organic farmer. 
Outcome 3 - Non-organic farmer fails to internalise effects. The cost of 
neutralizing effects is shared between producer and recipient 
 
Outcome 1 is the position most favourable to the organic farmer. It involves a non-
organic farmer being obliged to internalise effects that could potentially cause 
decertification of an organic farm, and being responsible for the costs resulting from 
protection measures. We will explore matters of principle, and the legal framework to 
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ascertain the extent to which Outcome 1 can be supported in principle, and applied in 
the New Zealand context. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
194 The Life Sciences Network “Organic growers try to impose their system on all” [4 November 2003] 
<http: www.lifesciencesnetwork.com >. 
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IV. Principles and Theoretical Justifications 
 
4.1 Principles and Theoretical Justifications as they relate to Outcome 1  
(Non-organic farmer internalises adverse effects that could cause decertification. The 
cost of internalisation falls on producer of effects.) 
As conflict between organic and non-organic farmers can be resolved in 3 
different ways, it assists to consider matters of principle to illuminate justification for 
a chosen outcome. In respect of human interrelationship with the environment, a 
number of principles or theoretical justifications have evolved that can aid in defining 
the parameters of the relationship.195 The principles offer a range of perspectives and 
justifications potentially available to guide resource use and resolve resource conflict. 
These principles will be examined to identify support or otherwise for the proposition 
(1) that organic farmers are entitled to be free of contaminants produced by others, 
where that contamination would result in decertification and (2) that the cost of 
internalising the adverse effects should fall on the polluter.  
 
4.1.1 Ethical duties to the Environment 
 
The idea that we as humans should look beyond our self-centred view of the world to 
consider the wider environment is gaining ground as a leading principle. This shift in 
perspective results from a developing awareness of the nature and extent of human 
impact on the environment. It enables acceptance of pure existence value, as opposed 
to human-based value. Aldo Leopold has been credited with first developing a land 
use ethic based on an ecological premise,196 although no doubt many traditional 
communities could lay claim to practising it. Leopold based the ethic on the assertion 
that the integrity of the ecosystem as a whole requires protection.197 He viewed human 
beings as part of this relationship, with duties to the environment as a result. 
Alexander Gillespie charts with clarity the growth of new, non-anthropocentric 
ideals within international law.198 He identifies a change in the ethical basis of 
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environmental law and policy making which change includes the development of a 
land ethic.199 He refers200 to the 1986 Declaration of Fontainebleau that states: 
 
If humanity is to find a way forward, it must base its advance on a code of values 
that is less aggressive and more caring for the earth. A code that reflects a deep 
sensitivity to the ecological interdependence of our planet, and a respect for life in 
all its forms. 
 
The land ethic reflects these sentiments, and has been refined by a number of writers 
over recent years.201 Additional principles have been expounded in recognition of the 
need to resolve competing moral claims, in the application of the ethic.202 While 
several of these principles address the conflict between humans and other species, the 
application to conflicts between human activities is less clear. In general however, the 
principles support a regime directed towards reducing human impact on the 
environment. The principle of minimum wrong expounded by Taylor203 is apposite. 
This principle recognises the need for people to:204
 
…choose alternatives which do the least damage to the natural world and harm or 
destroy the fewest number of organisms. 
 
This is in contrast to the principle of self-defence that:205
 
Individuals can protect themselves against dangerous and harmful organisms by 
destroying them. 
 
This latter principle provides some support for the use of pesticides against dangerous 
and harmful organisms, however its application needs to be balanced against the 
principle of minimum wrong. Using Taylor’s framework there is also a need to 
differentiate between basic and non-basic human needs; and the extent of the threat to 
human survival from the other species would require assessment.  
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4.1.2 Application of the ethical duty to the environment and organics 
 
Organic production systems that focus on whole system health, and minimising 
impacts on the environment, are closely aligned to the land ethic, including the 
principle of minimum wrong. Interacting in a constructive and life-enhancing way 
with natural systems and cycles is central to the definition of organic production.206 
So too is the enhancement and encouragement of biological cycles, and the 
maintenance of genetic diversity of the production system and its surroundings, 
including the protection of plant and wildlife habitats.207
Being in step with the land use ethic constitutes a good reason to develop systems 
that preserve the integrity of the organic farm. As recognition of the need to choose 
alternatives which cause the least damage to the natural world grows, it should follow 
that policy support for aligned systems will also. There is some evidence that this is 
beginning to happen. The Danish model in relation to chemicals is a good example. 
Denmark has recognised the threats to the environment from chemicals and since 
1986, has instituted a series of initiatives to reduce the threats.208 Danish policies and 
legislation encompass the health of humanity and the environment, and are formed 
from a holistic standpoint.209 Recognising that increasing organic farming is 
compatible with achieving environmental benefits, part of the Government’s strategy 
targets an increase in the acreage under organic production.210 To support this goal the 
Government also initiated activities designed to intensify organic production and 
introduced subsidies for development activities within organic production.211 In 
tandem, the Government has introduced measures to reduce the pesticide treatment 
frequency index, protect sensitive areas by reduced usage and buffer zones, and to 
revise the pesticide approval system. Those measures support and strengthen the 
organic sector and limit the extent of threat from external contamination.  
The use of buffer zones to improve environmental health (in particular the health 
of water ways) is a method that potentially produces side benefits for organic farming. 
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It is also a tool that could be specifically used to protect organic farms. The use of set 
asides has similar implications. Since 1993 it has been possible under the European 
Union’s agricultural policy to obtain hectare aid for production of certain crops on 
condition that the farmers’ seeking aid set aside from production certain acreage.212 In 
addition under the agri-environment measures scheme, buffer zones, where no 
pesticides or fertilizers may be applied, can be created in sensitive farming areas. 
Danish legislation has used these instruments to reduce the impact of chemicals along 
specific watercourses and lakes over 100m².213 Initially these measures have been 
voluntary and incentives have been used to induce farmers to implement change. The 
measures are not universal, and factors such as minimum size requirements and 
sensitivity may dictate entry to the schemes.214 Evaluation of progress of the Action 
Plan is underway, and if targets have not been achieved additional compulsory 
measures may be introduced.215
By these steps the Danish Government has partially assumed the burden of 
protecting the wider environment from the impact of chemicals. Organic farming is 
recognised as conducive to the goal of protection and is supported. Avoiding adverse 
effects on organic farms is consistent with securing the goal of protection, and 
represents a way in which the ethical duty to the environment can be partially 
fulfilled. 
 
4.2 Anthropocentrism and the self-interest justification216
 
Placing humans at the centre of the world, but recognising that a healthy environment 
is vital to human survival and happiness, may in principle lend some support for 
protecting an organic farm from contaminants. This would only be so if it were 
recognised that organic farming systems are central to human wellbeing. Recognition 
of the alignment of organics with the land ethic may assist, however measuring 
contribution to wellbeing may provoke a contest with non-organic farming. It will be 
argued that although contribution to wellbeing is important, it may not represent a 
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sufficiently finely tuned mechanism for resolving the complex conflict arising at the 
boundary of the organic farm. 
 
4.3 Utilitarianism 
 
A utilitarian view of the world promotes decision-making on the grounds of utility. 
Conflicts are resolved on the basis of which option produces the greatest benefits. 
Generally the benefits are assessed from a human welfare point of view, although 
there has been much debate about how to measure these benefits.217 The market 
model is commonly used to assess the benefits:218
 
Land is viewed by the utilitarian as essentially a means to an end, to be used to 
satisfy human preferences (often narrowly defined). The appropriate uses of land in 
this framework are those that generate the highest return for society, as determined 
by the pricing signals of a free market economy. The primary value of land is the 
economic value it holds – dollar values can be attached to land in much the same 
way that they can be given to toasters, automobiles or pieces of furniture. 
 
A simplistic application of a utilitarian approach to the conflict between the non-
organic farmer and the organic farmer, could see the rights of the non-organic 
preferred due to the large economic returns currently produced society from non-
organic farming. This approach however may fail to produce an efficient result due to 
failure to calculate and account for all costs. The creation of an efficient functioning 
market requires the operation of well-defined property rights.219 Tietenberg describes 
an efficient structure as having three main characteristics: 220
  
Exclusivity – all benefits and costs accrued as a result of owning and using the 
resources should accrue to the owner, and only to the owner, either directly or 
indirectly by sale to others. 
 
Transferability – all property rights should be transferable from one owner to 
another in voluntary exchange. 
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Enforceability – property rights should secure from involuntary seizure or 
encroachment form others. 
 
It is upon the characteristic of exclusivity that the efficiency of a market often 
founders. This is due to the need of an owner to shoulder both the benefits and costs 
of resource use. Failure to take account of the full costs creates an externality.221 Air, 
water and light pollution are classic examples of externalities.222 The presence within 
the boundary of an organic farm of contaminants from a non-organic farm falls within 
this category in that the non-organic farmer benefits from the use of the organic 
farmer’s land without having to pay for it. This effects an immediate redistribution of 
wealth in favour of the non-organic farmer.223
Policies in line with the principle of exclusivity are more likely to correct market 
failure and create a climate that supports the organic farmer. The wider environment 
frequently suffers damage in the same way. The environment has traditionally been 
viewed as providing a free service,224 without adequate recognition of the benefit 
donated, or the cost created. The failure of activities to account for the damage to the 
wider environment, has led to some of the more severe environmental problems we 
now encounter. Global warming, acid rain and biodiversity loss are clear examples of 
human failure to account for damage to the wider environment. 
For a market to operate efficiently and avoid externalities such as biodiversity 
loss, and air pollution total costs of production need to calculated and accounted for. 
This includes not only cost to individuals but also damage to the wider environment. 
If the value of the damage can be accurately assessed then theoretically it can also be 
compensated. Debate arises first as to whether the environment is invaluable, and 
secondly as to whether producers could afford to compensate the environment for 
damage caused.225 Recent studies have attempted to put a cost on externalities caused 
by modern agriculture. A study by Pretty et al,226 investigated the costs in the United 
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Kingdom, the United States and Germany. The following cost categories were 
assessed: 
 
1. Damage to natural capital: water (for instance pesticides in sources of 
drinking water, and nitrate phosphate and soil in drinking water) 
2. Damage to natural capital (emissions of methane, ammonia, nitrous 
oxide and carbon dioxide) 
3. Damage to natural capital: biodiversity and landscape 
4. Damage to human health: pesticides 
5. Damage to human health: nitrates 
6. Damage to human health: micro-organisms/disease agents (bacterial and 
viral outbreaks in food, BSE and new variant CJD, overuse of 
antibiotics) 
 
From this research it was calculated that the external costs of modern agriculture in 
1986 amounted to ₤49-71/ha ($81-117) of arable and grassland in Germany and the 
USA, but rising to ₤208/ha ($343/ha) in the UK.227 Although the researchers noted 
that there were many gaps where costs are to still to be calculated,228 they concluded 
that the costs represent substantial burdens upon non-agricultural sectors of 
economies. It also seems clear that the cost burden falls upon sections of the 
agricultural sectors that are not reliant upon the artificial substances that in many 
instances represent a prime source of the cost imposed. It is accepted that organic 
agriculture can have attributed to it some of the damage referred to above, for instance 
methane emissions from organic dairy farms and externalities arising from 
cultivation. However many organic practices such as those associated with retention 
of biodiversity229 and soil health are expressly targeted at limiting such damage.230
Although there is debate about the extent of the benefits provided by organic 
farming methods, it is clear that benefits do exist.231 In 1997 a comprehensive review 
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of organic farming in New Zealand concluded that organic agriculture could reduce 
the level of negative externalities from agriculture.232 Where regulatory systems 
permit polluters to discharge pollution with few restrictions, organic farming will 
provide a clear public benefit. The value of that benefit will reduce as regulatory 
restrictions increase.233 Organic farming may also provide benefits in terms of food 
safety, soil erosion, structure and fertility, biodiversity and animal welfare.234
In the United Kingdom, a multi- disciplinary research programme, (the Organic 
Farming study), involving teams from six scientific establishments, looked at the 
consequences of converting to organic farming methods. The major findings of the 
report established inter alia:235
 
Pollution of air and water is reduced: estimates of whole farm nutrient losses are 
less under organic than conventional production. 
 
Significantly more butterflies are found on organic farms. Reasons may include 
greater plant diversity, rotational cropping, hedgerow management, and an absence 
of pesticides. Spiders that are also important predators of crop pests, are also more 
abundant. 
 
The study also concluded that the organic farm, upon conversion was more 
economically sustainable than non-organic farming. It found:236  
 
Once fully converted, gross margins on Duchy Home Farm were up to 15 per cent 
higher than for a similar conventional farm, assuming present day support policies. 
This improvement would be increased to around 30 per cent if these subsidies, 
currently favouring conventional farmers were, removed. 
 
When calculating the cost of agriculture, it is important to factor in the value of 
positive externalities of farming. Benefits created from agriculture include:237 
landscape and aesthetic value, water supply, nutrient fixation, soil, biodiversity, flood 
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control and carbon sequestration. The Organic Farming study estimated the social 
value of organic farming to be in the range of ₤75-₤125 per hectare per year. On the 
basis of this calculation, combined with the fact of a greater burden arising from 
conventional agriculture, the authors of the study concluded that there was a strong 
case for the subsidisation of organic agriculture.238 A policy of subsidy was 
recommended on the basis of recognising the benefits provided by organic farming. 
The report concluded: 
 
If Britain is to pay its way towards sustainable agriculture in the 21st century a 
change in policy and in economic support towards organic agriculture is 
unavoidable. 
 
 A utilitarian approach to land use conflict is one that makes choices based on the 
highest return to society. Pricing signals of the free market economy are used to 
govern the choice. Where a market operates inefficiently and externalities arise sound 
choices cannot necessarily be made on that basis, as important losses remain 
uncalculated. Where the law anticipates making choices by balancing economic, 
cultural and social benefits with costs it is important that the full extent of the costs is 
properly calculated in that conclusion. By virtue of the operation of s 5 of the RMA, 
decision makers are required to consider a wide range of factors in promoting the 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources. It has been argued that this 
calculation, rather than requiring a balancing of competing factors requires a 
weighting exercise to be carried out, so that the various elements of sustainable 
management can be weighed in the context of a particular case.239 Nevertheless, 
whether weighing or balancing, where the economic benefits provided by non-organic 
farming are espoused in a conflict with organic farming, to clearly understand the 
extent of the benefit, uncalculated costs should also be measured. The uncalculated 
benefits provided by organic farming should also be considered.  
Government subsidy has been raised as one method of supporting and capturing 
those benefits. An alternative or complementary approach to the provision of 
economic support is the use of rules or incentives that align with the principle of 
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exclusivity and require polluters to take responsibility for damage caused. Where this 
method is applied to require internalisation of effects in relation to resource use 
conflict between the organic and non-organic farmer, it obviates the any further need 
to choose one type of farming over the other, as on this basis both can coexist. 
 
4.4 The Polluter Pays Principle 
 
The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) is gaining wide recognition and expression.240 In 
1972 the OECD Council adopted the Recommendation on guiding Principles 
concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies.241 In so doing 
the first formulation of the PPP was created at international level.242 The 
Recommendation provides that: 
 
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control 
measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to avoid 
distortions in international trade and investment is the so called “Polluter Pays 
Principle”. This principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of 
carrying out the above –mentioned measures decided by public authorities to ensure 
that the environment is in an acceptable state. In other words, the cost of these 
measures should be reflected in the cost of goods and services that cause pollution 
in production and/or consumption. Such measures should not be accompanied by 
subsidies that would create significant distortions in international trade and 
investment. 
  
The PPP as first enunciated focused on the need for non-subsidisation to ensure that 
government’s were not carrying the cost of pollution. It was defined in order to 
support an economic climate where pollution costs were calculated into the price of 
goods sold. The principle did not necessarily mean that polluters were required to 
actually pay anything. In time the principle has evolved significantly.243 The OECD 
Joint Working Party noted in its report: 
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The PPP has become a principle whereby polluters bear an increasing share of the 
costs of the pollution they cause, or risk causing. [Recommendation of the Council 
concerning the Application of the Polluter Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution 
(89) 88(Final), OECD, 1989(attached)] The scope of pollution-related costs to be 
borne by the polluter varies across instruments. Particularly at the domestic level, 
this scope has increased over time: at first, it involved only the costs of pollution 
control; later, it came to include compensation payments, taxes and charges, and is 
now evolving in certain instruments towards encompassing all pollution related 
expenditure. 
 
Evolution of PPP has created two distinct forms of expression. A strict sense and a 
broad sense have been identified.244 The former accords with the 1972 OECD 
Recommendation and requires that polluters should be responsible for the costs of 
pollution prevention and control measures as determined by the public authorities. 
The broad sense extends further to cover other costs including charges, taxes, clean-
up costs and compensation.245 The PPP can be applied at national level either through 
a regulatory framework, or alternatively through the use of economic instruments. 
Application of the PPP creates a focus upon the internalisation of effects, in order to 
avoid the consequences of those adverse effects on those who did not create them. As 
expressed in the Rio Declaration:246
 
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the 
approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due 
regard to the public interest and without distorting public interest. 
 
Application of the PPP internationally varies widely. Concern exists in relation to the 
competitive trade burden it places upon OECD member nations whose application of 
the PPP is strict and rigorous. The OECD Recommendations do provide for some 
limited exemptions with regard to subsidies and other forms of assistance.247 
Reduction of reliance on subsidies in agriculture is expressed as a primary aim of the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture.248 Application of the PPP in relation to agriculture 
                                                 
244 Ibid, 12. 
245 Ibid, 14. 
246 Principle 16, Rio Declaration, UN.Doc A/Conf 151/5.1992,7 May. 
247 Supra n 240, 14-16 
248 Ibid, 21. 
 49
supports this aim. A recent OECD Joint Working Party on Agriculture and the 
Environment restated the principle: 249
 
The Polluter-pays-principle states that the polluter should be held responsible for 
environmental damage caused and bear the expenses of carrying out pollution 
prevention measures or paying for damaging the state of the environment where the 
consumptive or productive activities causing the damage are not covered by 
property rights. This is the principle used for allocating costs of pollution prevention 
and control measures aiming to ensure a rational use of scarce environmental 
resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and investment. 
 
As will be seen in a subsequent chapter the concept of PPP informs the RMA, but it is 
the extent of the application of the principle that becomes the critical issue. 
Application of the PPP supports an argument that a non-organic farmer should 
internalise adverse effects and bear the cost of carrying out pollution control 
measures. The extent to which the principle is applied becomes a policy issue. If a 
policy climate does not support the principle, then the burden of the pollution and the 
associated risk falls upon society in general. This has been termed socialisation of the 
risk.250 If policy does support the principle, the question arises whether a polluter 
should be required to internalise all adverse effects, or simply achieve a given 
standard. If a non-organic farmer can internalise effects to a level satisfactory to 
general society, can organic farmers seek a higher standard? This could be termed the 
difference between avoidance and mitigation of the effects, and is of vital importance 
to the organic farmer in terms of achieving a standard that protects organic 
certification. Avoidance may achieve that standard, whereas mitigation may not. A 
policy decision favouring internalisation only to a partial level requires the organic 
farmer to shoulder the balance of the cost of protection. 
Further justification for the polluter paying, and the extent to which 
internalisation should be achieved will be examined in paragraph 4.5. A vital 
consideration to bear in mind is the consequence of one sector being required to 
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shoulder the burden of another’s pollution. The risk of creating the failure of an entire 
sector should not be underestimated. 
  
4.5 Property Rights 
 
Property rights are often invoked by those seeking to avoid what they consider to be 
over regulation by government. In New Zealand Owen McShane is one of the 
protagonists for that view, which is supported by many farmers who object to the use 
of private property for public gain, particularly in relation to protection of the 
landscape and indigenous vegetation. In justification of the minimalist approach 
reliance is placed upon the works of Locke and Blackstone. Locke argued for the 
limiting of political power in the public sphere, and sought to maximize individual 
freedom of choice. On the other hand Blackstone, used religious justifications for 
asserting a right to private property that entitled the holder to exclude the rights of 
other individuals.251
Barton in a careful examination of the arguments relating to property rights, 
places them in the context of time and place. Moving through a wide spectrum of 
political theory and history, he concludes that environmental regulation is justifiable 
on a range of grounds.252 Effective environmental regulation may in many instances 
benefit the organic farmer by reducing or eliminating pollution. Yet ironically, 
arguments based on property rights may offer an even more fundamental form of 
protection.  
The threat of decertification for the organic farmer arises because someone else 
uses property in a way that causes harm to the organic property. Underlying property 
rights offer some justification for restraining that harm. In The Right to Private 
Property, Waldron examines the nature of private property.253 Referring to the work 
done by Honoré,254 Waldron details the standard incidents of ownership as including: 
 
1. a right to possession of X; 
2. a right to use X; 
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3. a right to manage X (that is to determine the basis on which X is used by 
others if it is so used); 
4. a right to income that can be derived from permitting others to use X; 
5. a right of capital value of X; 
6. a right to security against the expropriation of X; 
7. a power to transmit X by sale, or gift or bequest to another; 
8. the lack of any term on the possession of these rights etc.; 
9. a duty to refrain from using X in a way that harms others; 
10. a liability that certain judgments against him may be executed on X; and  
11. some sort of expectation that, when rights that other people have in X 
come to term or lapse for any reason, those rights will, as it were, 
“return” naturally to him. 
 
There is some argument as to whether the prohibition on harm in 9) above fits 
comfortably within the standard incidents of ownership, or should be more properly 
recognised as a constraint on action.255 That aside, recognition of an obligation to 
refrain from using a thing in a way that harms others may necessitate constraints 
being imposed upon other incidents of ownership. The obligation to avoid harm to 
others is a common regulatory justification. Ancient water law restrained upstream 
users from polluting that destined for downstream. Various common law doctrines 
evolved to support the principle that property owners in the use of their property 
should refrain from causing harm, damage or nuisance to others.256 Utilitarian theory 
adopted the principle on the basis that its application, although restricting private 
benefits, it would create greater net social benefits. It was contended that the 
prevention of harm to others was the only purpose for which power could be 
rightfully exercised over members of a civilized community, against their will.257 A 
requirement to use property so as to avoid harm to others (including the environment) 
is an evident rationale in modern environmental law.258
Using property in a way that harms another may also interfere with that other’s 
right of possession and result in a right to derive income. In this way arguments from 
property rights offer dual justification and protection for the organic farmer. Property 
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rights can constrain a polluter from causing harm to others. Property rights can also 
endow an owner with the right to manage and exclude others from that resource.259
The United States Supreme Court on numerous occasions has found that the right 
to exclude others is one of the most important sticks in the bundle of rights that 
comprise property.260 It has been contended that this right extends to the right to 
prevent someone from physically intruding on property by chemical means. 
Accordingly where pesticides are sprayed on the land of non-consenting owners the 
spraying creates the conveyance of an easement over the land sprayed.261 The taking 
of an uncompensated easement constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause of the United Sates Constitution.262 Acknowledging that law from the 
United States offers no direct parallels to New Zealand law, it is important to 
remember the basic attributes of a property right. Of late in New Zealand, regulations 
aimed at providing environmental protection have been pilloried on the basis of 
invasion of property rights. As Professor Gardner reminds us this is a two way street, 
and property rights may also operate as effective weapons to those who seek 
protection of the environment.263
The exact parameters of a property right are often unclear, and are ultimately 
defined by the action of a regulatory framework or the common law. Whether harm 
exists, or the right to exclude has been infringed, will often become a matter for a 
court to decide.264 Decisions determining the nature and extent of a property right will 
be affected by the theoretical foundation upon which the decision rests. Statutory 
decisions may be guided by a defined statutory purpose, whereas decisions at 
common law may respond to other rationales. An economic approach to decision 
making has been promoted as a means of determining resource use conflict. However 
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the economic theory of internalisation of effects achieving an economically efficient 
result was thrown into doubt by the work done by Ronald Coase.265 Relying on the 
Coase theorem, a property right could be allocated to either party and an efficient 
allocation could result.266 Arguably, if the organic farmer had neither property right 
nor right accruing from a liability regime, he or she could compensate the non-organic 
farmer for measures employed to contain pollution. Alternatively if the rights accrued 
to the organic farmer, he or she could expect compensation from the polluter. Where 
the transaction costs are too high for a Coasean bargain to be struck the Learned Hand 
theory propounded by Judge Hand in U.S v Carroll Towing267 would see liability 
imposed for those situations where the expected loss exceeded the cost of taking care 
to avoid the loss. However, the question arises as to whether we should be making 
decisions for economic reasons alone.  
What such an approach tends to overlook is the issue of equity.268 Allocative 
efficiency may occur, but not equitable distribution. Justice-based theories of liability 
move beyond economic allocation to consider relative fairness and loss distribution. A 
libertarian argument could support internalisation of costs of activities due to fairness 
rather than economic efficiency.269 However it has been argued by Perry270 that the 
libertarian approach is susceptible to the Coase theorem in the same way that the 
economic approach is; tort losses are caused by the interaction of activities. Perry 
argues that instead, avoidability should become the touchstone for responsibility for 
outcomes. In this way foreseeability of harm and the ability to avoid that harm 
contribute to outcome responsibility, and requirement for compensation will follow 
where a risk was not only foreseeable but should have been avoided. Perry concludes 
that the need to avoid foreseeable risks will arise when they are associated with 
actions that are either negligent or intended to cause harm. Where damage to an 
organic farm was foreseeable, and avoidable this approach would support recovery for 
loss suffered. 
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Identifying what degree of harm is to be avoided and making decisions about 
acceptability of a risk is complex. The argument can be fine, particularly in the area of 
aesthetics.271 In terms of harm to an organic farm, property damage caused by toxic 
spray drift would likely fit comfortably within the concept of harm. However, other 
actions such as superphosphate fertilizer drift, or pesticide drift at levels acceptable to 
general tolerance standards, but not to organic standards may be less clear. 
Superphosphate drift may not be the average farmer’s idea of a hazard, yet the 
consequences of the drift could potentially lead to decertification of the organic 
farm.272
Judging harm from the narrow objective standpoint of the reasonable person or 
the reasonable community background level alone,273 presents problems for a 
vulnerable activity. The vulnerable activity will inevitably require a standard higher 
than the general, and in this way may never claim the right to have the risk avoided. 
This approach is insufficiently flexible to deal with the complex realities of the 
modern world. It fails to recognise other legitimate reasons for the need to avoid 
harm, such as the value of the vulnerable activity to that reasonable community, the 
corresponding need to recognise the primacy of a vulnerable activity’s right to 
exclude others from its land and associated airspace, and in this instance the freedom 
to choose how to farm. It also overlooks the lack of reciprocity as between the 
polluter and the organic farmer, particularly in a situation where a non-organic farmer 
could reasonably readily avoid the potentially disastrous effect of decertification of 
the organic farm. A better approach is one that enables consideration of all conflicting 
considerations, economic and justice-based. For the organic farmer an approach 
recognising the primacy of the property right to exclude, combined with the 
theoretical justification of outcome responsibility could support internalisation of 
effects causing decertification. Relying upon the concept of avoidability, an exception 
could arise where there is an inability to control effects, and there are overriding 
economic and justice-based policy reasons for not requiring internalisation. Due to the 
significant reduction of the organic farmer’s right to use and manage land owned, 
such exception would only be justifiable in rare circumstances. 
                                                 
271 Beatley, supra n 196 at 57. 
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In relation to harm caused, or rights reduced, it is open to a non-organic farmer to 
argue that he or she too is harmed by the presence of the organic farm, in that he or 
she is restricted from carrying out a legitimate operation.274 This type of claim has in 
the United States been used to justify the passage of “nuisance laws”275 in all fifty 
States.276 Generally however the laws have been applied to restrict nuisance-type 
claims being generated from urban activities, where the interface between rural and 
urban activities creates conflict. The policy behind the laws is intent to protect from 
urban newcomers a sector responsible for feeding the nation. The concept of first in 
time and first in right is evident. This policy does not lend itself so readily to 
application to the organic farming sector. First, it is also the intention of this sector to 
feed the nation, and where possible with as limited an impact on the environment as 
possible. Secondly, it would be difficult to displace organics with a first in time 
argument, as organic methods of cultivation date back to ancient times.277 It is also 
important to contemplate the extent of the reduction of a right. Internalisation of 
effects merely constrains a contaminating practice, to prevent emanation beyond the 
boundary. It does not extinguish the right to farm using chemicals or new organisms; 
merely it avoids the off-site impacts of those practices. By contrast emanation of those 
substances beyond the boundary extinguishes the ability of a neighbouring farm to 
employ organic methods. 
Should a property owner be obliged to accept contaminant discharge from a 
neighbour so as to remove the ability to farm organically? The only type of policy that 
would validate this position is one that confines organic agriculture to the margins. It 
would fail to capitalize on the benefits presented by organic farming, and would see 
New Zealand lag behind other international leaders. Such a policy may also have 
implications for environmental justice, in that it may cause price increases and place 
organic products beyond the reach of lower socio-economic groups. Adequate 
recognition of the right to exclude and the duty to refrain from harm would instead be 
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represented by policy that requires the internalisation of adverse effects that cause 
decertification, thereby supporting a future for both forms of agriculture.278
 
4.6 Land Use Rights 
 
It contrast to the obligation to refrain from causing harm, it has been argued that there 
exists a right to be free from environmental harm.279 Although not expressly stated it 
would appear that this principle is inferentially accepted by current legislation. The 
long title of the Smoke-Free Environments Act 1990 records that the intention of the 
Act is: 
  
To reduce the exposure of people who do not themselves smoke to any detrimental 
effect on their health caused by smoking by others; and… 
 
The focus is on keeping people free from detrimental health effects caused by other 
smokers. In order to implement this intention, s 5 of the Act requires employers to 
create written policy on smoking that enable common areas to be designated smoke 
free. The Act contains further prohibitions and restrictions on smoking in public 
places.280 The Smoke-Free Environments (Enhanced Protection) Act 2003 has further 
extended the restrictions. 
It is notable that the Act does not require any quantification of smoke (e.g. the 
impact of 1 cigarette or 10) and accepts the received scientific wisdom that smoking is 
harmful to health. Accordingly people are entitled to be free from the smoke of 
another. Upon the introduction of the Act, there was considerable public concern 
regarding the curtailment of the personal freedom to choose to smoke. However the 
right of those affected to be free from the harm caused by passive smoking overrode 
that concern. People remain entitled to smoke in private, and thus their freedom is not 
entirely impacted.  
The extent of harm arising from contaminant discharge may be at issue in any 
given circumstance, however it is worth considering the relative position of the parties 
in relation to the right to be free from harm. Requiring non-organic farmers to 
internalise adverse effects causing decertification enables organic farmers to farm free 
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of unwanted artificial contaminants. The corresponding right of the non-organic 
farmer to use the contaminants is only reduced to the extent of ensuring that the 
contaminant remains within land owned. In contrast to the potential loss of the right to 
farm organically, the boundary restriction on the non-organic farmer would appear to 
be a minor curtailment of the rights of the non-organic farmer. The critical question to 
ask is why should people be forced to smoke, (or be contaminated by pollutants) 
when they choose not to be? 
  
4.7 The Rights of Future Generations 
 
Although it has been a rather leisurely awakening, humans are recognising the impact 
that our decisions have on the wider environment, and the need to preserve natural 
resources. The nature of our destruction was recognised in 1877 by George Perkins 
Marsh:281
 
Purely untutored humanity, it is true interferes comparatively little with the 
arrangements of nature, and the destructive agency of man becomes more and more 
energetic and unsparing as he advances in civilization, until the impoverishment 
with which his exhaustion of the natural resources of the soil is threatening him at 
last awakens him to the necessity of preserving what is left, if not of restoring what 
has been wantonly wasted. 
 
Exhaustion or destruction of resources presents problems not only for current 
generations but also for those who have yet to come. The existence of an obligation to 
provide for future generations is well supported internationally and domestically. 
Alexander Gillespie charts the trend of concern for future generations in the 
international environmental context:282
  
Since the Second World War, States have been expressing concern in international 
documents for the welfare of future generations. A growing number of international 
agreement, declarations, charters and the United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions recognise this justification for many forms of human action. 
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He notes that the concept is not new and its historical origins go back much further.283 
The idea of providing for future generations is inextricably bound to the concept of 
sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources. By way of example, the 
traditional Maori concept of kaitiakitanga284 supports practices that conserve and 
sustain resources.  
The ability of current generations to meet their own needs without compromising 
the needs of future generations has been termed sustainable development.285 In 
worldwide environment and policy discourses, it is a principle that influences many of 
the decisions made in respect of natural and physical resources. 286  
As a principle, it is not however without problems in terms of interpretation and 
application. As described by Diane Hunt in The parable of the well287 the principle 
leaves undefined a number of important questions. For instance: to which generation/s 
do we owe the obligation? Does the obligation extend to finite as well as renewable 
resources? How much should we allocate, and should we prefer current generations to 
future? Should we discount benefits to future generations on the basis that the total 
benefits to infinite future generations will always exceed any cost to a single current 
generation?288
These are all difficult questions and will fall to the policy makers of the day to 
decide. However it is fair to say that the enormous rate of biodiversity decrease 
worldwide and the extent of global pollution are strong indicators to suggest that we 
have taken this obligation rather lightly.  
In relation to the organic farmer, the principle offers a degree of indirect support. 
This is because organic farming, due to the provision of environmental benefits, 
presents itself as a vehicle for providing gains to current and future generations.289 In 
contrast to this position it has been argued that low-technology agriculture will not 
produce sufficient crop yields to feed the world’s burgeoning population, and that 
                                                 
283 Ibid, 111. Gillespie notes that the concept appears within Islamic doctrine and within the Judaeo-
Christian tradition. 
284 Section 2 RMA defines kaitiakitanga as meaning: the exercise of guardianship; and in relation to a 
resource, includes the ethic of stewardship based on the nature of the resource itself. 
285 World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future (1987).  
286 Skelton, supra n 239 at 157. 
287 Hunt, "Responsibility to future people" in Howell (ed) Environment and Ethics-a New Zealand 
contribution (1986) 164. 
288 For discussion see Farber, D and Hemmersbaugh, P “The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, 
Later Generations, and the Environment (1993)” in Percival, R and Alevizatos, D (eds) Law and the 
Environment (1997) 60. 
 59
pesticide and technology intensive agriculture should therefore should preferred.290 
On this basis it could be argued that in preferring organic agriculture the needs of 
future generations are being compromised.291 It would be fair to say that neither 
position is unassailable. However in the contest between organic farming and non-
organic farming rather than requiring a choice to be made to prefer one form of 
agriculture over another we should look for ways which enables organic farming to 
survive and flourish in coexistence with other systems. 
 
4.8 Risk Assessment and the Precautionary Principle 
 
Risk assessment is used by administrators and decision makers to manage the 
environment by weighing the risks of a particular activity. A 3-phase process is used 
to measure the risk:292
 
1. Hazard identification (does a substance cause cancer or other adverse effects) 
2. Dose-response assessment (how potent a carcinogen is it?) 
3. Exposure assessment (how many humans are exposed to the substance, for how 
long and at what levels). 
 
Having measured the risk, a reduction assessment determines the magnitude of 
resources required to produce a given reduction of the risk.293 The process expands 
upon the more narrow cost/benefit approach to include much broader consideration of 
relevant social values.294 Rather than making an isolated monetary quantification of 
the costs and benefits of regulating the risk, it is prioritized by comparing it to other 
risks.295 In many areas the New Zealand Government adopts a managed risk approach 
that means using the most cost-effective ways of reducing risk rather than trying to 
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eliminate all risk.296 This approach will be in sympathy with organic practices insofar 
as it restricts adverse effects to mere background levels consistent with the 
requirement of the relevant standard. However, consistently achieving that level via a 
risk management approach is unlikely, because organic systems in general require a 
more restrictive standard in terms of residual contaminants, than do general standards. 
The risk is managed by organic systems to a higher threshold. Many organic farmers 
will have adopted an organic regime on the basis that non-organic farming systems 
offer unacceptably high risks to the environment (including impacts upon human 
health). 
Whether or not risk assessment is the best process for achieving sound social 
decisions is a matter of debate.297 The Royal Commission Report noted the 
submission of the Life Sciences Network which while supporting the effectiveness of 
scientific risk assessment, also suggested: 298
 
At its most scientific, risk assessment and management is the process by which 
people, activities, communities, organisations, countries make informed judgments 
about proposed activities and actions weighing relative risks and benefits. Having 
made the assessment it is then possible to ensure a positive balance of benefits over 
risks is maintained. 
 
However the assessment of risk is only partially scientific and factual. Many risks 
are unable to be characterized in an objective sense and must be determined and 
weighed using subjective criteria. 
 
Our ability to assess risk imperfect, as it is contingent upon possession of adequate 
scientific knowledge. We are capable of committing errors of titanic proportions 
where that knowledge is imperfect.299 The Precautionary Principle resulted from an 
understanding of these shortcomings. Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development defined the principle:300
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Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation. 
 
The Principle has been expressed in many different forms, and its role in New 
Zealand law has been subject of debate.301 However in all its differing forms there can 
be adduced a common intention of avoiding risk where there is scientific uncertainty 
relating to the existence or magnitude of a given risk to the environment.302 The 
principle is particularly relevant in relation to the impact of the introduction of 
contaminants and new organisms into the environment. Applying a precautious 
approach where there is doubt would in many situations legitimize the use of 
restrictions. The Royal Commission on Genetic Modification in its Report 303 was not 
convinced that a single principle [the Precautionary Principle] could be applied 
across the board to the use of genetic modification in New Zealand. It considered:304
 
Decisions on the use of technology must rest on a number of factors; including the 
risks and acceptability to the public of the proposed use. They are factors that 
should inform the process of managing the risk 
 
While it is evident from the Report that the Commission is seeking to avoid a carte 
blanche application of a sometimes-amorphous principle, there must be room for the 
application of the Principle when approaching the factors of risk and acceptability.  
For the organic farmer the importance of risk assessment and any application of 
the Precautionary Principle is how those factors work out in terms of restricting 
contaminant discharge. Where an organic standard demands a threshold higher than 
one arrived at on a regulatory risk assessment basis, people will manage the risk to the 
lesser standard. The issue becomes, should a person or a group of people be entitled, 
or able to manage resources to a higher, more conservative standard? Currently 
HSNO says yes in relation to hazardous substances, but is silent in respect of GMO. 
This critical issue we will explore further in relation to the statutory framework. A 
final and important matter to explore in terms of the relationship of basic principles to 
Outcome 1 is the Maori world view. 
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4.9 Maori world view 
 
The Maori world view integrates well with an organic farming perspective. 
Knowledge of Maoritanga tends to originate from oral tradition.305 That tradition 
speaks of creation processes that in turn anchor the Maori perspective on the 
environment: 306
 
Within the structures of whakapapa, all the elements of the natural world are 
originally descended from Ranginui and Papatuanuku, the sky and the earth. All 
living things-trees and plants, fish, birds, insects, people-are connected back to the 
atua through whakapapa and are thus linked in the bonds of obligations and kinship. 
This interdependence has, from the beginnings of the living world, been the proper 
order established by the gods as the basis of coherence and correct functioning of te 
putaiao, the natural environment. 
 
It cannot be argued that by virtue of this world view all Maori actions in relation to 
the environment are sustainable. Nevertheless there are aspects of the world view and 
tikanga that sit comfortably alongside the organic ethic and sustainability. Throughout 
the world organic farmers are rejecting GMO technology as an option for production. 
In New Zealand some Maori have adopted a similar position:307
 
Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu [IP41] expressed its abhorrence to genetic modification 
and said it believed the benefits and control of this technology would accrue to 
“national and multinational companies, universities and researchers”. It stated that 
this loss of control would mitigate against its ability and desire “to act as kaitiaki for 
Te Runanga’s taonga”. 
 
The Report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment on the options 
for possum control,308 describes the conflict between the traditional Maori perspective 
and the introduction of genetic engineering and biocontrols. The report considered the 
impact of GMO on the concepts of mauri, kaitiakitanga, mana, rangatiratanga and 
tapu. Diminution of the mauri (essential life force) of a resource such as air, soil or 
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water is the consequence of pollution or corruption of a resource. In turn, loss of 
mauri threatens the survival of the resource that in Maori terms would be a taonga 
(highly prized or special thing). It would also disturb or disrupt the natural order of 
the world, as established by the legend of creation.  
This disturbance of mauri through contamination or mixing with the mauri of 
another resource was highlighted by Angeline Ngahina Greensill (Tainui), a witness 
to the Royal Commission on GMO called by Nga Wahine Tiaki o te Ao:309
 
Everything possesses a mauri or life force and is to be respected. Because 
everything is inter-related and interconnected, any mutilation, modification or 
unnatural desecration of any parts affects the whole. 
 
The introduction of GMO technology, or any form of contaminant has implications 
for health and well being of the entire system. The extent of contamination 
acceptable is also relevant. On this point many Maori share the same view as 
organic farmers, and consider the standard should set at zero.310  
 
In some instances, such as contamination of water, there is potential for cleansing and 
reinvigoration, by passage through the ground.311 The same cannot be said for plants 
with altered gene codes that would no doubt reemerge from the soil with the alteration 
intact. In addition GMO technology also presents difficulties in terms of tapu. The 
concept of tapu goes beyond sacred and   implies a prohibition which if violated 
would have calamitous consequences; quite possibly death…even though nothing is 
visible, a person who violates [tapu] knows the awful and inescapable consequences 
will certainly follow.312 It is a concept and practice that serves as a reminder that we 
must respect the natural environment.313
The creation of transgenic animals and plants raises concerns relating to the tapu 
against cannibalism.314 Inserting a portion of the human gene into a consumable, risks 
violating the tapu. For Maori concern also arises as to consequences which may result 
from human arrogance in altering the natural order of the world.315 Difficulties 
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relating to the violation of the incest tapu were also raised in submissions to the Royal 
Commission.316 These issues are raised bearing in mind the existence of the 
“pragmatic view” of Maori tikanga that affirms the position that Maori traditional 
values are dynamic and evolving, and Maori are well capable of grasping new 
technology and managing them in accordance with tikanga.317 The impact of this 
pragmatic view on GMO technology is as yet undetermined. 
Modification or contamination of taonga has the potential to impact upon the 
Treaty of Waitangi relationship. By the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 the Crown 
confirmed and guaranteed to Maori their existing rights to land and natural resources, 
including rights in respect of intangible taonga.318 It is arguable that allowing 
widespread contamination by GMOs, or any other contaminant, would place the 
Government in a position of having failed to actively protect the Maori resources, 
special places and other taonga.319 In addition impact of contaminants upon 
indigenous flora and fauna could potentially deprive Maori of rangatiratanga 
chieftainship over such taonga.320
Rangatiratanga and the associated tradition of kaitiakitanga provide motivation 
for Maori to seek to guard and sustain taonga in the New Zealand environment. 
Understanding the threats to resources and implementing practices to avoid or limit 
those threats is central to the concept of kaitiakitanga. 
Guardianship of taonga and a strong relationship the natural environment are 
natural forerunners for the adoption of organic farming techniques. The Royal 
Commission report noted that some Maori preferred organic methods.321 The 
establishment of Te Waka Kai Ora the independent Maori organic certification 
initiative evidences a trend towards adoption by Maori of organic farming. Formed in 
2001,322 Te Waka aims to carry out the functions of a National Maori Organic 
Authority. It intends to provide support for organic growing clusters, and to develop 
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an indigenous brand for product grown under traditional Maori organic practice. 
Organic farming practices have been identified as being beneficial to Maori:323
 
The organic sector is providing hope to many Maori in rural areas as a means of 
providing livelihoods and ways of life that are grounded in tikanga Maori (Maori 
custom) and enabling Maori to achieve tino rangatiratanga (self-determined 
development)… 
Maori have retained ownership of their land, much of which remains free of 
agrichemicals and is well positioned for organic development… 
Organics provides an opportunity to maintain and enhance the vibrancy and health 
of Maori communities as well as other communities in general… 
Maori are able to trust organics as it is ethically based, whereas many past injustices 
were based on unethical practices of industries, governments and bureaucracies 
 
It would seem that the Maori world view is in step with organic farming and is 
represented by the move by Maori into (or back to) organic farming. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The principles explored offer justification for Outcome 1 for different reasons and to 
varying degrees. As a farming system, which can complement protection and 
enhancement of the environment, organic farming is in step with ethical duties to the 
environment and to future generations. Requiring the producer of contaminant 
discharge to bear the cost of pollution is consistent with the Polluter Pays approach, 
and represents an opportunity to achieve the efficient operation of the free market. A 
utilitarian approach based on economic benefits alone, may not be supportive of 
Outcome 1, due to the need to recognise that at the present time greater economic 
benefits are flowing from non-organic farming. Yet such an approach is unduly 
simplistic and fails to incorporate recognition of other justifications. It would work 
against change, even where that change would introduce benefits for the environment. 
Adopting justifications that enable a more rounded approach to the problem, are more 
likely to secure Outcome 1. Arguments from property rights support internalisation of 
effects where the right to exclude is interfered with and/or the duty to refrain from 
using property so as to cause harm, is breached. It is the extent of the constraints 
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related to the incidents of ownership that becomes the critical consideration. A risk-
based approach may not enable the organic farmer to achieve a higher standard of risk 
management than the general public. In a similar manner, nor would the application 
of an objective standard to the concept of harm. Arguments from property rights may 
constitute sufficient good reason to allow an organic farmer to manage a risk to a 
higher standard. Where the fundamental right to exclude, is weighed with notions of 
foreseeability of harm and avoidability it is arguable that sound reason exists for 
requiring internalisation of effects. This conclusion is bolstered by the other 
theoretical justifications. It also represents a method by which the Maori world view 
can find practical expression. The extent to which the law of New Zealand can reflect 
these principles and achieve Outcome 1 will be considered in following chapters.  
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V. The New Zealand Framework – Common Law 
 
The objective of this and following chapters is to analyse the New Zealand legal 
framework to assess whether the law in New Zealand protects organic farms, and the 
extent to which it enables Outcome 1 to be achieved. 
For the purposes of this thesis the main focus will be upon the extent of measures 
available to contain or limit External threat 1 - Contamination from a non-organic 
farming point source, for example, spray and fertilizer drift to land, air or water 
(chemical drift), or release of genetically modified organisms (GMO contamination).  
  
5.1 Common Law 
 
The common law is examined first, as traditionally this has been the mechanism used 
by property owners to restrain others from causing harm to property and to recover for 
loss suffered. The value of the remedies in terms of securing the requirements of 
organic Standards will be assessed. One of the enquiries will be, whether traditional 
remedies that experienced infancy in the Industrial Revolution,324 are capable of 
providing meaningful solutions in the face of the changed world of the twenty first 
century.  
The common law takes effect in different ways. It employs the equitable remedy 
of injunction to stop or prevent harm occurring and makes provision for damages to 
compensate for loss suffered. The existence of remedies at common law may also act 
as a deterrent to unlawful actions. The threat of a suit can result in changes in property 
use, whereby a neighbouring owner takes care to order activities to prevent damage to 
another. In this way liability may operate as a pricing mechanism resulting in the 
internalisation of adverse effects. 
The use of common law remedies in response to threats from contamination by 
agrichemicals and genetically modified organisms has been the subject of several 
recent publications.325 These works provide a basis for enquiry and exploration of 
remedies particular to the organic farm. However, despite widespread searches, 
                                                 
324 Brenner, J "Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution (1974)" in Percival, R, and Alevizatos, D 
(eds) Law and the Environment (1997).  
325 See for instance: Chen Palmer Report supra, n 250; Agrichemical Trespass Ministerial Advisory 
Committee, Final report to the Minister of the Environment Ministry for the Environment, (2002) 
Wellington, Law Commission, Liability for Loss Resulting from the Development, Supply or Use of 
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judicial consideration of the issues as they relate specifically to organic farms is 
sparse. In New Zealand the authorities do not pertain expressly to organic farms,326 
whilst in the United States, the leading case was decided over 25 years ago.327 The 
Australian decisions tend to consider organic farms as the issues arise in the planning 
context, and any decisions located by searching United Kingdom databases tended to 
discuss issues peripherally.328 Whilst it is clear that the GM issue is creating litigation, 
these cases are currently undecided. If the law is as yet untested, it is unlikely to be so 
for long. 
 
5.1.1 Nature of the loss 
 
Loss caused to an organic farm by all external threats can be categorised as follows: 
 
1. Property damage, such as damage to plants or pesticide residues due to 
chemical drift, or GMO contamination of land, crop, processed foods and 
other products.329 
2. Economic loss consequent upon decertification due to contamination. 
3. General environmental damage, for instance loss of biodiversity.330 
 
Recovery for such loss sounds potentially in negligence, nuisance and the doctrine of 
Rylands v Fletcher. A review of these remedies indicates that some forms of loss will 
be more readily recoverable by the organic farmer than others and exposes the 
vulnerable position currently occupied by the organic farm. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Genetically Modified Organisms Study Paper 14, Law Commission, (May 2002) Wellington, New 
Zealand.  
326 For instance the Privy Council decision Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2002] 3 NZLR 308 
(PC).  
327 Langan v Valicopters, Inc 567 P.2d 222 (Wash 1977), Koll H v Cardinia SC [2001] VCAT 2118, 
Giles v Break O'Day Council [2001] TASRMPAT 117, Tomlinson v East Gippsland Shire Council 
[1998] VCAT 111  
328 R v Secretary of State for the Environment and MAF, ex parte Watson [1999] Env LR 310. 
329 Law Commission, Liability for Loss Resulting from the Development, Supply or Use of Genetically 
Modified Organisms Study Paper 14, Law Commission, (May 2002) Wellington, New Zealand.  
330 Ibid. Personal injury and spiritual harm are also documented, but beyond the scope of this enquiry. 
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5.2 Liability for damage caused by Chemical drift 
 
5.2.1 Negligence 
 
The organic farmer stands in the same shoes as any farmer in respect of recovery for 
property damage caused by chemical drift. Negligence has been the main ground for 
recovery in such a situation, although there is also potential for claims based on strict 
liability and nuisance.331 To establish negligence a plaintiff must show:332
 
1. The defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care (that is, the risk of the 
damage was foreseeable);  
2. The defendant has breached that duty; 
3. The breach of the duty caused the loss to the plaintiff; and  
4. The loss suffered was not too remote. 
 
Recovery for damage caused to property by chemical drift has been viewed as 
difficult because of the need to establish causation. Commonly drift that occurs is 
invisible, and unless the event is witnessed and documented there may be insufficient 
proof of cause and effect. However improved scientific testing procedures have been 
developed and are more freely available. Where proof of causation is available, New 
Zealand courts have not found any difficulty in establishing a duty of care in terms of 
application of toxic sprays and have recognised the risks attached to such practices.333
 
5.2.1.1 The nature of the damage 
 
A particular problem exists however for the organic farmer. Not all chemical drift will 
necessarily create physical damage so as to render the produce unable to be consumed 
or sold. Maximum pesticide residues levels (MRL)334 exist for food safety reasons 
and apply to all produce. If pesticide drift occurs on a non-organic farm, yet does not 
exceed this MRL (“the general standard”) then arguably the owner of the property has 
not suffered damage. The position is not the same for an organic farm. Generally the 
acceptable level for an organic farm will be set at 10 per cent of the MRL.335 The 
                                                 
331 Attorney-General v Geothermal Produce NZ Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 348, CA. 
332 Law Commission, supra n 329 at 10. 
333 Attorney-General v Geothermal Produce NZ Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 348, CA. 
334 BIO-GRO Standards, supra n 114. 
335 Ibid. 
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question arises as to whether or not the property is physically damaged by the 
presence of a contaminant at levels lower than those tolerated by general society. 
From an organic farmer’s point of view the property is damaged at any level in 
excess of the 10 per cent threshold, as the property is rendered unsuitable for organic 
certification. The first enquiry in this situation is whether physical damage to the 
property has occurred. The common law establishes that when property is physically 
changed then it is damaged, however classification is not always straightforward.336 
Where a defendant sprayed with insecticide, crops which were then consumed by 
cattle so as to create inert chemical residues in the fat of the cattle, the Court found 
that the plaintiff had suffered economic loss resulting from the damage to the cattle. 
Due to the presence of the chemical (which did not harm the cattle) any costs from 
postponement of sale, reduction of price or other associated expenses suffered by the 
plaintiff could be recovered.337 Although it is currently unclear how a court will view 
similar loss suffered by an organic farmer it is possible that where an organic farmer 
suffers damage to a crop which causes prohibited residues in excess of the relevant 
organic standard, but less than the general standard, that any claim should be for pure 
economic loss, as opposed to physical damage. This is arguable and will depend on 
the extent of the damage, and the view taken by the court of the damage. However 
proceeding on the basis that decertification may constitute economic loss, recovery 
for that loss will now be considered.  
 
5.2.1.2 Economic loss 
 
Decertification of an organic farm consequent upon a breach of Standards may create 
financial loss due to loss of sales, forward contracts and premium. Rejection of 
general export crops due to excess chemical residues creates similar losses. Recovery 
may be sought in addition to loss caused by physical damage, or in substitution for it 
if physical damage is not proved. Damages for loss of profits may also be sought. 
Due to policy considerations, relating generally to constraining indeterminate 
claims,338 the courts have been cautious of imposing a duty of care where a person 
suffers pure economic loss that is not the result of injury to person or tangible 
                                                 
336 Todd, S (ed.) The Law of Torts in New Zealand, (2001) 170. 
337 Ibid, 170 discussing McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 1. 
338 Ibid, 258-259. Other policy reasons include economic interests being viewed as less worthy of 
protection, and market efficiency arguments supporting insurance of the risk, rather than liability. 
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property.339 The law relating to recovery for economic loss is new, and different 
approaches have been advanced for dealing with situations where there is no legal 
precedent.340 In New Zealand there is currently no formulaic approach, beyond 
general principle, and financial loss is recoverable as a matter of ordinary principle 
where policy considerations point to that conclusion.341 Recovery is potentially 
available for both consequential and relational loss. 
The High Court of Australia considered the impact of decertification342 in Perre v 
Apand Pty Ltd.343 The respondent was a major operator in the potato crisping industry 
in South Australia and provided potato seed to a number of growers throughout 
Australia. The seed produced a crop suffering from the disease known as bacterial 
wilt. Affected growers included the Sparnons. The appellants were all potato growers 
who conducted their business in close proximity to the affected Sparnon property, as a 
consequence of which their crops were denied certification due to the risk of 
infection. Absence of certification resulted in inability to access the Western 
Australian market. None of the appellants’ properties suffered physical harm as a 
result of the presence of the affected crop. They did however suffer significant 
financial loss due to the loss of market.344
The High Court of Australia allowed the appellants claims to succeed. In doing 
so, they returned to general principle to support the claim. As stated by McHugh J:345
 
Para 100 – In determining whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the 
plaintiff, the ultimate issue is always whether the defendant in pursuing a course of 
conduct that caused injury to the plaintiff, or failing to pursue a course of conduct 
which would have prevented injury to the plaintiff, should have had the interest or 
interests of the plaintiff in contemplation before he or she pursued or failed to 
pursue that course of conduct.346 That issue applies whether the damage suffered is 
injury to person or tangible property or pure economic loss.347
 
                                                 
339 Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] 164 ALR 606 (HCA) para 70. McHugh J. 
340 Ibid, para 25. Gaudron J. 
341  Todd supra n 336 at 252. 
342 The decertification arose in the context of biosecurity regulations aimed at controlling bacterial wilt, 
as opposed to decertification for organic production. Decertification of the potatoes prevented entry in 
to the Western Australia. 
343 Perre, supra n 3339. 
344 Ibid, para 235. Kirby J. 
345 Ibid, para 100. 
346 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at 580 per Lord Atkin. 
347 See Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad” (1976) 136 CLR 529. 
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In connection with the existence of a duty of care the Justices considered proximity 
and vulnerability. The fact that the appellants were near neighbours (either adjoining 
or in the locale) was relevant and affected the duty of care. Additionally the 
respondent’s knowledge of the neighbouring potato growers’ vulnerability to the 
disease, and inability to control it was relevant.348 The Justices also considered that 
indeterminacy was not a reason for refusing relief, as those affected were 
ascertainable. As summarised by Gleeson CJ: 
 
Para 14 – Furthermore, the combination of circumstances involving the use and 
ownership or enjoyment of land, the physical propinquity of such land to the 
Sparnons' land, the known vulnerability of people in the position of the appellants, 
and the control exercised by the respondent over the relevant activity on the 
Sparnons' land, is unlikely to apply to an extent sufficient to warrant an 
apprehension of indeterminate liability. 
Para 38 – Where a person is in a position to control the exercise or enjoyment by 
another of a legal right, that position of control and, by corollary, the other's 
dependence on the person with control are, in my view, special factors or, which is 
the same thing, give rise to a special relationship of "proximity" or "neighbourhood" 
such that the law will impose liability upon the person with control if his or her 
negligent act or omission results in the loss or impairment of that right and is, 
thereby, productive of economic loss. 
Para 42 – In my view, where a person knows or ought to know that his or her acts or 
omissions may cause the loss or impairment of legal rights possessed, enjoyed or 
exercised by another, whether as an individual or as a member of a class, and that 
that latter person is in no position to protect his or her own interests, there is a 
relationship such that the law should impose a duty of care on the former to take 
reasonable steps to avoid a foreseeable risk of economic loss resulting from the loss 
or impairment of those rights. 
 
In his decision, Kirby J traced the development of the law relating to financial loss 
and proposed a 3 stage test for deciding whether a duty of care existed in negligence 
as follows:349
                                                 
348 In examining the issue of inability to control, a Court may also consider whether a plaintiff should 
be required to take reasonable steps by way of self –protection see Ports of Auckland Ltd v Auckland 
City Council [1999] 1 NZLR 601, 159.What is reasonable in any given circumstance becomes a mixed 
question of science and law. 
349 Perre, supra n 339 at para 259. 
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As an approach or methodology for deciding whether a legal duty of care in 
negligence exists, I suggested that the decision-maker must ask three questions: 
1. Was it reasonably foreseeable to the alleged wrongdoer that particular 
conduct or an omission on its part would be likely to cause harm to 
persons who have suffered damage or a person in the same position? 
2. Does there exist between the alleged wrongdoer and such person a 
relationship characterised by the law as one of "proximity" or 
"neighbourhood"? 
3. If so, is it fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of a 
given scope upon the alleged wrongdoer for the benefit of such a person? 
 
The third limb of the test brings issues of policy to the enquiry.350 Kirby J weighed 2 
policy reasons that in the past have emerged to justify a rule excluding a legal duty of 
care to a plaintiff who has suffered no physical damage to its person or property, but 
only pure economic loss.351 The first related to indeterminacy and was eliminated on 
the grounds of ability to ascertain. The second reason was whether to hold the 
respondent to a legal duty of care would be to unreasonably interfere with its 
economic freedom, its autonomy and the competitive operation of the market place.352 
In considering this issue Kirby J took into account the fact that the introduction of 
infected seed to south Australia was illegal, and as such refused to find a good policy 
reason for excluding the duty. It was undecided as to whether absent such statutory 
prohibitions, illegality otherwise affecting what Apand did in relation to the Perre 
interests would have been sufficient in any case to put a limit on Apand's economic 
freedom.353 The interface with statute and regulations made thereunder, and the 
defendant’s conduct in relation to them, therefore becomes relevant. 
 In New Zealand it is well established that statute law will abrogate common law 
rights where there is inconsistency.354 Following a similar line, where the law of 
negligence develops, courts tend to seek consistency with statutes and other legal 
principles.355 It could be argued that where statute law does not restrict a defendant’s 
                                                 
350 A similar approach has been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Cooper v Hobart [2001] 3 
S.C.R. 537, 206 D.L.R. (4th) 193. For discussion see Brown, R, " Still Crazy after All These Years: 
Anns, Cooper v Hobart and Pure Economic Loss" (2003) 36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 159. 
351 Perre, supra n 339 at para 297. 
352 Ibid, at para 300. 
353 Ibid, para 301 per Kirby J. 
354 Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622, 632. 
355 Ports of Auckland, supra n 348. 
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freedom, then the common law should be slow to impose any limitation. Yet this 
tends to overlook the plaintiff’s freedom to operate within the market, and also any 
particular exposure or vulnerability a plaintiff may have in relation to its relationship 
with the defendant. It is accepted that in our free enterprise society competition in the 
market place will only be restricted on a limited basis.356 However, in essence this line 
of policy relates to choice, and the freedom of an individual to exercise that choice 
without unnecessary limitations. As stated per Mc Hugh J:357
  
One of the central tenets of the common law is that a person is legally responsible 
for his or her choices. It is a corollary of that responsibility that a person is entitled 
to make those choices for him or her self without unjustifiable interference from 
others. In other words, the common law regards individuals as autonomous beings 
entitled to make, but responsible for, their own choices… 
…In any organised society, however, individuals cannot have complete autonomy, 
for the good government of a society is impossible unless the sovereign power in 
that society has power in various circumstances to coerce the citizen. Nevertheless, 
the common law has generally sought to interfere with the autonomy of individuals 
only to the extent necessary for the maintenance of society.   
   
McHugh J refers to unjustifiable interference. When placing this notion in the context 
of a land use conflict, it takes on a similar aspect to a claim in nuisance for 
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. Where the interference 
constitutes an intrusion onto another’s land, consideration of fundamental property 
rights may assist in defining further evolution of policy in this context. The right to 
exclude, and/or gain compensation for use is apposite. Should it be the defendant’s 
freedom to operate in the market or the plaintiff’s right to choose how land owned is 
managed which is paramount? This will be discussed further in para 5.2.1.4.1. In 
considering these issues a final relevant factor is the steps taken by the plaintiff to 
protect itself from harm As noted by McHugh J,358 where it was reasonably open to 
the plaintiff to take steps to protect itself, then this may remove reason for imposing a 
duty of care. The protective steps contemplated are generally in the form of 
contractual warranties, but do not normally include a requirement to obtain insurance 
                                                 
356 The RMA reflects this notion by the operation of s 104 (3)(a), which expressly excludes 
consideration of trade competition in resource consent decisions. 
357 Perre, supra n 339 at para 114. 
358 Ibid, para 118. 
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to cover the loss.359 A plaintiff’s vulnerability is more likely to arise where it is unable 
to protect itself by contract.360
 
5.2.1.3 Application to organic farms 
 
Perre v Apand Pty Ltd is useful to organic farmers to the extent that it allows for 
recovery for economic loss consequent upon decertification. In terms of application to 
New Zealand law, decisions of the High Court of Australia are regarded as highly 
persuasive. The factual circumstances of the case are slightly different in that none of 
the appellants suffered any form of physical damage. It was simply their presence in 
the locale that led to decertification. For decertification to occur on an organic farm, 
in relation to chemical contamination, there will be some residual presence or damage 
from a chemical. Nevertheless, in either circumstance decertification is the 
consequence.  
The issue of damage requires further consideration. Traditionally tort has 
provided a remedy where a defendant gains by expropriating a resource that a plaintiff 
has an exclusive right to use.361 A question to consider is to what extent does the 
damage represent an interference with a property right exclusive to the plaintiff? Does 
the presence of the residue impact upon the plaintiff and confer a benefit upon the 
defendant in a manner that is unfair in the circumstances? To what extent does a 
property right support a claim for zero tolerance? Should the degree of expropriation 
in an instance of decertification found a right to compensation?   
In resolving these issues a court will examine the position of the non-organic 
farmer. It will need to weigh the steps taken to avoid harm, the gravity of the risk, the 
ease of avoidance and the social value of the activity.362 In this way locality, 
topography, proximity, land use, type of vegetation and crop, physical and natural 
barriers, chemicals and methods of application require consideration in determining 
the existence of a duty of care. Exclusionary factors also require consideration, but a 
court will need to balance the economic freedom of the defendant against the right of 
the plaintiff to exclude others from property owned. Efficient allocation in a well-
                                                 
359 Ibid, para 130. 
360 Ibid, para 123. 
361 Brown, R " Still Crazy after All These Years: Anns, Cooper v Hobart and Pure Economic Loss" 
(2003) 36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 159 at para 169. 
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functioning market economy turns upon the characteristic of exclusivity.363 By 
contaminating the property of the organic property, the non-organic grower stifles the 
freedom of the organic to choose how to farm and how to create an economic gain. A 
policy choice to disallow recovery for economic loss in these circumstances, also fails 
to incorporate the Principle of Polluter Pays to a full extent. Evolving policy in a 
direction away from the concept of Polluter Pays is arguably out of step with domestic 
and international developments in environmental law.  
In relation to establishing a duty of care considerations of known vulnerability 
and proximity, are key factors. Any neighbour who has received notice of presence 
from an organic farmer will be aware of the farm’s vulnerability to prohibited inputs. 
That neighbour will not normally be in a contractual relationship with the organic 
farmer and as such protection via contract is unavailable. Should knowledge of the 
vulnerability and awareness of appreciable harm give rise to a duty of care? The Court 
in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd. said yes. What is unclear however, is whether a spray 
operator, guilty of causing residues which offend organic standards, but not the 
general standard, should for policy reasons be excluded from owing a duty of care. It 
is feasible that the existence of a statutory scheme that expresses tolerances by way of 
Maximum Residues Levels,364 or any other tolerance standard, could affect the way in 
which a court applies the doctrine of negligence. A court may choose to promote 
consistency with statute and thus align the common law with statute. However it is 
unlikely that a court would adopt this course where it would cut across other statutory 
schemes, such as the RMA, pursuant to which more stringent controls upon the use of 
hazardous substances may be imposed.365 In particular the provisions of a Regional 
Plan would require scrutiny to assess the legality of any discharge activity. A 
Regional Plan directed at controlling chemical drift by avoidance, tied to a rule 
requiring the preparation of a spray plan identifying sensitive activities potentially 
removes the barriers of legality and foreseeability and could establish known 
vulnerability. The framing of a Regional Plan thus acquires real importance in terms 
of recovery by an organic farmer for economic loss at common law.   
                                                                                                                                            
362 Todd, S "Liability issues involved, or likely to be involved now or in the future in relation to the 
use, in New Zealand, of genetically modified organisms and products" Submission to the Royal 
Commission on Genetic Modification [27 April 2001] <http://www.gmcommission.govt.nz/> 11. 
363 Tietenberg, T supra n 219 at 60. 
364For example MRLs established by the NZFSA or EELS and TELS set pursuant to regulations made 
pursuant to HSNO, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
365 For discussion see chapter 6. 
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Recovery by the organic farmer for economic loss is not assured and will depend 
upon the facts of a given case. There is however, potential for considerations of 
known vulnerability and awareness of appreciable harm, to override other policy 
considerations. The critical issue is establishing known vulnerability, and avoidability. 
Notice of organic status thereby assumes considerable importance. The existence of 
known vulnerability may also be a ground for defeating exclusion from duty on the 
grounds of sensitivity. 
 
5.2.1.4 Sensitivity 
 
Upon establishment of the category of damage, the second enquiry relates to the 
sensitivity of the plaintiff. If chemical contamination causes damage in excess of the 
general threshold, then an organic farmer is in the same position as a non-organic 
farmer, and is unlikely to be deemed sensitive. Where however a certification system 
of any kind sets a threshold higher than the general standard there is potential to be 
deemed sensitive, where recovery is sought for loss in excess of the general standard. 
If organic farming systems are deemed sensitive, there is a body of law that suggests 
that recovery in negligence and nuisance should not be permitted, as it is incumbent 
upon the sensitive activity to protect itself from harm, The question of sensitivity also 
affects foreseeablity, and hence the extent of the duty of care.  
Hamilton v Papakura District Council366 a recent decision of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council deals with the issue of sensitivity. This decision 
represents a significant but not insurmountable obstacle to activities deemed sensitive. 
The plaintiffs in this case were not organic growers, but grew cherry tomatoes 
hydroponically at three properties in Papakura. At two of the properties the water for 
the hydroponic system was drawn from the town supply, operated by Papakura 
District Council, and sourced form bulk supplier Watercare Services Ltd. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the water supplied was contaminated with herbicide levels that 
were toxic to their plants. The plaintiffs based their case in contract (Sale of Goods 
Act 1908) and tort (negligence, nuisance and Rylands v Fletcher). 
The difficulty faced by the plaintiffs was that if the water supply did cause the 
damage to the plants (which the Court accepted as probable), it was because the 
tomato plants must have been sensitive and vulnerable to herbicides at very low levels 
                                                 
366 Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2002] 3 NZLR 308 (PC). 
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in their particular growing conditions. The chemical in question was triclopyr, and it 
was suggested that the plants were sensitive to the chemical in the range of 1 to 10 
ppb.367 It was acknowledged that triclopyr at 10ppb was one-tenth of the maximum 
allowable level under the 1995 drinking water standard and, if detected, would not 
precipitate any monitoring on health grounds.368
The Privy Council upheld the Court of Appeal, and dismissed the claim in 
negligence. The first ground for dismissing the claim was that it was unreasonable to 
extend the duty of care to all uses, particularly where those uses may have special 
needs. The Court found:369
 
[36] If the duty is put in terms of all uses, even all uses known to Papakura, the duty 
would be extraordinarily broad. For a Court to impose such a duty would be to 
impose a requirement on water suppliers which goes far beyond the duty met in 
practice by those authorities supplying bulk water, a duty which has long been 
founded on the drinking water standards, standards drawn from World Health 
Organisation guidelines and from other international material and established 
through extensive consultation. It would impose extras costs on general users which 
relate in no way to their needs for pure, potable water. No evidence was called to 
support the imposition of such a wide-ranging, costly and burdensome exercise. 
 
This finding would suggest that where a defendant in its activities achieved a 
minimum standard defined by general law, then a duty of care in negligence would 
not extend to a more restrictive standard. The Privy Council approved the view of 
Gault J who said: 370
 
Those who have particular requirements, and in this case it was a particular 
requirement over and above water of ordinary standards, must deal with the 
problem as part of their ordinary operating procedure. 
 
                                                 
367 Hamilton v Papakura District Council [2000] 1 NZLR 265, (CA), para 40. 
368 Ibid, Para 41. 
369 Hamilton, (PC) supra, n 367. 
370 Ibid, para 31, in turn quoting the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in Munshaw Colour 
Service Ltd v Vancouver (City) (1962) 33 DLR (2d) 719 at p 727. 
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The Court of Appeal concluded that to require a water supplier to ensure that the town 
water supply had a zero level of triclopyr contamination would be unrealistic in this 
country with its agricultural based economy.371
 
5.2.1.4.1 Distinguishing features 
 
Hamilton v Papakura District Council relates to water supply for a public purpose. 
Actionable negligence involves an explicit overall weighing of the costs and benefits 
generated by the defendant’s activities.372 The policy evident behind the decision is 
avoidance of the imposition of undue cost upon water suppliers that then flows onto 
general users. The difficulties faced by a water supplier in avoiding widespread 
contamination by chemicals of water catchments are no doubt factored into the 
reasoning. The Court places the burden on the sensitive user to employ measures that 
protect from this risk.  
In relation to a conflict between organic and non-organic farmers it is arguable 
whether the reasoning in Hamilton v Papakura District Council can be extended to 
apply to point source chemical drift. In the latter situation there is no question of 
supply to the public, and the issue of indeterminacy does not arise. A non-organic 
farmer is in a much better position to internalise the adverse effects of chemical drift, 
than is a water supplier whose catchment area may have a broad reach. 
A second point for consideration is the justification for extending policy so as to 
treat an entire sector as sensitive. The concept of sensitivity may require reshaping in 
the face of the twenty first century. The growth of the organic sector, environmental 
benefits produced and the concomitant public support may influence such policy. 
Cognisance of mounting environmental pressures derived from agriculture and of 
international measures to actively support organic farming so as to reduce that 
pressure may have bearing. It may also be helpful to reconsider underlying property 
rights in this instance. If organic farming is deemed a sensitive activity, an organic 
farmer’s right to exclude others from property owned is diminished. It is arguable that 
diminution of that fundamental right by reason of sensitivity alone, without 
recognition of known vulnerability and avoidability is inequitable. 
                                                 
371 Although as a matter of fact, due to the low residue levels, the water in this case may not have 
“damaged” organic product, the decision creates a strong impetus for organic farmers to have a hard 
look at their water supply. 
372 Todd, supra n 336 at 504. 
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Property rights evolve and change in response to economic, social and 
environmental pressures.373 Regarding organic farmers as sensitive gives primacy to 
the right of non-organic farmers to pollute on grounds of economic and consequent 
social benefits. It would however, completely fail to respond to the economic and 
social needs of the organic farmer or arguably the need of the wider environment. It 
can be argued that such policy infringes the right to be free from environmental harm, 
as well as failing to provide for future generations. Terming organic farmers sensitive 
may also be out of step with rules in resource management plans made pursuant to the 
RMA. Statutory directions to promote sustainable management and to consider the 
sensitivity of the receiving environment may create conditions where vulnerable 
activities require protection.374 There is much at stake in consequence of treating an 
organic farm a sensitive activity, and a court well appraised of these issues may be 
reluctant so to do. 
 
5.2.1.5  Foreseeability 
 
The second ground in Hamilton v Papakura District Council for dismissing the claim 
in negligence related to the inability of the plaintiff to show that the loss was 
foreseeable. Sir Kenneth Keith375 for the Judicial Committee held:376
 
[37] The extraordinarily broad scope of the proposed duty provides one decisive 
reason for rejecting the claims in negligence. A second, distinct reason is provided 
by the requirement of foreseeability. The High Court in the passage quoted and 
endorsed by the Court of Appeal (see para [31] above) said that in the circumstances 
it was unable to conclude that it was or should have been reasonably foreseeable to 
Watercare, still less to Papakura, that water containing herbicides at a fraction of the 
concentration allowable for human consumption would cause damage to cherry 
tomatoes grown hydroponically … 
 
[39] As the Board made clear in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co 
Pty (The Wagon Mound No 2) [1967] AC 617 at p 643, damage is foreseeable only 
when there is a real risk of damage, that is one which would not occur to the mind 
                                                 
373 Guerin K "Property Rights and Environmental Policy: A New Zealand Perspective" New Zealand 
Treasury Working Paper 03/02 [March 2003] <http://www.treasury.govt.nz > 10. 
374 For discussion see chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
375 A New Zealand Court of Appeal Judge, sitting as a member of the Privy Council. 
376 Hamilton (PC), supra n 366 at para 37. 
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of a reasonable person in the position of the defendant and one which he would not 
brush aside as far-fetched. The mere fact that certain herbicides may kill or damage 
certain plants at certain concentrations does not itself establish such a risk… 
 
The Court found that lack of reasonable foreseeablity was firmly supported by the 
evidence, and the claim in negligence must fail. 
 
5.2.1.5.1 Distinguishing features 
 
The finding on this point is related directed to the susceptibility of the tomato plant to 
certain herbicides, a fact of which none of the parties (not even the plaintiffs) had 
knowledge. The position for organic farmers can be differentiated in that notice of 
organic status can readily be given to neighbours and contractors. In fact in many 
situations this will be a requirement.377 Possession of knowledge would affect 
foreseeability of harm, particularly if notice given were comprehensive. The giving of 
notice is also critical on the basis that it may ground liability in negligence if a 
defendant, with knowledge of the plaintiff’s special susceptibility, fails to adopt such 
reasonable precautions as would have avoided the damage without appreciable 
prejudice to his or her own interests.378
The scope of appreciable prejudice in the context of restrictions on the spraying 
practices of a farmer is unclear. However, given the techniques available to limit 
spray contamination of other properties, it is arguable that this could be achieved with 
minor consequences to the non-organic farmer comparative to the harm caused to the 
organic farmer. The question to return to is, is there a real risk of damage, and is it 
reasonable, fair and just to recover the damage suffered? Most reasonable people 
apprised of the existence of an organic farm on their boundaries would appreciate the 
risk of causing physical or economic damage to their neighbour by the use of 
uncontrolled chemical application. The organic sector, in allowing for contamination 
of up to 10 per cent of maximum residue levels, also recognises the reality of 
background levels of pollution. What is yet to be decided is whether or not it is 
reasonable for organic farmers to recover for loss caused above that background level 
but below the general level.379  
                                                 
377 BIO-GRO Standards 4.2.6.b.iv. 
378 Todd, supra n 336 at 502. 
379 This being for damage created between 10.01 and 99.9 per cent of the relevant maximum residue 
level. 
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To disallow recovery on the basis of susceptibility, places, organic farming firmly 
in the hypersensitive category. Perhaps it is the reality of the modern world that 
attempting to farm naturally has become unnatural or abnormal. This is a somewhat 
troubling reflection of the way in which we order this world, and it would also appear 
to be out of step with international and national policies geared to reducing the 
externalities of modern agriculture. If the common law fails to provide for organic 
farms to recover damages for economic loss consequent upon decertification, where 
there was no physical damage, it leaves organic farming with the following choices: 
 
1. Reliance on the general law, for instance the RMA. 
2. Risking contamination for which no recovery will be allowed. 
3. Grouping with like activities and creating spatial barriers. 
4. Erecting physical barriers 
5. Accepting MRL levels as Standards thus diluting if not eliminating the 
organic standard. 
 
5.2.2 Nuisance  
 
Nuisance is the customary common law remedy employed to resolve land use 
conflicts.380 A plaintiff suffering damage to property or interference with the 
enjoyment of land, without physical damage, may make a claim in nuisance.381 An 
encroachment on to land so as to closely resemble trespass may also constitute a 
private nuisance.382 Fleming describes the inherent difficulties in the resolution of 
land use conflict:383
 
The paramount problem in the law of nuisance is therefore to strike a tolerable 
balance between conflicting claims of neighbours, each invoking the privilege to 
exploit the resources and enjoy the amenities of his property without undue 
subordination to the reciprocal interests of the other.  
 
                                                 
380 This enquiry will be directed to the concept of private nuisance, in relation to interference with 
property owned, in contrast to a public nuisance consisting of interference with a public or common 
right. For discussion of the distinction see Fleming, J The Law of Torts (1998), 459. 
381 Todd Report, supra, n 362 at 10. 
382 Hawkes Bay Protein Ltd v Davidson [2003] 1 NZLR 536, HC, para 15.However to result in actual 
trespass a person must cause some other person or thing to directly intrude on the land, it is insufficient 
for the encroachment to arise as the indirect or consequential result of the defendant’s act, for 
discussion see Todd, supra n 336 at 456. 
383 Fleming, J, supra n 380 at 467. 
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In nuisance, liability may be easier to prove than negligence. Once damage to 
property or loss of enjoyment of a naturally occurring right is proven, the defendant 
must then raise a defence, for instance that he or she was using reasonable skill and 
care in the ordinary or natural use of land. The focus will be upon whether or not the 
defendant’s interference was unreasonable in the circumstances, rather than upon 
whether or not adequate precautions were taken.384 Fleming discusses the factors to be 
considered in striking the balance between the conflicting claims by reference to the 
standard of reasonableness: 
 
…In striking this balance, a number of factors are given weight in accordance with 
traditional values relating to private property rights. Little, if any, attention is paid 
directly to utilitarian criteria like cost or resource efficiency or to the larger 
considerations of zoning and welfare, which are thought to belong to the province of 
legislation and planning. 
 
Due to the range of interests incidental to ownership, nuisance liability offers 
protection against a wide range of harms. The character and duration of harm will 
determine the existence of an unreasonable interference. The immediate 
neighbourhood will form the background against which the standard of 
reasonableness will be assessed.385 In Hawkes Bay Protein v Davidson Ltd.,386 
Gendall J observed: 
 
[18]…The law requires the standard of comfort and convenience of the average man 
within the character of the neighbourhood to be taken into account. It is well known 
if someone lives in an industrial town they cannot reasonably expect the same purity 
of air or freedom from noise as in a pleasant country locality, or exclusively 
residential district. But this does not mean that someone who lives in a noisy 
neighbourhood can never complain of additional noise, any more than someone who 
occupies an industrial neighbourhood cannot complain of additional excessive 
industrial disturbances or, in the present case, excessive odours. It is a question of 
degree and assessment of the extent to which the increased volume of noxious 
smells, judged by the standards prevailing in that area, is so substantial as to detract 
from the standard of comfort reasonably to be expected of an occupier of a 
neighbouring property. 
                                                 
384 Todd Report, supra n 362 at 11. 
385 Todd, supra n 336 at 504. 
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The conduct of the wrongdoer need not necessarily be unlawful,387 and compliance 
with planning permission does not operate as a defence to a claim in nuisance.388 Such 
an approach has parallels to the operation of s 17 of the RMA, which may override 
lawful activities where an adverse effect upon the environment is evident.389 It is no 
defence for the defendant to show that the activity carried out confers a benefit on the 
public that outweighs the harm done to the plaintiff.390 Fleming notes that some 
consideration will be given to the fact that the offensive operation is essential and 
unavoidable in a particular locality, but warns that the argument should not be pushed 
too far:391
 
…it should be remembered that we are concerned with reciprocal rights and duties 
of private individuals, and a defendant cannot simply justify his infliction of great 
harm upon the plaintiff by urging a greater benefit to the public at large has accrued 
from his conduct. 
 
Fleming reminds us that “where the public be interested let the public bear the loss”, 
a result that he says can be accomplished by holding the defendant liable in the first 
place and letting him charge the cost to the benefiting public or alternatively 
conferring statutory authorisation on the enterprise coupled with compensation for 
damage caused. This approach is consistent with a requirement for internalisation of 
effects. 
 In nuisance the focus remains trained upon what is reasonable in the 
circumstances. It is no defence that the plaintiff came to the nuisance.392 In this way 
the common law diminishes a first in time first in right argument. Todd identifies the 
policy reason for taking the position as Otherwise one occupier would be able, by 
establishing his use first, to permanently diminish the value of neighbouring land 
without providing compensation.393 Furthermore in nuisance it is irrelevant that the 
                                                                                                                                            
386 Hawkes Bay, supra n 382 at para 18. 
387 Ibid, para 15. 
388 Ibid, para 19. 
389 Where however a defendant’s acts are specifically authorized by statute, a plaintiff’s claim will fail 
where the defendant can prove that the creation of the nuisance was an inevitable result of carrying out 
the authorized activity. 
390 Todd supra n 336 at 504. 
391 Fleming, supra n 380 at 471. 
392 Ports of Auckland, supra n 348 at 608. 
393 Todd, supra n 336 at 523. 
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plaintiff failed to take steps to avoid or minimise the harm,394 as the focus of the 
enquiry rests upon the interference. In Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood 395 it was 
held that liability in nuisance arose even in circumstances where a plaintiff could 
avoid the effects more cheaply than the defendant could eliminate the nuisance, unless 
the cost of elimination was so proportionately small, so as to lead the court to a 
conclusion that no actionable nuisance had occurred. 
Foreseeability of harm is a requirement and the plaintiff may fail if the activity 
they undertake is unduly sensitive.396 In relation to sensitivity, Justice Gendall in 
Hawkes Bay Protein v Davidson Ltd. held:397
 
[17]…The discomfort must be substantial, not merely with reference to a plaintiff 
and his/her sensitivities but to a degree that would be substantial to any person 
occupying the plaintiff’s premises irrespective of age or state of health. It must be 
that it materially interferes with the ordinary comfort expected of occupation in the 
relevant area according to reasonable standards expected amongst those in that area. 
 
Where however a defendant acts deliberately or maliciously to cause harm to a 
plaintiff with known sensitivities, those actions may be judged unreasonable.398 In 
terms of a remedy an injunction is available to refrain the wrongdoer from continuing 
the nuisance. Where there is physical damage, damages will be awarded and the 
measure of damages will be the cost of restoring the land, or the diminution of the 
value of the land due to the damage.399 Damage to crop as a result of a nuisance is 
recoverable, as are the costs of averting a physical threat.400 Where however a 
“transitory nuisance” causes the damage, diminution of land value will not be the 
appropriate measure, as the value of the land will seldom be reduced. Damages for 
loss of amenity value are more appropriate in these circumstances and should only be 
awarded for the period during which the nuisance persisted.401
Where there is no physical damage, reliance is placed upon the interference with 
use and enjoyment of the land. This may be reflected by damages for loss of utility or 
                                                 
394 Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood [1984] 1 NZLR 525 at 534-535. 
395 Ibid. 
396 Todd Report, supra n 365 at 11. 
397 Hawkes Bay, supra n 386 at para 17. 
398 Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd v Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468. 
399 Hawkes Bay, supra n 382 at para 13. 
400 Todd supra n 336 at 529 and Attorney General supra n 331. 
401 Hawkes Bay supra n 382 at paras 32-39. 
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amenity value. Damages for loss of profits stemming from the inability to use land 
may also be recovered.402
 
5.2.2.1 Application to organic farming  
 
At first glance a claim, by an organic farmer, in nuisance for contamination by spray 
drift looks promising. Where contamination arises in excess of general tolerances, and 
a link can be made to the wrongdoer, then recovery for loss suffered is likely. Due to 
the fact that general tolerances are exceeded, the issue of foreseeability is unlikely to 
arise. The fact that a nuisance-creating farmer is busily engaged in feeding the nation 
would not operate as a defence in favour of the farmer. Nor would an argument of 
first in time. It will also be irrelevant that an organic farmer could avoid the effects at 
a cost lower than that to be paid by the non-organic farmer in eliminating the 
nuisance.  
The situation is less clear, however, where spray contamination creates residues 
below the general level, but above organic certification thresholds. The ability to 
claim for interference with the use and enjoyment of land may assist the organic 
farmer in this situation. It could be argued that the practices of a defendant unduly 
restrict the ability of the plaintiff to operate an organic farm and thus use and enjoy 
land in the manner of choice. Damages could be sought for loss of utility as an 
organic farm. The issue of foreseeability could be overcome in instances where notice 
of presence of an organic farm had been given. The Court would then have to assess 
what a reasonable level of interference is.  
In relying on the doctrine of nuisance the greatest obstacle is that of abnormal 
sensitivity. The decision in Hawkes Bay Protein v Davidson Ltd suggests that the 
interference or discomfort need be substantial. This could be difficult to prove where 
spray drift results in residual contamination, which exceeds the organic, but not the 
general, standard. In assessing the degree of interference a court would assess what is 
reasonable in the immediate location. The constitution of the neighbourhood, and 
spray practices employed would be relevant. The ease and extent of the ability to 
control the discharge will be weighed as well. Known vulnerability may also be 
relevant. Where a neighbouring operator has knowledge of a plaintiff’s organic status 
and possesses the ability to control spray practices, it is possible that a Court could 
                                                 
402 Clearlite Holdings Ltd v Auckland City Corporation (1976) 2 NZLR 729. 
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find that operator to have acted unreasonably in discharging spray in a manner that 
breached organic certification standards. Although such actions could not be termed 
malicious, they could be viewed as unnecessary. Toleration of sprays by community 
and changing industry practice could influence a court’s decision in terms of 
reasonableness 
 Arguments from property rights may also bolster the organic farmer as discussed 
in paragraph 5.2.1.5.1. Consideration of the statutory framework may be relevant and 
a court may also want to consider rules in resource management plans created under 
the RMA, relating to spray drift and land use when considering whether the activity 
was reasonable Planning permission will not necessarily operate as a defence to a 
claim in nuisance. In identifying the balance to be struck between the parties a court 
will need to conclude whether or not the right to farm organically should be 
subordinated to the right of a neighbour to discharge chemicals over the organic 
farmer’s land in such a way as to result in decertification. Evolution of policy 
rejecting this latter position is arguably more consistent with international and 
national efforts to control the externalities of modern agriculture. 
A requirement to internalise effects causing decertification represents one way in 
which a tolerable balance could be struck between the parties. This would not mean 
that chemical farming techniques could not be carried out on a block adjoining an 
organic farm. It would simply mean that anyone applying those chemicals should do 
so in a manner that does not have flow on effects for incompatible activities. It may 
have implications for some techniques, such as aerial crop dusting, but leaves open 
other avenues. Finding sensible solutions that support all forms of agriculture, without 
rendering one impossible should be the goal for those administering the common law. 
 
5.3 Rylands v Fletcher 
 
Reliance upon the doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher is another avenue for recovery of 
damage to property. It is now established that this doctrine is a subset of the nuisance 
action. The Court of Appeal in Hamilton v Papakura District Council assessed the 
similarities between the causes of action:403
 
                                                 
403 Hamilton (CA), supra n 371, para 71. 
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The similarities between the Rylands v Fletcher cause of action and the cause of 
action in nuisance are clear. Rylands v Fletcher deals with an isolated instance of 
escape while nuisance is concerned with a continuing wrong. The true nuisance 
should normally have some degree of continuance about it as the plaintiff must 
show some act of the defendant on his land that disturbs the actual or prospective 
enjoyment of the plaintiff’s rights over the land. However, an isolated escape can 
give rise to an action in nuisance. Examples include a water main bursting (Irvine & 
Co Ltd v Dunedin City Corporation [1939] NZLR 741), a blocked drain causing a 
flood (Pemberton v Bright [1960] 1 WLR 436 (CA)), and a gas explosion (Midwood 
& Co Ltd v Mayor, Aldermen And Citizens of Manchester [1905] 2 KB 597). This 
illustrates the close relationship between the law of nuisance and the rule in Rylands 
v Fletcher which originally dealt with instances of the escape of large amounts of 
water stored on the defendant’s land. Lord Macmillan recognised in Read v J Lyons 
and Co Ltd [1947] AC 156 that nuisance is a cogener of the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher, but the former usually focuses on the acts of the defendant, while the latter 
always focuses on the event of an escape of some mischievous thing which the 
defendant brought onto his land. 
 
The Court of Appeal also found that the requirement of foreseeability was a 
prerequisite to both forms of action.404 In Hamilton v Papakura District Council the 
requirement for foreseeability was fatal to all three-tort causes of action before all 
three courts. 
A differentiating factor of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is the requirement that 
the activity carried out by the defendant constituted a non-natural use of land. In 
Attorney-General v Geothermal Produce NZ Ltd 405 the majority were not prepared to 
classify the use of sprays in that case as non-natural, due to their fairly common rural 
use in New Zealand and the state of English case law. However Somers J, in minority, 
took a different view and concluded:406
 
…To direct a toxic hormone spray capable of drifting considerable distances across 
the boundary of one’s land up to heights of not less than 6 feet hardly seems a 
natural use of land. I find it difficult to see why the Department should not be liable 
under the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher. 
 
                                                 
404 Ibid, para 73. 
405 Attorney General, supra n 331.  
406 Ibid, 363. 
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In the Hamilton v Papakura District Council decisions neither the Judicial Committee 
nor the Court of Appeal refer expressly to the non-natural issue, instead there appears 
to be implicit recognition that release of toxic sprays into a water supply could 
constitute either cause of action, in the event that the requirement for foreseeability is 
fulfilled. It may be that the better view is as expressed by Professor Todd: 407
 
Aerial spraying of weedkillers near sensitive crops on nearby land probably carries 
sufficient inherent risk of damage from drift to amount to a non-natural use even 
though it is a reasonably common agricultural practice. 
 
Accordingly there is potential for the organic farmer to recover in nuisance, providing 
the issues of foreseeability and sensitivity can be dealt with. What is reasonable in the 
circumstances will come down to a court’s decision in terms of the immediate 
location. 
 
5.2.5 Recovery in the USA 
 
In terms of weighing or balancing the different interests represented by organic and 
non-organic farmers it is instructive to enquire as to how such conflicts have been 
resolved in other jurisdictions. The courts in the United States have a degree of 
experience in resolving these issues,408 although the existence of extensive right-to-
farm laws differentiates the policy climate.409 The United States however also has a 
strong organic community, and the rights of organic farmers to protection have been 
considered. The decision in Langan v Valicopters, Inc.410 is apposite. 
The plaintiffs, Mr and Mrs. Langan owned a small organic farm in the Yakima 
Valley near Washington where they grew organic produce that they intended to 
market. Their neighbours employed Valicopters, Inc to make aerial application by 
helicopter of pesticide to their property in order to control a beetle infestation. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the crop dusting resulted in pesticide residues in their crops. A 
laboratory test conducted after the spraying indicated the presence of 1400 parts per 
billion by weight of Thiodan on the Langans’ crop tissue. At that time, the United 
States Department of Health Education and Welfare, Food and Drug Administration’s 
                                                 
407 Todd, supra n 336 at 552. 
408 Feitshans, T "An Analysis of State Pesticide Drift Laws" (1999) 9 S.J. Agri. L. Rev. 37  
409 Luedeman, R "A Tale of Three States: Liability for Overspray and Chemical Drift caused by Aerial 
Application in Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi" (2000) 10 S.J. Agri. L. Rev. 121. 
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(the FDA) tolerance standard for Thiodan on tomatoes and beans was 2.0 parts per 
billion. Consequent upon the test results, the plaintiff’s certifier; Northwest Organic 
food Producers Association (NOFPA) revoked the plaintiffs’ certification as organic 
growers. The existence of pesticides at any level greater than 10 per cent of the 
maximum pesticide residue allowed by the FDA standard invoked immediate 
suspension pursuant to NOFPA’s bylaws. Due to decertification the Langans did not 
grow their tomato and bean crops to fruition, but pulled the crops to minimise risk of 
further contamination to the land. 
The Supreme Court of Washington, subsequent to a jury trial where judgment 
had been entered for the plaintiffs, heard the case. Upon consideration the Supreme 
Court affirmed the order of the lower court that awarded damages in strict liability 
and wanton conduct for the crop duster’s use of the chemical pesticide on the organic 
farmers’ land. In coming to its conclusion the court applied the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts §§ 519, 520 (Tent. Draft No.10 1964) (“The Restatement”) and asserted that 
strict liability will arise in situations where risk of harm makes the activity abnormally 
dangerous. The Restatement applies strict liability for harm to a person who carries 
out an abnormally dangerous activity even when that person has exercised the utmost 
care to prevent such harm. Section 520 of the Restatement lists the factors to be used 
in determining what constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity as follows: 
 
(a) Whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of some harm 
to the person, land or chattels of others; 
(b) Whether the gravity of harm which may result from it is likely to 
be great; 
(c) Whether the risk cannot be eliminated with reasonable care; 
(d) Whether the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
(e) Whether the activity is inappropriate where it is carried on; and  
(f) The value of the activity to the community. 
 
The Restatement offers further guidance in considering these factors, and suggests 
that one alone may be insufficient to create strict liability, and the essential question 
to ask is whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or 
because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict 
                                                                                                                                            
410 Langan v Valicopters, Inc 567 P.2d 222 (Wash 1977).  
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liability.411 In considering the factors the court concluded that crop dusting involved 
an element of risk of harm, and found on the evidence that in the particular case it was 
not possible to eliminate the risk of drift in crop spraying. In terms of the gravity of 
harm the court concluded that this would be dependant on the nature of activities 
carried out on adjoining land. Different crops types may have spray incompatibility, 
such as the differences between broad and narrow leafed crops. The court reviewed a 
number of cases and concluded that there were many different situations where a 
neighbouring property may be sensitive to and damaged by the spraying activities of 
the neighbouring landowner. In terms of an organic grower the court assessed the 
damage as including inability to sell crop as organic due to loss of certification, and 
consequent loss of premium, and also the inability to sell crops on regular commercial 
markets due to failure to enter into contracts with commercial produce buyers before 
the season begins. 
The court then turned its mind to whether or not crop dusting was a matter of 
common usage. It concluded that despite the prevalence of crop dusting in the area, it 
was only carried out by a comparatively small number of persons and accordingly 
was not a matter of common usage. As to whether or not the activity was appropriate 
the court concluded: 
  
Given the nature of organic farming, the use of pesticides adjacent to such as area 
must be considered an activity conducted in an inappropriate place 
 
Finally the Court assessed the value of the activity to the community: 
 
There is no doubt that pesticides are socially valuable in the control of insects, 
weeds, and other pests. They may benefit society by increasing production. [HN8] 
Whether strict liability or negligence principles should be applied amounts to a 
balancing of conflicting social interest – the risk of harm versus the utility of the 
activity. In balancing these interests we should ask who should bear the loss caused 
by the pesticides… 
…In the present case, the Langans were eliminated from the organic food market 
for 1973 through no fault of their own. If crop dusting continues on the adjoining 
property, the Langans may never be able to sell their crops to organic food buyers. 
Appellants on the other hand, will all profit from the continued application of 
                                                 
411 Ibid. 
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pesticides. Under these circumstances there can be an equitable balancing of social 
interests only if the appellants are made to pay for the consequences of their acts. 
 
On this basis the court declined to find that the lower court had erred in its instruction 
to the jury on strict liability. The court took the same view on the wanton misconduct 
instruction on the basis that the evidence established that the helicopter had flown 
directly over the Langans property (and over Patrick Langan himself) with the spray 
turned on. 
The factors considered by virtue of the Restatement represent a useful toolbox for 
analyzing the incompatible interests to be weighed when dealing with resource use 
conflicts. Of particular assistance to the organic farmer is the factor relating to 
appropriateness that may be useful in supporting a finding that some harmful 
activities are inappropriate in a location adjacent to an organic farm, when they cannot 
control their activities within the boundaries of their own land. The case in point 
related to application of pesticides by aircraft. An unresolved issue is whether other 
forms of aerial application would create the same degree of harm, and attract 
classification as uncommon usage. The Langan decision has attracted comment. One 
commentator criticized the decision on several counts. He stated: 412
 
This view is one-dimensional and raises the question of whether small scale growers 
should be required to compensate farmers who might be prevented from destroying 
harmful pests because of the presence of small organic farms nearby. One wonders 
whether traditional farmers in Washington or elsewhere ought to be held captive in 
this fashion by what may be a determined minority of exurbanite weekend 
gardeners. 
 
It would be fair to say that such comments may well be representative of views held 
by some stakeholders and associates who view chemical farming as the only system 
capable of feeding the nation. However the rationale behind the comment appears 
flawed and anachronistic. It fails to comprehend the depth and the reach of the 
organic sector, and international policy support for sustainable agricultural 
techniques. Furthermore, considering chemical farmers as traditional discloses a 
rather foreshortened historical perspective. 
                                                 
412 Supra n 409.  
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What these comments reveal is that the value and legitimacy of the organic sector 
requires promotion. In negligence social value contributed by non-organic farmers 
may be weighed, and although it is accepted that a defendant in nuisance may not 
argue that a social benefit provided outweighs the harm done to a plaintiff, a court 
may nevertheless consider the utility of the competing positions. It is incumbent upon 
the organic sector to mobilize, strengthen and advocate. If benefits are to be weighed 
or balanced it is important to consider all contributing factors. 
 
5.3 Liability for damage caused by GMOs 
 
Due to the recent nature if its innovation, and the existence of historical controls upon 
general release to the environment, liability for damage caused by GMO has yet to be 
considered by a New Zealand court. The lifting of the moratorium and a regulatory 
framework aimed at preserving opportunities creates a climate where liability issues 
are likely to arise. Failure to comply with rules and controls imposed due to 
negligence or deliberate action is part of the human condition. So too is overstating 
benefits without fully understanding the consequences.413 Damage is likely to occur, 
and who should be liable for the consequences or cost of prevention rests with the 
courts to decide.414
There has been much argument in relation to a liability regime for GMO damage 
in New Zealand.415 The Royal Commission took the view that the liability regime was 
best left, as it stands shared between statute and common law.416 The Commission 
considered that the common law was well able to mould new remedies for novel 
situations.417 GMO pollution is novel. This section of the thesis considers what 
protection the common law affords to organic farms. The Royal Commission alluded 
to the need for: 418
 
…delicate balancing; on the one hand protection of the public and the environment, 
and on the other the need, in the public interest, not to stifle innovation or drive 
                                                 
413 Green, supra n 299. 
414 This is in the context of the common law. An enforcement regime is provided for by HSNO where 
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away investors by imposing overly stringent conditions on research or economic 
activity.   
 
The potential for socialisation of unforeseen or unanticipated loss or damage was also 
recognised.419 In paragraph 2.3.3.2 we examined the ways in which GMO could 
contaminate an organic farm. Loss of certification is the most obvious form of harm 
that would be suffered, but further harm may also occur such as contamination 
resulting in failed crops or a the colonisation by a GM neighbour requiring changed 
crop management techniques.420 Contamination of organic crop and product by GMO 
presents liability issues in negligence and nuisance in a manner similar to 
contamination by chemicals. There three discernible differences. The first is that 
contamination by GMO may well affect general growers wishing to trade as “GE 
Free” in the same way as organic growers. The second is that the ability to control 
some forms of genetically modified crops released to the environment is limited. 
Thirdly it is arguable that toxic chemicals pose a more serious risk of harm to the 
environment than genetically modified organisms. These three factors may influence 
decisions in respect of liability at common law. 
 
5.3.1 Negligence 
 
5.3.1.1   Physical damage 
 
Whether contamination by GMO can constitute physical damage raises the same 
issues discussed in relation to chemical drift. If the contamination causes a change in 
the nature of the crop, or product it is possible that physical damage has occurred. 
Where there is evidence of physical damage, a plaintiff will need to prove that a duty 
of care was owed. In an instance where a crop is known as likely to spread, 
foreseeability is unlikely to be an issue. The duty may also include a requirement that 
the crop be grown in such a way as not to cause harm.421
 
                                                 
419 Ibid. 
420 Lee, "Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the "Victim"?" (2002) 65 The Modern Law 
Review 534, 530. 
421 Repp, R "Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for Genetically Modified Crop Production and 
Genetic Drift" (2000) 36 Idaho L.Rev.585 14. 
 95
  
5.3.1.2   Statutory Permission 
 
The issue of statutory permission is relevant to both physical damage and economic 
loss. The existence of a statutory permission may impinge on whether or not a duty 
exists, as courts may choose an approach that promotes consistency with statute.422 In 
relation to GMO any statutory permission would likely be issued pursuant to 
HSNO.423 The relationship between HSNO and the common law has yet to be 
considered by the courts. In an analogous situation permission granted pursuant to the 
RMA does not prevent responsibility in tort.424 It is arguable that this approach should 
be extended to cover permissions issues pursuant to HSNO. Permissions given 
pursuant to HSNO have similarities to resource consents granted pursuant to the 
RMA. Initially HSNO was conceived as part of the RMA.425 The permissions under 
each regime are the result of a statutory framework where power is delegated to 
another body to weigh the interests of the environment and the interests of individuals 
in deciding how a resource is to be used. Both systems adopt similar purpose clauses, 
and each focus upon whether a particular activity should be permitted and where 
necessary prescribe controls upon the exercise of the permission.426 Administrative 
decisions under both HSNO and the RMA may extinguish private rights without 
compensation, and courts have therefore supported the need to retain access to tort 
remedies regardless of the existence of a statutory permission.427
When considering the impact of a statutory permission upon the common law, 
courts will examine the entire scheme of the legislation. Whilst HSNO does not 
include a savings provision in terms similar to that of s 23 of the RMA,428 it is clear 
that policy makers have assumed that the common law will continue to operate in 
tandem with statute.429 Section 124 G of HSNO enables recovery of damages for loss 
                                                 
422 See discussion para 5.2.1.3. 
423 Although it will be argued that more stringent controls pursuant to the RMA should be permitted in 
a manner similar to hazardous substances. 
424 Ports of Auckland, supra n 348 at 611. 
425 Although it is acknowledged that the legislation was subsequently separated due to the extensive 
nature of the HSNO regime. 
426 This is in reference to the treatment of new organisms by HSNO, not hazardous substances. 
427 For discussion see Ports of Auckland, supra n 348 at 610. 
428 Section 23 RMA states that compliance with the RMA does not affect the need to comply with other 
legal requirements including rules of law. 
429 See comments of Royal Commission supra n 297 at 419. 
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caused as a result of a breach of the Act,430 but specifically preserves the right to seek 
additional recovery by virtue of another cause of action.431 HSNO is silent in terms of 
recovery for GMO damage caused in a situation where there is no breach of the Act. 
If no common law remedy is permitted for such a loss, the result will be that any loss 
will be socialised, and this loss will fall on those who wish to produce and trade as 
GMO free. If however the common law provides a remedy in negligence or nuisance 
irrespective of statutory permission, it will be possible to recover unanticipated losses 
for which there may be no other remedy.432
If statutory permission did not prevent responsibility in tort, it may yet provide an 
indicator relative to discharge of the burden.433 A defendant claiming to have 
“followed all the rules” may receive some sympathy from the courts. This points to 
the need for authorising agencies to understand coexistence issues, and to have a 
detailed knowledge of the environment into which the GMO will be released.434 
Failure to comply with the conditions of permission, such as a requirement for buffer 
zones or separation, is likely to constitute breach of duty, as well as rendering a 
defendant liable under the enforcement provisions of a statutory scheme. 
 
5.3.1.3      Threshold of contamination 
 
In determining whether harm has been suffered, the courts will have to decide 
whether a zero tolerance for GMO contamination can sustain an action in negligence. 
As discussed in paragraph 3.1.1.3, this will depend upon what a court considers 
reasonable in the circumstances. A pragmatic court may choose to strike the balance 
at a level higher than the zero tolerance level required for organic farming. On this 
basis an organic farmer will be left without a remedy. 
Compelling organic farms to accept a degree of contamination, even where the 
contamination is minimal, removes the right to choose how to farm. This loss of 
                                                 
430 This includes for a breach of controls applied by virtue of an approval or by regulation-see s 124G 
(1)(c). 
431 Section 124 (G)(3). 
432  The existence of a statutory permission may also impede the granting of an injunction by way of 
remedy, so as to effectively override the permission. Damages in lieu may represent a more palatable 
alternative. For discussion see Lee, "Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the "Victim"?" 
(2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 534. 
433 For discussion see Repp, R "Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for Genetically Modified Crop 
Production and Genetic Drift" (2000) 36 Idaho L.Rev.585 14. 
434 The consequences of the failure to do so are obvious in R v. Secretary of State for the Environment 
and MAFF, ex parte Watson [1999] Env LR 310, where the decision maker was unaware that organic 
growers were operating in the locality. 
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choice is a significant, and to be condoned must be justifiable. Those who support the 
widespread use of GMO argue that contamination will need to be accepted by the 
organic sector, and infer that the a minimal degree of contamination is appropriate due 
to the benefits to be provided by GMO.435 However before a court adopts this 
approach to the level of harm, it would need to examine closely by what measures the 
harm could be avoided, the gravity of the risk, and the social value of the activity. 
Such an enquiry would also want to consider damage caused to non-organic growers 
who wish to remain GMO Free, and in doing so may want to consider increasing 
consumer support for the purchase of GMO free products. 
Regardless of contamination levels, to succeed in negligence it will be necessary 
to establish that a duty of care was owed and that the loss was foreseeable. Relying on 
Perre v Apand Pty,436 factual conditions creating proximity, known vulnerability and 
ability to avoid may lead to the establishment of a duty. However where there is 
potentially no other illegality arising in relation to the defendant’s conduct, a court 
may not be prepared to interfere with the defendant’s economic freedom in the market 
place. The right of the defendant to use GMO will again be juxtaposed against the 
right of the plaintiff to farm organically and exclude unwanted intrusion. This 
exclusionary factor may mean that an action in nuisance represents a better prospect 
for recovery. Other policy issues such, as indeterminacy would also require 
consideration. Widespread contamination by GMOs could potentially render it 
impossible for any grower to be GMO Free. Potentially there could be a large class of 
persons seeking redress in this situation, but not necessarily unascertainable 
A final issue is that of sensitivity. A claim in negligence could be defeated on this 
ground, however with GMO the class of potentially sensitive activities, extends 
beyond the organic sector to include all producers who wish to remain GE Free. In 
contrast to the single class of hydroponic tomatoes in Hamilton v Papakura District 
Council, this would appear to rather overreach the category of sensitive. This issue 
will be reconsidered in respect of a claim in nuisance, which is the subject of the next 
enquiry. 
 
 
                                                 
435 Christensen, M Horgan, P and Caudwell, A "Genetic Modification: the Liability Debate" 
<http://www.lifesciencesnetwork.com/Repository/020118_liability.pdf>. 
436 Perre (PC), supra n 339. 
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5.3.2 Nuisance  
 
The issues for consideration are similar to those for spray contamination. One 
potential difference is whether or not GMOs can have the classification of dangerous 
applied in a manner similar to the use of toxic sprays.437 To establish a claim in 
private nuisance, a plaintiff as owner of land, must prove that the defendant caused 
physical damage to the land or interfered with the use and enjoyment of the land. 
Liability is strict, however foreseeability is a prerequisite.438 The focus will be on the 
harm suffered by the plaintiff,439 but the defendant’s conduct will be considered in 
assessing whether the interference was reasonable.440 The aim of the law will be to 
strike a balance between the conflicting interests of neighbouring occupiers.441 The 
character of the locality can be used to justify the activity only in relation to inference 
with the use and enjoyment of land, and not in relation to physical damage. 
 
5.3.2.1 Foreseeability 
 
Damage to any GMO free farmer will be foreseeable where notice of that status is 
given to the GMO farmer. 
 
5.3.2.2 Is the interference unreasonable? 
 
Contamination by GMO, whether as physical damage or as interference with the use 
and enjoyment of the land could potentially found an action in nuisance. To be 
successful the plaintiff would have to prove that the activity was unreasonable in the 
circumstances.  
Where an organic farmer has choice of operating an organic farm eliminated by 
the presence of a contaminating GMO neighbour, the use and enjoyment of the land 
as organic is clearly interfered with. In an area where organic growing is predominant, 
or at least well represented, a court may find that the interference is unreasonable. 
While this may be beneficial for tightly grouped organic growers, it does not 
necessarily represent a just principle for decision-making. It in effect operates a 
                                                 
437 For discussion see Jones, A "What Liability of Growing Genetically Engineered Crops?" (2002) 7 
Drake J. Agric. L. 621 5. 
438 Todd Report, supra n 365 at 10. 
439 Lee, supra n 432 at 531. 
440 Todd Report, supra n 362 at 10. 
441 Ibid. 
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principle of first in time, first in right. Such a principle may be initially beneficial to 
established organic farmers. It may however eventually work against the 
strengthening of the organic sector, as farmers struggle to find appropriate soil types 
and climatic conditions in an “organic/GE Free Island ”. 
 
5.3.2.3   Balancing interests and the issue of sensitivity 
 
The real issue that a court will have to deal will is again how to strike a fair balance 
between competing interests in a situation where one of those interests fails to 
internalise adverse effects and the other is unwilling to accept them. A court will have 
to consider whether or not the organic sector constitutes a sensitive user. To come to 
this conclusion a careful assessment of tolerance thresholds for organic and non-
organic GMO free producers will have to be undertaken. If all GMO Free producers 
adopted a similar standard, given the expanding market, it might be difficult to argue 
that they are all sensitive. If however the organic sector adopts a higher standard, a 
court favouring the preservation of opportunities, could conceivably apply the label of 
sensitivity and exclude liability on those grounds. From the organic sector’s point of 
view such a move would destroy the opportunity to be truly GMO free. 
It is arguable that classing organics as sensitive is inappropriate in the 
circumstances. GMO technology is an outstanding example of scientific innovation. 
Years of research and incalculable sums of money have been invested in the 
technology. If science is capable of such innovation, then it should also be able to 
provide technological answers to avoid contamination. The evidence suggests that 
such techniques are under development and will become available at some time in the 
future.442 However in the haste to get GMO products onto the market there seems to 
be something of a time lag between production and response. If there is the possibility 
of applying technology that could prevent contamination of organic farms, and indeed 
of the wider environment, then those who come after us would surely prefer to see 
opportunities for an uncontaminated environment preserved. Although HSNO will 
provide relief where a GMO farmer creates contamination in breach of conditions 
imposed, in the absence of breach of condition, the common law can potentially fill 
the gap. Where, in these latter circumstances, the ground of sensitivity (or any other) 
prevents the operation of the common law, no other remedy will exist and loss will be 
                                                 
442 For discussion see supra n 183. 
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socialised. This situation threatens the viability of organic, or any other GMO-free, 
production as currently conceived. A refusal to allow recovery would need to be 
based on the premise that no one has a right to choose to be GMO Free. Any such 
decision will provoke the need for growers who wish to be GE free to utilise other 
measures such as controlled spatial groupings of activities to remain free from 
contamination. A more flexible approach to land use is one where effects that cause 
decertification are internalised, and in that way organic and non-organic growers 
remain compatible and retain choice in terms of location. Application of the common 
law so as to provide for internalisation of effects will also potentially be consistent 
with the current approach to internalisation taken by the courts pursuant to the RMA. 
 
5.3.3 Rylands v Fletcher 
 
A separate argument could also be raised relying on the doctrine of Rylands v 
Fletcher. One element, which sets the doctrine apart from nuisance, is the requirement 
that the defendant should be making a non-natural use of land in carrying out the 
offending activity. Whether or not the escape of GMO contaminating seeds or pollen 
can be considered non-natural will depend upon the court’s assessment of the use of 
genetically modified plants in farming.443 The fact that the emanation is from a 
“natural” source does not appear to be an obstacle. The escape of thistle seeds from a 
thistle infestation has grounded liability in nuisance.444
 
5.4  Liability of Approving agencies 
 
A final consideration is the prospect of an organic farmer attaching liability to the 
agency that approved the release of the GMO organism. In New Zealand there is 
potential for an organic farmer to recover for damage resulting from the exercise of a 
permission granted by ERMA under the HSNO Act. Liability could arise in nuisance, 
negligence or misfeasance of public office.445
 
                                                 
443 For discussion see Lee, supra n 432. 
444 Todd Report, supra n 362 at 13. 
445 Royal Commission, supra n 297 at 320. 
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Conclusion 
 
In New Zealand the common law has yet to be rigorously tested in relation to 
contamination of an organic farm and consequent loss of certification. Though the 
common law has been held out as providing remedies that support the organic farm in 
the face of pollution a careful study reveals that clear protection extends only so far as 
physical damage to a level compatible with general damage. Even in that position, 
problems with causation are possible. To receive the full protection of the common 
law, the organic farmer needs to overcome the hurdles of foreseeability, sensitivity, 
and statutory permission and make an appeal to “reason” for the purposes of survival. 
Factual conditions creating known vulnerability and avoidability may potentially 
constitute sufficient reason to overcome those hurdles and enable recovery. Courts 
will be required to decide whether organic farms are entitled to protection by the 
common law or obliged to defend themselves by whatever means remaining. Reliance 
upon regulatory schemes may offer an alternative option for preservation of integrity. 
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VI. The Regulatory Framework 
 
6.1 The Resource Management Act 1991 (the RMA) 
 
6.1.1 Introduction 
 
The RMA is the principal statute that governs the environment in New Zealand. 
Introduced in 1991 it has been both lauded and reviled.446 The RMA has weathered 
assaults from all sides, the more vocal of which culminated in a reform and 
amendment process that arguably failed to please anyone.447 Business continues to 
consider that the Act as unnecessarily constrains its development interests,448 whereas 
conservationists doubt the efficacy of its environmental protection. The RMA by its 
very nature it evokes an emotional response. People look to the Act to favour their 
position, whether it is to use or conserve resources. The struggle of the organic sector 
to be free of unwanted contaminants is representative of other similar tussles between 
those who desire different outcomes relative to the environment.449
The legislation however expresses only the intent to sustainably manage 
resources. There has been much criticism of the lack of clarity in s 5, in failing to state 
which interests are preferred. However human interaction with the environment is 
complex, and a degree of openness in language allows for a full consideration of all 
conflicting interests. To survive and flourish we need to use and develop resources 
and we need to protect the environment. It is the weight or importance given to these 
relative factors that ultimately charts the way forward. It is unarguable that via s 5 of 
the RMA constraints are placed upon the use and development of resources, yet it is 
the extent of these constraints that is of real concern to the organic sector. 
A focus of this thesis is to ascertain what the RMA can deliver to the organic 
sector. This delivery is influenced by the Act’s general implementation. Recent 
research450 questions the effectiveness of the Act, and suggests shortcomings 
                                                 
446 Salmon, P “Access to Environmental Justice” (1998) 1 NZELJ 4. 
447 Hawkins, R “The Resource Amendment Act 2003: Does it give comfort to anyone?” (2003) 
Resource Management Journal Issue 2 Volume XI, 5.  
448 Rennie, H “Viewing the RMA as creating a legitimate property market, rather than blackmail” in 
Papers Presented at the Working with the RMA (2003) Wellington 2. 
449 For case studies discussing contrasting stakeholder positions in discrete areas of New Zealand (Far 
North, Tauranga, Queenstown and Tasman Districts) see Eriksen, N et al, Planning for Sustainability: 
New Zealand under the RMA (2003).  
450 Ibid, 283. 
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including problems with mandate design, lack of funding to build capacity and 
implement plans, and inadequate guidance and support from Central government. The 
effectiveness of any measures evaluated will be against this general backdrop. In 
terms of assessing whether the RMA can be used to secure Outcome 1 the key 
considerations are: 
 
1. Can the RMA be used to regulate chemical drift and GMO contamination? 
This involves an examination of RMA powers and functions. In particular it 
necessitates an examination of the interrelationship of the RMA and the 
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO). This will be 
the subject of Chapter 6. 
 
2. Where the RMA can be used, does the Act in principle support avoidance of 
adverse effects, where the presence of those effects would result in 
decertification of an organic farm? This will be the subject of Chapter 7. 
 
3. What are the techniques or methods available pursuant to the RMA to best 
achieve Outcome 1? This will be the subject of Chapter 8. 
 
6.2.  Can the RMA be used to regulate chemical drift and GMO 
contamination?   
 
6.2.1 Framework 
 
The RMA creates a framework for the use and protection of natural and physical 
resources. As described by Justice Barker: 451
  
Part II of the Act sets out its governing purposes and principles which infuse its 
decision-making and policy-formulating procedures. Of these, the purpose (being 
the promotion of sustainable management as defined in s 5) is paramount. At each 
operational level, policy statements, plans and rules promulgated under the Act are 
linked back to the core provisions of Part II. Moreover Part II must be considered in 
determining any resource consent application… 
                                                 
451 Falkner v Gisborne District Council [1995] 3 NZLR 622, 632. 
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…This represents a relatively new form of statutory organisation; the Act is 
structured around a fundamental purpose and various principles which function as 
substantive guidance to decision makers at a localised level… 
…The Act prescribes a comprehensive, interrelated system of rules, plans, policy 
statements and procedures all guided by the touchstone of sustainable management 
of resources. The whole thrust of the regime is the regulation and control of the use 
of land, sea and air. 
 
Section 5 of the Act focuses on managing effects of activities to enable people and 
communities to provide for their social cultural and economic wellbeing and health 
and safety. In dealing with the competing interests encapsulated in s 5, the courts have 
adopted a pragmatic approach. Refusing to adopt a doctrinal position that may favour 
one position over another, current judgments reflect the overall broad judgment 
approach.452 As expressed by Sheppard J: 453
 
The method of applying s5 then involves an overall broad judgment of whether a 
proposal would promote the sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources. That recognises that the Act has a single purpose (…). Such a judgment 
allows for comparison of conflicting considerations and the scale or degree of them, 
and their relative significance or proportion to the final outcome. 
 
The RMA mandates the preparation of plans at central, regional and district level as a 
means of achieving the purpose of the Act.454 The focus of the RMA is upon 
controlling the effects of activities, rather than the activities themselves. The intention 
was to create a flexible framework, whereby innovation and technology drove 
environmental choices, as opposed to rigid categorisation linked to wise use and 
control.455 The aim was maximum environmental benefit with minimum 
environmental regulation of the market.456 The Act segregates resource use by type,457 
                                                 
452 For further discussion see Skelton, supra 240, and by way of contrast see Upton, S, Atkins, H and 
Willis, G "Sections 5 re-visited:  A Critique of Skelton and Memon's analysis" Resource Management 
Journal X: November 2002, 10. 
453 North Shore City Council v Auckland Regional Council [1997] NZRMA 59, 94. 
454 For empirical research and discussion on the effectiveness of the plan making process see generally 
Day, M, Backhurst, M., and Ericksen, N., et al., "District Plan Implementation Under the RMA: 
Confessions of a Resource Consent." Hamilton: The University of Waikato, The International Global 
Change Institute (IGCI), Second PUCM Report to Government. [April 2003] 
http://www.waikato.ac.nz/igci.  
455 Eriksen supra n 431 at 12. 
456 Ibid. 
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and allocates responsibility for each resource group to local and central government 
agencies.458 Resource use rests upon a foundation of presumptions459 designed to 
infuse flexibility and efficiency in managing the environment. In particular, a 
permissive presumption applies to land use activities,460 in that activities are presumed 
to be permitted unless controlled by rules in a Plan. By way of contrast, most 
discharges are presumed to be prohibited unless expressly allowed by a rule in a 
Regional Plan or resource consent.461
Effects of activities are controlled by classification of activity types462 via a 
relevant plan, and an associated resource consent process.463 Public participation is 
provided for by way of consultation and submission at both plan making464 and 
resource consent junctures.465 At resource consent stage, an applicant is obliged to 
produce an Assessment of Environmental Effects,466 detailing effects and proposing 
ways of avoiding, remedying or mitigating those effects.467 The Act also makes 
detailed provision for enforcement and monitoring.468
 
6.2.2 Land use under the RMA 
 
In general, territorial authorities via a mandatory District Plan, control land use.469 
The ability of the authority to make rules is governed by its functions set out in s 31 of 
the RMA. These functions include the control of any actual or potential effects of the 
use, development, or protection of land, including inter alia for the purpose of the 
prevention or mitigation of any adverse effects of the storage, use, disposal, or 
transportation of hazardous substances. Although this latter function is shared with the 
regional authority, where responsibility is not specified in the Regional Policy 
                                                                                                                                            
457Part III, Duties and Restrictions, ss 9-15, Land use, (including existing use rights and subdivision), 
coastal marine, river and lake beds, water and discharges. 
458 Part IV. 
459 Set out in ss 9-15. 
460 Section 9. 
461 Section 15. 
462 Section 2 and Part VI section 77B.The categories of activities are: permitted, controlled, restricted 
discretionary, discretionary, non-complying and prohibited. 
463 Part VI. 
464 First Schedule. 
465 Sections 93-95. 
466 Section 88. 
467 Fourth Schedule. 
468 Part XII. 
469 Section 73. 
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Statement the territorial authority will be primarily responsible for hazardous 
substances and the Regional authority for natural hazards.470
The scope of a territorial authority’s role is very broad. Control of the use of land 
in respect of hazardous substances is explicit. Although not so unambiguous in 
respect of genetically modified organisms, the function to control effects of land use 
and development would readily contemplate the control of genetically modified 
organisms, as it does the myriad of other activities carried out on land in New 
Zealand. A problem arises however when separate legislation exists to control the 
activity in question. The extent, to which the exercise of functions of local 
government under the RMA is fettered by HSNO, will be the subject of a later section 
of this thesis. 
When creating a plan the territorial authority must carry out an evaluation 
pursuant to s 32 of the RMA to scrutinize the effectiveness of the plan. In doing so the 
authority must consider the extent to which each objective is the most appropriate 
way to achieve the purpose of the Act; and whether, having regard to their efficiency 
and effectiveness, the policies, rules, or other methods are the most appropriate for 
achieving the objectives.471 The evaluation must take into account the benefits and 
costs of policies, rules, or other methods and the risk of acting or not acting if there is 
uncertain or insufficient information about the subject matter of the policies, rules, or 
other methods.472 A plan may be challenged on the basis of an inadequate s 32 
evaluation, but only by way of a submission during the plan making process.473
A District Plan must identify the significant resource management issues of the 
District, and define objectives, policies, methods, reasons and results anticipated in 
respect of such issues. District Plans offer significant potential to resolve conflict or 
incompatibility between land use activities. Zoning and related performance standards 
are common tools used in Plans to achieve compatibility between activities. Layered 
upon and connected to these mechanisms is the consent process,474 which offers 
further methods of control via approval or otherwise and the imposition of a wide 
range of conditions pursuant to s 108. 
 
                                                 
470 Section 62 (2). 
471 Section 32 (3)(a) & (b). 
472 Section 32 (4)(a) & (b). 
473 Section 32A. 
474 Part VI. 
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6.2.3 Discharge under the RMA 
 
Pursuant to s 30 of the RMA Regional Councils have a wide range of responsibilities 
including: the control of discharges of contaminants into or onto land, air, or water 
and discharges of water into water,475 and the control of the use of land for the 
purpose of the prevention or mitigation of any adverse effects of the storage, use, 
disposal, or transportation of hazardous substances.476 A regional authority must 
prepare a Regional Policy Statement in accordance with its functions.477 The 
Statement must identify the local authority responsible for specifying inter alia the 
objectives, policies, and methods for the control of the use of land to prevent or 
mitigate the adverse effects of the storage, use, disposal, or transportation of 
hazardous substances.478
Preparation of Regional Plans is voluntary,479 yet it is unusual to find a regional 
authority without some form of plan in place.480 The plans are often prepared in 
chapters linked to function. A s 32 evaluation is required in a similar manner to 
District Plans. Section 65 (3) defines circumstances when consideration should be 
given to preparation of a Regional Plan and these include where there exists 1) any 
significant conflict between the use, development, or protection of natural and 
physical resources or the avoidance or mitigation of such conflict and 2) Any actual or 
potential adverse effects of the storage, use, disposal, or transportation of hazardous 
substances which may be avoided or mitigated. 
Section 15 of the RMA controls the discharge of contaminants. The definition of 
contaminant is broad.481 The breadth of the scope of the definition would readily 
contemplate agrichemicals. Accordingly Regional Plans can and do regulate the 
discharge of agrichemicals into the environment. It is less clear whether the definition 
of discharge extends to new organisms.482  
We have examined the ways in which GMO contamination can arise. These 
include pollen transfer, mixing of crops, transfer of seed, volunteers and seed 
                                                 
475 Section 30 (1)(f). 
476 Section 30 (1)(c)(v). 
477 Section 61(1). 
478 Section 62 (1)(i)(ii). 
479 Section 65(1). 
480 Pursuant to s78A a local authority may now combine district and Regional Plans and or policy 
statements into 1 document. 
481 Section 2. 
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impurities. Whether the transfer of heritable material, such as pollen or seed, to air 
water of land constitutes a discharge is arguable. The term discharge includes emit, 
deposit, and allow to escape.483 Case law has established that the word discharge is to 
be extended to cause to discharge.484 Failing to take adequate precautions to prevent 
the escape of a contaminant will equate to allowing to escape.485 A causal connection 
must be established between the person and the discharge.486 It has been argued,487 
that the inability to control pollen release in general farming conditions, suggests that 
there can be no discharge of a GMO contaminant. This is a troubling conclusion, and 
if accepted could lead to an inability to regulate some of the more pervasive 
environmental threats such as many non-point source discharges. Should the escape of 
pollen or seed to the environment be treated differently to the escape of animal 
effluent or gas? 
Lack of control is considered in relation to offences pursuant to the Act. Although 
an offence will be one of strict liability,488 the Act provides a number of statutory 
defences,489 which includes a defence of inability to control an event or action. The 
defence provides:490
 
(b)  That the action or event to which the prosecution relates was due to an event 
beyond the control of the defendant, including natural disaster, mechanical 
failure, or sabotage, and in each case ... – 
(i)  The action or event could not reasonably have been foreseen or been 
provided against by the defendant; and 
(ii)  The effects of the action or event were adequately mitigated or remedied 
by the defendant after it occurred. 
 
The categories referred to in (b) above are inclusive and cover natural disaster, 
mechanical failure or sabotage. Although not closed, it cannot be said that the 
categories would readily contemplate GMO contamination via “natural” processes. 
Natural disaster is undefined by the Act, but may have some correlation to the s 2 
                                                                                                                                            
482 Cooney Lees Morgan, Role of RMA in controlling Genetically Modified Organisms Legal opinion 
provided to the Chief Executive, Environment Bay of Plenty Regional Council, (April 2003) 2. 
483 Section 2. 
484 McKnight v NZ Biogas Industries [1994] NZRMA 258 at 265 (CA).      
485 Ibid, 267. 
486 Ibid, 265. 
487 Cooney Lees Morgan, supra n 482. 
488 Section 341(1). 
489 Section 341(2). 
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definition of natural hazard that includes a range of atmospheric or earth or water 
related occurrences that adversely affect human life, property or other aspect of the 
environment. In ordinary language, it could be argued that the event of a natural 
hazard occurring will lead to a “natural disaster”. It is arguable that pollen or seed 
transfer is insufficiently elemental in nature to qualify within the definition. 
Furthermore the term disaster suggests a calamity or catastrophe that causes great 
destruction or ruin.491 Although GMO contamination can cause great destruction, 
whether such an event could be considered a catastrophe is arguable. 
In addition reliance upon the defence, or lack of causal connection, rests upon the 
assumption that pollen and seed transfer cannot be controlled. This may be true in 
some situations, but not necessarily all. Emerging research and associated techniques 
are identifying a range of ways of preventing contamination.492 In a situation where a 
producer knew of the ability of a crop to create pollen or seed transfer which could 
contaminate neighbouring crops, and where mechanisms for control were available, it 
would appear unreasonable to extend the defence of inability to control. 
In the event that a discharge is proven, the next obstacle is to consider whether a 
GMO can be considered a contaminant. Whether gene transfer between 
microorganisms and organisms, could constitute contamination is unclear, and will 
become a mixed question of science and law493 in relation to the particular organism. 
In terms of organic farming, one of the greatest threats is presented by incursion 
of GMO seed or pollen, from neighbouring farms.494 The word contamination is 
commonly used in relation to GMO, but capture by the RMA definition is open to 
argument. As the definition of contaminant is inclusive, it could include any natural 
and ordinary meaning of the word. The definition of contaminant extends to cover any 
substance including micro-organisms which when discharged will change the 
physical, chemical, or biological condition of the land, air or water. The term micro-
organism is undefined in the Act, but its dictionary meaning is: any organism, such as 
a virus, of microscopic size.495 In turn organism is defined as any living animal or 
                                                                                                                                            
490 Section 341(2)(b)(i). 
491 McLeod, W (ed.) The New Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus (1992) 279. 
492 Defra, supra, n 183.  
493 Cooney Lees supra n 482 at 3. 
494 The experience of Canadian organic farmers in the Western provinces is a clear example of such a 
threat. 
495 Collins Dictionary supra, n 491 at 630. 
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plant, including any bacterium or virus.496 Whether the seed or pollen of an organism 
will qualify as an organism is not clear from the Act, and in other areas such as 
intellectual property rights in plants, is the subject of debate 
The escape of viable seed and pollen is capable of creating an organism, but this 
may be inadequate for the purpose of the definition. The dictionary definition of seed 
is: a mature fertilized plant ovule, consisting of an embryo and its food store 
surrounded by a protective seed coat.497 The point at which an embryo becomes an 
organism is a question of science as yet unresolved by the Courts. A recent 
Amendment to HSNO498 sheds some light on the matter. It contains a definition of the 
term genetic element as follows:499
 
“genetic element, in relation to a new organism, means--- 
heritable material; and 
any genes, nucleic acids, or other molecules from the organism that can, without 
human intervention, replicate in a biological system and transfer a character or trait 
to another organism or to subsequent generations of the organism. 
 
Heritable material is then defined as: 
 
“heritable material, in relation to a new organism, means viable biological 
material, including gametes and spores, arising from the organism that can, without 
human intervention, regenerate the same organism or reproduce anew generation of 
the same species as the organism. 
 
Although caution needs to be exercised when drawing implications from other 
statutes, where a definition is undefined by one, and expressly defined by the other, 
the latter may be of some assistance. The scientific nature of the definition could 
possibly also support adoption of the definition. If the definitions were adopted in the 
context of the RMA, it would become difficult to argue that seed or pollen constitutes 
an organism or micro-organism. Rather seed or pollen would be treated as heritable 
material of an organism. Exclusion from the term micro-organism is not fatal, as it 
                                                 
496 Collins Dictionary supra, n 491 at 698. 
497 Collins Dictionary supra, n 491 at 903. 
498 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms (Genetically Modified Organisms) Amendment Act 
2002 
499 Section 5 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms (Genetically Modified Organisms) 
Amendment Act 2002. 
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remains possible to define the material as a substance, which has a very wide 
dictionary definition:500
 
Substance n.1. the tangible basic matter of which a thing consists. 
 
Pollen is clearly defined in the dictionary as a substance:501  
 
Pollen n. a substance produced by the anthers of seed-bearing plants, consisting of 
numerous fine grains containing the male gametes.  
 
Whether a seed has the same elemental nature is open to argument. Pollen (and 
possibly seed) is therefore within the reasonable contemplation of the definition of 
contamination, provided that it can be proved that the escape changed the physical, 
biological and chemical condition of the land.502 It is arguable that when a seed is 
introduced to soil and grows that it changes the condition of the land in all three ways. 
As for pollen its mere presence may effect change,503 but the greater change is 
wrought when the pollen changes the physical, biological and chemical condition of 
what is growing on the land. Can crops be considered part of the land, or are crops 
simply a use of the land? Land is defined by the RMA504 to include land covered by 
water and the air space above land. This is a broad, inclusive definition, and it is 
unclear whether the definition extends to cover plants grown on the land. Section 9 
does not specifically contemplate crops as being part of the land, although the 
removal of a tree has been considered as consistent with subsections (b) and (c) 
above, thus constituting a use of land in terms of s.9.505 However the situation is not 
entirely clear as on appeal the Court of Appeal discussed the use in terms of someone 
being on the land with a chainsaw, as opposed to removing the tree.506
                                                 
501 Collins Dictionary supra, n 491 at 765. 
500 Collins Dictionary supra, n 491 at 1001. 
502 Section 2, definition of contaminant. 
503  Works Infrastructure Ltd v Taranaki Regional Council [2002] NZRMA 517 (HC). In this decision 
the High Court found that in relation to a discharge of bitumen a substance was defined as a 
contaminant if it caused any change to the condition of the land. The extent of the change was 
immaterial. A claim of de minimis for the purposes of s15 (1)(d) failed.   
504 Section 2. 
505 Supra, Williams n 18 at 124, with reference to Smith v Auckland City Council [1996] NZRMA 276 
(HC). 
506 Smith, ibid. 
 112
Generally unless a statute expressly adopts a definition, that definition is unlikely 
to apply.507 However given the broad and inclusive nature of the definition in the 
RMA, reference to other statutes may not necessarily be ruled out. The Land Transfer 
Act 1952 is the principal statute in New Zealand governing dealings with land. Land 
is defined by s 2 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 to include plantations, gardens, mines, 
minerals, and quarries, and all trees and timber thereon. If the RMA definition was 
deemed to extend to the Land Transfer Act 1952 definition, then it could readily be 
argued that pollen (and seed) transfer is capable of altering the chemical, biological 
and physical condition of the land. Accordingly it could be argued that transfer by 
either GMO pollen and seed constitutes a discharge of contaminants pursuant to s 15. 
This would enable a regional council to regulate the discharge of new organisms, in 
addition to the functions of a territorial authority. 
 One of the main difficulties with such a conclusion is that the definition would 
not necessarily be exclusive to GMOs. Potentially the discharge could extend to 
transfer of all heritable material, GMO or not. Whether a court would consider such a 
definition desirable, as a matter of policy, remains to be seen. However there is a 
common law parallel, in terms of the ability to create a nuisance by virtue of 
spreading thistle seeds.508 The key issue would be to ascertain a clear cut off point in 
terms of what is reasonable. 
 
6.2.4 Discharge and presumptions 
 
The presumptions at work below the surface of s 15 vary according to the nature of 
the discharge. In relation to discharges to water, and all those from industrial or trade 
premises, the presumption applying is restrictive. Those discharges cannot occur 
unless expressly permitted by a rule in a plan or resource consent. Where a discharge 
to air occurs, that is not from an industrial or trade premise, the permissive 
presumption will apply, and consent will only be required if a rule in a plan is 
contravened. However, if the discharge is applied in a manner that may result in the 
contaminant entering water, the restrictive presumption, will apply. 
                                                 
507 Burrows, J Statute Law in New Zealand (2003) 289. 
508 Todd Report, n 362. 
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The definition of industrial and trade premises, expressly excludes production 
land.509 The effect of this exclusion is that discharges into the air from agricultural, 
pastoral, horticultural and forestry production are subject to the permissive 
presumption. Only where an activity contravenes a rule will consent be required. 
Where the Plan is silent, (unless the Plan itself reverses the presumption),510 an 
activity is presumed permitted. In this way the provisions of a Regional Plan assume 
great importance in terms of discharges to air. The same importance need not 
necessarily attach to discharges to water, or land where it may enter water, due to the 
fact that if the Plan is silent, then the activities are presumed prohibited unless consent 
is obtained. 
Where resource consent is required for a discharge permit, considerations 
supplementary to s 104 apply in terms of the granting of the consent.511 The consent 
authority must consider the nature of the discharge and the sensitivity of the receiving 
environment to adverse effects, the applicant’s reasons for the proposed choice and 
any possible alternative methods of discharge, including discharge into any other 
receiving environment. This is useful for organic farms. Provision for focus on the 
sensitivity of the receiving environment must by its nature contemplate protection of 
that environment. The extent of potential protection will be considered in chapter 7.  
Pursuant to s 108 of the RMA conditions may be attached with a view to 
avoiding, remedying or mitigating adverse effects. In relation to discharges these may 
include conditions that requires the consent holder to adopt the best practicable option 
to prevent or minimise any actual or likely adverse effect on the environment of the 
discharge, and other discharges (if any) made by the person from the same site or 
source.512
In addition, s 108(8) requires the consent authority; prior to granting a discharge 
permit subject to a condition pursuant to s 108(2) (e) to be satisfied that the inclusion 
of that condition is the most efficient and effective means of preventing or minimising 
any actual or likely adverse effect on the environment. In considering this, the 
authority should have regard to the nature of the discharge, the receiving environment 
and other alternatives, including any condition requiring the observance of minimum 
                                                 
509 Section 2.The definition of industrial and trade premises previously included factory farms, but this 
provision was deleted by the Resource Management Amendment Act 1997. 
510 Pursuant to s 68 (5)(e) a Regional Plan rule may require a resource consent to be obtained for an 
activity causing, or likely to cause, adverse effects not covered by the plan. 
511 Section 105(1)(a). 
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standards of quality of the receiving environment. Provision for the adoption of the 
best practicable option may in some circumstances support mitigation of an effect 
rather than avoidance. This is not necessarily supportive of the organic farmer 
achieving Outcome 1, unless the mitigation was sufficiently rigorous to reduce 
contamination below certification levels. However due to the need to consider the 
sensitivity of the receiving environment, the presence of an organic farm in the 
vicinity may dilute the threat posed by the best practicable option. Reference back to s 
5 may be the decisive factor.  
As the principal statute regulating the environment, the RMA has the scope to 
regulate threats posed to an organic farm to the extent consistent with the purpose of 
the Act. In terms of threats regulated, territorial authorities control land use, and this 
could potentially extend to control in relation to effects from the use of hazardous 
substances and GMO. Regional authorities have clear powers in relation to discharge 
of chemical contaminants, although power in respect of new organisms is not certain. 
This will depend not only on whether: 1) the transfer of heritable material can 
constitute a discharge; 2) genetic material can be termed a contaminant, but also upon 
the extent to which the operation of the RMA is circumscribed by HSNO. That is the 
next issue for consideration. 
 
6.3 The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO)  
 
6.3.1 Hazardous substances 
 
The Act sets out a complicated regime for the approval and control of hazardous 
substances. The part of the Act controlling hazardous substances came into force in 
July 2001. The Act is currently in transition, during which time existing substances 
will be transferred to the new regime.513 New substances will be subject to the 
controls described below and existing substances will be dealt with pursuant to the 
transitional provisions in Parts XI-XV of HSNO. Section 28 of HSNO provides for 
applications for approval to import or manufacture hazardous substances.  
                                                                                                                                            
512 Section 108(2)(e). 
513 Agrichemical Trespass Ministerial Advisory Committee, Final report to the Minister of the 
Environment Ministry for the Environment, (2002) Wellington 32. 
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In order to determine approval ERMA must first classify the substance. A series 
of regulations has been promulgated to add operational detail.514 Initially the 
Hazardous Substances (Minimum Degrees of Hazard) Regulations 2001 are applied to 
ascertain whether or not a substance is hazardous. When one or more of the thresholds 
of hazard are met, then the Hazardous Substances (Classification) Regulations 2001 
apply.515 These regulations assign classes of hazardous properties to each 
substance.516 A substance can receive more than one classification, and controls will 
be based on both properties.517 Once classified, controls upon the use of the substance 
are then set by the Hazardous Substances (Classes 1-5 Controls) Regulations 2001 
and the Hazardous Substances (Classes 6, 8 and 9 Controls) Regulations 2001. These 
regulations allow for the setting of exposure limits that are designed to reduce or 
avoid adverse effects on the environment.518 The exposure limits operate to specify 
acceptable concentrations of a hazardous substance in the environment.519 The 
Regulations520 require that acceptable daily exposure values be set in relation to a 
substance. An acceptable daily exposure value (ADE) is defined521 as exposure to an 
amount of a substance for each unit of body weight each day that would not result in 
an appreciable toxic effect on a person over a lifetime of daily exposure to that 
substance.522 The potential daily exposure value (PDE) is then calculated from the 
acceptable daily exposure value by taking into account different ways or routes by 
which a person may be exposed to the substance each day.523 One of the routes for 
exposure is food, and for pesticides and veterinary medicines, the PDE for food 
                                                 
514 Ministry for the Environment "Acting together-links between the HSNO Act and the RMA -A 
Training workshop -workshop manual" [May 2003] <http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications> Module 3, 
Table 3.4 
515 Ibid, Module 3, para 3.2.2. 
516 Regulation 5 identifies 9 categories as follows: 1-explosiveness, 2-flammability, gases, 3-
flammability, liquids, 4-flammability, solids, 5-capacity to oxidize, 6-toxicity, 7-unallocated, 8 -
corrosiveness and 9-ecotoxicity. 
517 Supra n 515 at Module 3, para 3.2.2. 
518 See for instance Regulation 11, Hazardous Substances (Classes, 6, 8 and 9 Controls) Regulations 
2001that requires that acceptable daily exposure values be set for a substance with an appreciable toxic 
effect, likely to be present in the environment, in food or to be ingested. 
519 Supra n 515 at Module 4, 4.2.2. 
520 For example the Hazardous Substances (Classes, 6, 8 and 9 Controls) Regulations 2001. 
521 For example see Regulation 3, Interpretation, Hazardous Substances (Classes, 6, 8 and 9 Controls) 
Regulations 2001. 
522 From information supplied by John Reeve, Programme Manager (Toxicology and Residues), 
Agricultural Compounds and Medicines Group, NZFSA, (23.01.04). The ADE is established from 
mammalian toxicology data. 
523 For example see Regulation 3, Interpretation, Hazardous Substances (Classes, 6, 8 and 9 Controls) 
Regulations 2001. 
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defaults to 50 per cent of the ADE unless there is reasoned argument to the 
contrary.524  
From these 2 values are then derived the Environmental Exposure Limit525(EEL) 
and the Tolerable Exposure Limit526(TEL) for a substance. An EEL is described as 
representing:527
 
… the maximum concentration of an ecotoxic substance (or ecotoxic component of 
a substance) in an environmental medium that will present a low risk of adverse 
environmental effects to organisms in non-target areas. It establishes the maximum 
concentration of a substance legally allowable in a particular (non-target) 
environmental medium (e.g. soil or sediment or water), including deposition of a 
substance onto surfaces such as in spray drift deposition. 
 
In contrast to the EEL’s application to the wider environment, the TEL has specific 
application to impacts upon humans. It has been described as:528
   
…the level below which a toxic substance, or component of a toxic substance, in an 
environmental medium (air, water, or soil) is unlikely to cause an adverse effect in a 
human. A TEL therefore represents the maximum allowable concentration of a 
substance legally allowable in a particular environmental medium, to protect 
humans from any adverse effects. 
 
In addition to controls related to classification and exposure limits, regulations 
provide for controls on the life cycle of a substance to ensure that the substance is 
managed well throughout the life cycle. These controls include packaging labelling 
and disposal requirements, emergency management rules, requirements to track 
certain substances and rules requiring handlers to obtain relevant handling training.529 
                                                 
524 From information supplied by John Reeve, Programme Manager (Toxicology and Residues), 
Agricultural Compounds and Medicines Group, NZFSA, (23.01.04). 
525 Defined by Regulation 3, Interpretation, Hazardous Substances (Classes, 6, 8 and 9 Controls) 
Regulations 2001,as: means a concentration of a substance in an environmental medium as set in 
accordance with Part 3. 
526 Defined by Regulation 3, Interpretation, Hazardous Substances (Classes, 6, 8 and 9 Controls) 
Regulations 2001,as: means a concentration of a substance in an environmental medium as set in 
accordance with regulation 23. 
527 Supra n 515 at Module 4,73. 
528 Ibid, Module 4,74. 
529 Hazardous Substances (Packaging) Regulations 2001, Hazardous Substances (Identification) 
Regulations 2001, Hazardous Substances (Disposal) Regulations 2001, Hazardous Substances 
(Emergency Management) Regulations 2001, Hazardous Substances (Tracking) Regulations 2001, 
Hazardous Substances (Personnel Qualifications) Regulations 2001. 
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Failure to comply with controls imposed by HSNO or regulations, (or acting in 
contravention of the Act in a variety of other ways), will result in an offence being 
committed pursuant to s 109 of the Act. Section 114 of the Act creates penalties in 
respect of offences and allows for the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment or a 
fine not exceeding $500,000. 
 
6.3.1.1 Agrichemicals, HSNO and organics. 
 
Most agrichemicals, with biocidal action, will fall within the definition of hazardous 
substance under HSNO.530 Accordingly, depending on the toxicity of the substance, 
and the ability to create adverse effects on the environment controls may apply to any 
given chemical. Such controls could range from exposure limits that may not be 
exceeded, to requirements that those applying the substances have approved 
qualifications and are not using leaky equipment.531 The Act thus focuses upon 
managing the effects to an acceptable level as opposed to avoiding effects on the 
environment. Focus is upon the avoidance of appreciable harm to humans and 
limiting impacts on the environment. There may be situations where all effects of a 
substance on the environment need to be entirely avoided, however this will be 
toxicity dependent, and judged on tolerance levels. 
In most situations, however, TELs and EELs will be used to manage substances 
to the acceptable exposure level. These levels acquire significance for organics due to 
the relationship with maximum residue levels (MRL). Agrichemicals present a threat 
to an organic farm where the use will result in excessive residue levels of agricultural 
compounds in organic produce.532 Generally the organic standard is 10 per cent of the 
applicable MRL.533 The MRLS are defined by the New Zealand (Maximum Residue 
Levels of Agricultural Compounds) Food Standards 2002. The NZFSA, as the agency 
responsible for food production, sets the MRLS to the equivalent level of a TEL 
(Tolerable Exposure Limit) for food set by ERMA pursuant to HSNO. A MRL may 
not exceed the potential daily exposure value (PDE) established by ERMA for food, 
and all decisions on MRLs by the New Zealand Food Safety Authority will be subject 
                                                 
530 ATMAC, supra n 513 at Appendix 6, as per the definition of agrichemical contained in the 
committee’s terms of reference: any substance manufactured for the purpose of causing mortality, 
inhibited growth, or inhibited reproduction in an organism–a term which corresponds with the term 
biocidal action in the Hazardous Substances (Minimum Degrees of Hazard) Regulations 2001. 
531 Ibid 74. 
532 Supra, n 114.  
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to audit by ERMA upon full transfer of veterinary medicines under HSNO. Exposure 
levels therefore translate to maximum residue levels (MRL), and further similar 
controls are also established under the Agricultural Compounds and Veterinary 
Medicines Act 1997.534
 
6.3.1.2 HSNO, Hazardous Substances and the Interface with the RMA 
 
Parliament has specifically dealt with the relationship of HSNO to the RMA in terms 
of hazardous substances. Section 23 of the RMA provides that compliance with the 
RMA does not remove the need to comply with other Acts. The RMA contemplates 
that the RMA will work in conjunction with other legislation. Section 142 of HSNO 
expressly enables the RMA to work in conjunction with HSNO, and where necessary 
in respect of hazardous substances to impose more stringent controls. Section 142 
provides: 
 
142. Relationship to other Acts--- 
(2) Every person exercising a power or function under the Resource Management 
Act 1991 relating to the storage, use, disposal or transportation of any 
hazardous substance shall comply with the provisions of this Act and any 
regulations made under the Act. 
(3)  Nothing in subsection (2) of this section shall prevent any person lawfully 
imposing more stringent requirements on the storage, use, disposal, or 
transportation of any hazardous substance than may be required by this Act or 
regulations made under this Act where such requirements are considered 
necessary by that person for the purposes of sustainable management. 
 
Pursuant to this requirement plans prepared under the RMA and consents issued 
would need to be in compliance with controls established under HSNO. Where it can 
be shown to be necessary for the purposes of sustainable management more stringent 
requirements may be imposed via the RMA. The issues therefore become: 
 
1. Do organic farms require more stringent protection in terms of hazardous 
substances? 
                                                                                                                                            
533 Ibid. 
534 This Act controls the use of agricultural compounds and veterinary and requires that agricultural 
compounds must be used in a manner so as not to exceed MRLS in domestic food residues.  
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2. If yes, then is provision of the protection necessary for the purposes of 
sustainable management? 
 
These two issues will be addressed in turn. 
 
6.3.1.3 Do organic farms require more stringent protection? 
 
Due to organic Standards being matched to a tolerance level of 10 per cent of the 
maximum residue levels535 set by the New Zealand (Maximum Residue Levels of 
Agricultural Compounds) Food Standards 2002, an organic farm will require more 
stringent protection than that provided by HSNO. If additional protection is not 
afforded by the RMA, then organic farming as currently defined, is unlikely to be able 
to flourish. This is because matching physical protection levels to achieving MRLS 
(or equivalent TELS or EELS) is likely to produce higher than acceptable residue 
levels in organic produce. This is simply due to the lower threshold of contamination 
provided for by MRLS. There may be rogue situations or types of substance, the use 
of which produce off-target residues to a threshold acceptable to organic standards. 
Yet, where controls do not match standards to be achieved there can be no guarantees. 
Matching RMA controls to require all producers to comply with levels equating to the 
MRL of a substance, does not equate to avoiding effects or internalising them. It has 
the effect of placing the onus on organic farmers to protect themselves to a 10 per cent 
of MRL standard, and fails to adequately address the sensitivity of the receiving 
environment.  
The same issues arise in relation to any substance that is not captured by 
classification as a hazardous substance, yet remains prohibited in an organic regime. 
Failure to control via the RMA will potentially result in breach of organic standards. 
On that basis organic farms need more stringent controls. 
 
6.2.1.4 If yes, then is provision of the protection necessary for the purposes of 
sustainable management? 
 
The term necessary has been viewed by the courts as one of somewhat protean 
dimensions.536 Included within the definition could be something indispensable or 
                                                 
535 This representing the standard applied generally in organic farming systems, for discussion see 
supra n 114. 
536 Environmental Defence Soc v Mangonui County Council [1989] 3 NZLR CA. 280 
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something requisite or needful.537 Protecting activities vulnerable to hazardous 
substances is an instance where additional controls pursuant to the RMA could be 
necessary to overcome resource use conflict. The different positions occupied by the 
relative statutes clarify the existence of the need. HSNO’s focus is directed to the 
substance as opposed the environment. The methods available under HSNO to 
achieve the purpose of the Act include the ability to classify and apply controls. As 
these controls apply universally to a substance once categorised, control is exercised 
across the board wherever the substances are transported, stored, used or disposed of. 
In terms of classification, location has no impact, although the media to which the 
substance is introduced to may affect classification or control.538 By contrast the 
RMA, through its reliance upon Regional and District Plans can create rules that can 
apply on a location basis.539
In this way the RMA provides an additional dimension, in that it can contemplate 
and protect, on a regional or district basis, the environment into which the substance is 
being introduced. We have seen that contemplation of the sensitivity of the receiving 
environment in relation to discharge is a requirement of the RMA. This dimension is 
critical to retaining the integrity of an organic farm. Upon identifying sensitive 
receiving environments such as an organic farm or groupings of vulnerable activities, 
the RMA can tailor measures to protect that particular environment. With HSNO’s 
focus bent upon a particular application avoiding appreciable harm to people, it is, 
unable in many instances to adequately cater for those who wish to obtain a higher 
standard of security. In this way protection via the RMA becomes necessary to fill the 
gap. It will be argued in chapter 7 that avoidance of adverse effects in order to 
preserve the integrity of an organic farm is consistent with promoting sustainable 
management. Where HSNO controls are insufficient to protect a vulnerable activity to 
the requisite degree from hazardous substances, protection pursuant to a resource 
management plan represents a method by which preservation can be achieved.  
Additional controls via the RMA are clearly contemplated in terms of hazardous 
substances, but additional control in relation to new organisms is not explicit. The 
addition of a new category of GMO release has further obscured this issue. 
                                                 
537 Ibid, 280. 
538 For discussion see Ministry for the Environment Workshop, supra n 515.  
539 Central Government also has the ability pursuant to Part V of the RMA to create National 
Environmental Standards and National Policy Statements, which enable the creation of universal 
Standards that are not necessarily location dependant. 
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6.3.2 New Organisms 
 
HSNO regulates genetically modified organisms. The part of the Act dealing with 
new organisms came into force on 29 July 1998. It created a regime whereby ERMA 
was responsible for considering applications for importing of genetically modified 
organism into containment, developing any GMO, conducting contained field trials 
and releasing any contained or imported GMO.      
The Act was supplemented by way of amendment on five further occasions. The 
Amendment in 2002 was notable for the imposition of the moratorium in relation to 
approval to import or release new GMO. The moratorium enabled the Government to 
undertake some of the changes recommended by the Royal Commission. One of the 
recommendations related to a new category of approval entitled conditional release.540 
This new category of release was provided for by way of the Hazardous Substances 
and New Organisms Amendment Act 2003. The addition of the new category 
pursuant to s 14 of the Amendment Act gave greater scope to ERMA to control and 
manage an organism upon release, a power previously lacking. 
Originally when the Act was introduced, release without controls was envisaged 
as the only practical alternative. This was due in part to the perception that once 
released, it would be difficult to control an organism. Apparently due to the recent 
commercialization of GMO, the potential range of uses of GMO technology had not 
been contemplated, nor the associated ability to control.541 With the growth of 
technology came awareness that some GMOs may be able to be released, controlled 
and monitored, hence the need for the new category.542
The management of new organisms is governed by the same purpose and 
principles in HSNO as relate to hazardous substances. All applications for importation 
or release must comply with the minimum standards set out in s 36 HSNO. Section 36 
provides that ERMA must decline any application if the new organism is likely to 
cause significant impacts on native species and habitats, human health and safety, 
genetic diversity or cause disease or be parasitic.543 In addition ERMA must have 
                                                 
540 Recommendation 6.8 (Conditional Release) Royal Commission supra n 297 at 338. 
541 Ministry for the Environment, Public discussion Paper-Improving the Operation of the HSNO Act 
for New Organisms The Ministry, (September 2002) Wellington 20. 
542 Ibid, 21. 
543 For a full description refer to s 36 HSNO. 
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regard to the ability of an organism to create an undesirable self-sustaining population 
and the ease in those circumstances with which the organism could be eradicated.544
With the addition of the conditional release category, further matters are required 
to be considered by ERMA in granting release or otherwise. These include weighing 
whether or not the positive effects of the organism outweigh the adverse effects of the 
organism, having taken into account all the effects and all the controls that would be 
imposed.545 This will include consideration of whether the controls are likely to be 
effective in meeting the objective of the controls.546 Section 38D sets out the 
parameters of the controls that may be attached to a conditional release approval. 
 A conditional release approval may be further constrained by a date of expiry,547 
and by provision to review controls imposed,548 in certain circumstances. Any 
application made for a conditional release approval is required to be publicly 
notified,549 and notification has been extended to include any local authority that, in 
the opinion of the Authority, is likely to have an interest in the application.550 As with 
hazardous substances, an enforcement regime under HSNO applies in the event of a 
breach of the Act. Strict liability applies to some offences,551 which include failure to 
comply with conditions imposed by ERMA and non-observance of a compliance 
order. Part 7A also provides for pecuniary penalties and civil liability for breaches 
relating to new organisms. To the latter strict liability applies, and any proceedings 
are in addition to any other cause of action.552
There has been much debate relating to the scope and effect of the liability 
regime for GMOs.553 Despite the general threat posed to the organic sector by the 
release of new organisms, the recent Amendments to HSNO have strengthened 
ERMA’s ability to protect non-GMO farmers. In particular provision for conditional 
release is likely to be an improvement although the efficacy of the new category is yet 
unproven. However consequent upon the lifting of the moratorium it is incumbent 
                                                 
544 Section 37 HSNO. 
545 Section 38 C (1)(c) HSNO Amendment Act 2003 
546 Section 38(1)(a) HSNO Amendment Act 2003. 
547 Section 38F HSNO Amendment Act 2003. 
548 Section 38 G HSNO Amendment Act 2003. 
549 Section 53 HSNO 
550 Section 53(4)(c) HSNO as amended by s32 (5) HSNOAA 2003. 
551 Section 108 HSNO. 
552 Section 124G HSNO Amendment Act 2003. 
553 For example see Chen Palmer Report, supra n 250 and Christensen, supra, n 435. 
 123
upon the organic industry to work to ensure that the system operates to preserve 
whatever opportunities remain. 
To enable controls to be applied, pursuant to HSNO to protect organic farmers it 
will be necessary to show that such controls are consistent with the purpose and 
principles of the Act. It will be necessary to prove that contamination of a non-GMO 
crop by a new organism is an adverse effect on the environment,554 and that controls 
are required. Claiming that low-level contamination of organic produce by GMO 
constitutes an adverse effect upon the environment may yet be disputed. Even where 
adverse effects are proven, they will still need to be weighed against any positive 
effects. This net benefit approach may yet fail to protect the position of the organic 
farm. Although the explanatory material accompanying the HSNO Amendment Act 
2003 clearly contemplated that the new category of release would by its successful 
operation protect organic and other non-GM human food producers,555 the extent and 
effect of protection for vulnerable activities is by no means assured. The intention to 
“preserve opportunities “ may yet weaken any protection provided to organic farmers. 
Thresholds and extent of contamination will become relevant in the context of each 
application for release. It will be important for the organic industry to have an 
effective voice any application. 
Potential controls to shield organic farms include controls to limit the extent and 
purposes of the use of the organism; to impose an obligation to comply with a 
coexistence standard,556 or to limit its proximity to other organisms, that may be at 
risk. Although it is unarguable that some types of crops can coexist in certain 
circumstances, there will be other situations where the risk of contamination is so high 
that declining the application will be the only sensible option. Close scrutiny of the 
organism, its characteristics and a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the 
environment to which it will released, are basic requisites to achieving coexistence. 
Any assessment would be upon an organism-by-organism basis, and driven by 
the mode of application sought by the applicant. Although there is opportunity for 
public comment, the system leaves little room for a community to plan for the 
preservation of opportunities. Decisions will arise on an ad hoc basis, and will be 
fuelled by market pressures of the day. Whether this represents an adequate way in 
                                                 
554 Section 4 HSNO.  
555 New Organisms and Other Matters Bill 2003, Explanatory note, General policy statement. 
556 Of which there are currently none. 
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which to decide where and how GMO should be released to the environment of New 
Zealand is the subject of much debate.557
A summary of submissions compiled in relation to improvement of HSNO shows 
that some members of the science/research community universities and 
agribusiness/forestry occupy one position in this debate.558 They tend to consider that 
the apolitical environment in which decisions are made by ERMA, the expertise held 
by the authority, efficiencies to be gained by single agency involvement and the 
existing opportunities for public comment are sufficient reason to support the 
involvement of ERMA as the sole agency. Others from the Maori community, local 
authorities and the organic sector do not agree.559 They take the view that ERMA 
should be required to recognise the decisions of local authorities made in respect of 
the release of GMO to a particular environment. They support the use of the RMA to 
construct such controls. This brings us to the interface of the RMA with HSNO. 
 
6.3.2.1 HSNO, new organisms and the interface with the RMA 
 
HSNO is silent in relation to provision by the RMA for more stringent controls upon 
new organisms, although the interface was the subject of debate in the lead up to the 
2003 Amendment.560 The explanatory note to the New Organisms and Other Matters 
Bill discussed the interface: 
 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (the RMA) has not been used to control the 
effects of GMOs or new organisms to date. With the introduction of conditional 
release under HSNO, local authorities may be asked to consider introducing 
additional controls under the RMA. Section 32 of the RMA will require a local 
authority to demonstrate why any such controls are necessary and what effects they 
are addressing that have not already been dealt with under HSNO. However 
conditional releases are a new provision, and the Ministry for the Environment will 
monitor how the interface between the RMA and HSNO is working. 
 
Due to the lack of expression, the extent to which the RMA can be used to provide 
additional controls in respect of GMO becomes a matter of statutory interpretation. 
                                                 
557 Ministry for the Environment, Summary of submissions: Improving the Operation of the HSNO ACT 
for New Organisms The Ministry, (February 2003) Wellington 33. 
558 Ibid, 32. 
559 Ibid. 
560 Ibid. 
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Where inconsistencies or overlap exist between statutes, the Courts have developed 
several approaches to resolve the conflict. Initially the courts will enquire as to 
whether there is in fact any inconsistency between the Acts. If there is inconsistency 
the courts will attempt to determine which of the two statutes was intended to 
govern.561 Burrows asserts that in determining inconsistency the Courts will try to 
find a construction which will allow provisions to stand together.562 In the Canadian 
context,563 this assertion is expressed as the presumption of coherence. Courts will be 
extremely reluctant to rule that there is conflict between statutes, and so long as 
overlapping provisions can apply, it is presumed that they will apply.564 In New 
Zealand, where it is reasonably possible to consider the provisions, so as to give effect 
to both, that is the construction a court will prefer.565 Only where it is clear that the 
two statutes are entirely inconsistent or repugnant to each other will the doctrine of 
implied repeal operate so that the latter statute repeals the earlier. 
The ability of two statutes to stand together is a complex issue, and depends to a 
degree upon whether one statute represents an exclusive code, precluding the 
operation of the other.566 The issue of whether a statute could impose more restrictive 
safety requirements was considered in Director of Civil Aviation v Planning 
Tribunal.567 The High Court considered the interface between the RMA and the Civil 
Aviation Act 1990 and identified the different functions imposed by each regime. It is 
noteworthy that the Court contrasted the role of the Director of Civil Aviation and the 
Planning Tribunal, and found that whilst it was the function of the Director of Civil 
Aviation to set minimum air safety standards, the Planning Tribunal was entitled to 
take a more particular look at the communities affected. Due to the differences in 
roles the Court was able to give effect to each statute without creating conflict. The 
extent to which HSNO represents an exclusive code, in respect of the use of new 
organisms, ousting the jurisdiction of the RMA is therefore at issue.  
 
                                                 
561 Burrows, supra n 507 at 319.The courts will look at the policies and purposes underlying the 
provisions, and consider extrinsic evidence where necessary. 
562 Ibid, 308. Burrows cites Re Silver Brothers Limited [1932] AC 514 at 523. 
563 While not binding on New Zealand courts, Canadian authority can be persuasive, 
564 For full discussion see Barton, B, The Powers of the Nunavut Planning Commission to Regulate 
Land Use in Relation to the Use of Land for Mineral Purposes. A Report prepared for the Nunavut 
Planning Commission, (December 2001).  
565 Hornby Trust v Christchurch City Council [1992] NZRMA 170. 
566 Burrows, supra n 507 at 15. 
567 Director of Civil Aviation v Planning Tribunal [1997] NZRMA 513, (HC). For discussion see 
Cooney Lees, supra n 482 at 7. 
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6.3.2.2 Inconsistency 
 
The first question to resolve is: is there inconsistency? Does one Act say one thing, 
and the other say something different? Does the operation of one exclude the 
operation of the other? In the face of the ability of the RMA and HSNO to co-regulate 
in terms of hazardous substances it is difficult to argue that the Acts are so 
inconsistent as to be unable to stand together. Clearly they stand together in terms of 
hazardous substances and were intended to do so. 
The majority of HSNO’s provisions apply equally to new organisms and 
hazardous substances,568 with independent provision where necessary. One exception 
is ERMA’s ability to approve a new organism via the controlled release category. 
What differentiates this category from other types of release pursuant to HSNO is the 
ability to control the location of the release, as opposed to the substance or product. 
Does the existence of this category create an inconsistency with the RMA, such that 
the jurisdiction of the RMA should be ousted?  
We have already examined the extent of controls that may be imposed pursuant 
to controlled release. The RMA may impose more stringent controls, yet this does not 
necessarily mean that the regimes are inconsistent and cannot stand together. It may 
instead show that they simply have a different focus. This difference in focus is a 
valid reason to support the Acts standing together.  
The RMA is a comprehensive and far-reaching statute intended to govern the use 
and protection of natural and physical resources in New Zealand. Permission to grant 
a permit for a new organism has parallels to the grant of resource consent under the 
RMA. Decision makers are compelled to take into account a wide variety of factors 
prior to making a decision pursuant to each regime. Whilst not identical, some of the 
factors are similar, such as the need to protect the environment,569 to consider social 
economic and cultural wellbeing and the needs of future generations,570 and to carry 
out weighting exercises in terms of outcomes.571 However, there is a vital mechanism 
missing. Use of resources in New Zealand pursuant to the RMA is fundamentally 
supported by resource management plans which guide and direct activities on 
national, regional and district levels. By virtue of these plans New Zealand people 
                                                 
568 See for example Parts I, II, III, IV, V and VI to X. 
569 Section 4 HSNO, s 5 RMA. 
570 Section 5 HSNO, s 5 RMA 
571 Section 38 C HSNOAA 2003, and s 5 as interpreted by the Environment Court. 
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have the opportunity to scope the use of resources in the districts and regions that they 
inhabit to reflect their interests, beliefs and desires to the extent consistent with 
sustainable management. The value of the ability to plan for resource use is widely 
recognised as a pivotal means of achieving sustainable management.572
It is accepted that HSNO makes provision for the public to comment on an 
application for conditional release, and has created a link to local government by 
providing for notification to the local authority. These opportunities arise however in 
the context of a single application for approval for a new organism on a controlled 
basis. Consideration will be ad hoc by nature, and related to the intentions and 
requirements of the applicant. Without the backdrop of a hierarchy of resource 
management plans, focus under HSNO moves away from the community and the 
environment to centre upon the applicant. It is arguable that this piecemeal approach 
does not represent an optimal way in which to plan for the release of GMO to a 
nation, region or district. Strategic planning,573 in contrast to planning via approval, 
offers a community the opportunity to consider how it best views all of the resources 
of the area to be used or protected.574 A long-term view is enabled. The extent of 
participation and the matters considered will have greater depth and breadth. Robust 
public participation procedures produce better decisions,575 and in the search for 
solutions to environmental issues we should be looking for the best decisions. Who 
these decisions favour is immaterial.  
The issue of coexistence is at the centre of these considerations. The controls 
available pursuant to s38 D of HSNO contemplate application of controls tied to a 
plan or standard, such as one relating to coexistence. However, the preparation and 
nature of such a document is not assured by legislation. Coexistence between GMO 
and non-GMO farmers is a classic example of land use conflict. Resolution of 
resource use conflict is a key reason for existence of the RMA. Resource management 
plans are principal means used in this resolution. By contrast, the HSNO framework 
lacks a robust and farsighted procedure by which a community can explore 
opportunities in an integrated and resource oriented fashion. Integration is a key issue 
                                                 
572 See generally Eriksen, supra n 449. 
573 As provided for by the plan making capabilities of the RMA. 
574 For discussion of this issue, and of public participation in general see Barton, B, "Underlying 
Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public Participation in Resources Development" in D Zillman, A 
Lucas and G Pring (eds), Human Rights in Natural Resource Development: Public Participation in the 
Sustainable Development of Mining and Energy Resources (2002) 77. 
575 Ibid. 
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in terms of resource use and protection in New Zealand under the RMA. 
Commentators have viewed s 5 as requiring substantive integration across all 
environmental assets.576 The need for integration has been identified as deriving from 
several critical factors including; the interconnectedness of environmental assets; the 
interrelationship between human society and the natural environment; the need to 
prioritise environmental problems and to achieve efficiencies and costs savings.577 To 
consider new organisms as a discrete package, outside of the RMA, would therefore 
require a strong rationale. 
Such a rationale does not arise readily from the debate surrounding this issue.578 
One of the initial reasons, advanced by way of submission, for making ERMA the 
sole agency is summarised as:579
 
…release [of new organisms] should be apolitical and based on sound risk 
management and scientific criteria and that ERMA has the expertise. 
 
Other agencies were perceived as lacking necessary expertise, and it was expressed 
that the role of controlling new organisms should be left to the expert and apolitical 
ERMA under the special legislation provided for by HSNO. This suggests a 
somewhat paternalistic attitude that assumes that some matters are best left to those 
who know better. The contention infers (if not expresses) that agencies other than 
ERMA are insufficiently skilled to make decisions in respect of new organisms. It 
also infers that other agencies might bring matters to the table beyond sound risk 
management and risk criteria. It seeks to avoid politicising the issue. It seems to 
assume that “political issues” will invade and overwhelm “scientific truths”. This is 
an uneasy position to adopt in the context of new organisms where the science itself is 
at times conflicting and consequences of release not always readily ascertainable. 
Why new organisms should be singled out for such treatment is unclear. Hazardous 
substances, pollution discharges, and electromagnetic radiation (amongst a host of 
others) all bring complex scientific and technical issues to the doors of our local 
authorities and Courts via the RMA. However, in the context of plan preparation and 
resource consents, the statute equips those agencies with the power and ability to 
                                                 
576 Ibid, 18. 
577 Klein, U "Integrated Resource Management in New Zealand - A Juridical Analysis of Policy, Plan 
and Rule Making under the RMA" (2001) NZELJ 1, 5. 
578 As summarised in MOE Summary, supra n 557 at 32. 
579 Ibid, 33. 
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resolve complex issues. The Courts have consistently displayed the ability to do so in 
an independent, dispassionate and scientific manner.580 Clearly new organisms are 
new, but novelty presents a good reason for dual scrutiny. Scientific uncertainty and 
unascertained consequences are common in the realm of new organisms. It can be 
strongly argued that a community should be entitled to take a conservative approach, 
where the potential for adverse effects can be proven. It has been suggested581 that the 
RMA by construction entitles communities to take a more conservative approach to 
risk than HSNO. That this is so is attributed to the difference in the purpose sections. 
HSNO refers to preventing or managing adverse effects whilst the RMA includes 
reference to avoiding effects. 
In terms of hazardous substances, controls that are more stringent may be applied 
via the RMA. The question arises why this should not be so for new organisms. In 
relation to liability it has been reiterated on several occasions that there is nothing so 
radically different in genetic modification as to require new or special remedies.582 It 
raises the issue of why new organisms should be so radically different in terms of the 
operation of the RMA. 
Communities, districts and regions throughout the world are invoking the right to 
be GE Free. If the application of the RMA is so restricted New Zealand people are 
denied a similar option. The option is denied, based on the need to preserve 
opportunities. However, in the context of a single application there is neither a wide 
reaching nor integrated method by which to determine which opportunities should be 
preserved and which should be denied, and how the resource represented by new 
organisms should be sustainably managed. In this way the mantra of preserving 
opportunities may overwhelm sustainable management without clear identification of 
the opportunities lost or won. Under the RMA any attempt to establish a GE free area 
or sensitive zone would need to be justified in terms of sustainable management. 
Decisions would be guided and controlled by policy and rules decided at national, 
regional and district level. If the protection was not justifiable it could not be 
established. Approval pursuant to HSNO lacks this depth and represents an 
inadequate method for defining the opportunities. 
                                                 
580 See for example Shirley Primary School v Telecom Mobile Communications Ltd [1999] NZRMA 66 
EC, where the Environment Court declined to find that community fear constituted an adverse effect in 
the absence of scientific evidence to support reason for fear. 
581 Cooney Lees, supra n 482 at 9. 
582 See for example Royal Commission, supra n 297 at 328. 
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Using the RMA in addition to HSNO should not be a cause of great concern. 
Decisions under the RMA are not immutable, and in time as technology advances can 
be fine-tuned. Concerns about excessive compliance costs stemming from a dual 
system have been raised. It is arguable that such costs are readily justifiable due to the 
novelty of the technology and the potential for wide spread damage. The RMA 
provides a wide range of options in terms of GMO and the application of zoning and 
performance standards. Where there is no or little risk in relation to an organism, 
controls under the RMA could be readily adjusted, to avoid excessive compliance 
costs. That was a particular aim of the RMA in its inception. Compliance costs appear 
an insufficiently compelling basis upon which to base the ousting of the RMA. 
 There is a clear gap in the HSNO regime in terms of integrated management of 
a resource. This provides a good reason for dual protection pursuant to the RMA. The 
question arises as to whether there are any other reasons that might displace this 
reason? 
It could be argued that the silence of the legislation in respect of provision 
pursuant to s 142 for more stringent controls presents one. Making provision in 
respect of hazardous substances and not for new organisms may infer intent on behalf 
of Parliament to create an exclusive code in terms of new organisms. However this 
needs to be considered in the light of the explanatory note to the Bill, which envisaged 
the use of s 32 of the RMA as the decisive factor in terms of control. Furthermore, 
whether silence is sufficient to express the intent of Parliament is arguable. Section 23 
of the RMA provides that the RMA does not remove the requirement to comply with 
other laws. The Act was clearly intended to work in conjunction with other 
frameworks. To oust the jurisdiction of the principal environmental statute, intended 
to govern in respect of all natural and physical resources,583 would require explicit 
language.  
It may also be suggested that judicial comment points to HSNO operating as a 
specific piece of legislation, in the context of environmental protection. As noted in 
Bleakley v Environmental Risk Management Authority:584
 
[116] Given that the authority found there was no such danger of escape, there was 
no obligation in law and it certainly was not appropriate for the authority to venture 
                                                 
583 With some express reservations, for instance the exclusion of minerals from s5 (2)(a) RMA. 
584 Bleakley v Environmental Risk Management Authority [2001] 3 NZLR 213 HC. 
 131
into more orthodox pollution issues. It is true that the Act has an environmental 
protection purpose, as does the Resource Management Act, however, that prima 
facie wide purpose is to be read in the context of its subject matter and specifics. It 
is to protect the environment against hazardous substances and organisms, and not 
on a wider scale. The wider scale is the role of others under general legislation in 
the RMA. Thus, if spraying milk on pastures were to raise a concern that heritable 
material might escape, that would be a concern for the authority. If after authority 
action, there was no risk of escape of heritable material but there remained a risk of 
another environmental character e.g. destruction of aquatic life in stream that would 
be a concern to be dealt with under the Resource Management Act. It would not be 
an authority matter, despite the breadth of the opening sections of the Act. It is a not 
unfamiliar judicial problem to reconcile legislation relating to specific activities, and 
a general legislation in the Resource Management field. 
 
Where one provision or regime is specific and one general the courts may apply the 
rule generalia specialibus non derogant to enable the specialist provision to override 
the more general.585 The comment of McGechan J infers that the RMA has a wider 
range than HSNO in terms of environmental protection, and that it is the role of 
HSNO to protect the environment against hazardous substances and new organisms. It 
could thus be argued that HSNO ousts the jurisdiction of the RMA. However when 
considering the comments of the Judge, it is important to bear in mind that the 
comments were made in the context of whether or not HSNO could extend its reach to 
venture into more orthodox pollution issues. The contrasting position of the RMA 
regulating new organisms was not at issue. 
The third ground that may support an exclusive code argument is that as the later 
and more specific piece of legislation HSNO should override the earlier and more 
general RMA.586 The need to override will however depend upon the degree of 
inconsistency. Given that it is not apparent that inconsistency exists, and in the light 
of the preference of the courts to enable the statutes to operate together, insufficient 
good reason exists to suggest that HSNO should override the RMA. A better option 
would be to enable dual operation. 
 
                                                 
585 Burrows, supra n 507 at 314. 
586 For discussion on the operation of this maxim in the context of the Court of Appeal decision R v 
Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37 see Burrows, supra n 507 at 321. 
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6.3.2.3 Are further controls necessary? 
 
If the RMA can be used to control GMO, the operation of s 32 would require an 
evaluation of any rules created. It could be argued that the ability to release GMO 
subject to controls overrides the need for rules in a plan. However the argument 
advanced in paragraph 6.3.2.2 militates against such an assumption. Rules in a plan 
are made in an integrated, holistic and region or district based manner. This approach 
underpins the attainment of sustainable management and cannot be replicated by 
virtue of controls applied pursuant to a single application. Absence of the ability to 
plan in an integrated manner necessitates the consideration of further controls. 
In this chapter we have examined the application of the RMA and HSNO in 
relation to hazardous substance and GMO. The analysis shows that the RMA can 
control hazardous substances and may where necessary make provision for more 
stringent controls than those provided pursuant to HSNO. The provision of location 
specific controls that can protect vulnerable activities presents good reason for 
additional protection, and is supported by the requirement of the RMA to consider the 
sensitivity of the receiving environment. Chapter 7 will examine situations where it 
may be reasonable for those additional controls to require internalisation of adverse 
effects.  
In respect of GMO, although the analysis leads to less clear results, potential for 
control by the RMA exists. By virtue of the ability to control land use, a territorial 
authority may be able to control the location of GMO crop plantations, provided that 
the interface with HSNO can be interpreted as permitting this. There are good reasons 
for so doing, not the least being the need for integrated management of natural and 
physical resources. Whether Regional Council can control the release of genetically 
modified heritable material depends upon whether the release can be defined as a 
discharge of a contaminant. Although there are some interpretational difficulties 
relating to inability to control the discharge, and the nature of a contaminant, a case 
can be made that the escape of GMO pollen, in particular, is capable of constituting a 
discharge of a contaminant enabling control by the Regional Council. As with land 
use, there is good reason to support additional control by the RMA of GMO 
contaminant discharge due to the supplementary dimension provided by the RMA to 
enable a community to plan for and manage the use, development and protection of 
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all natural and physical resources in an integrated manner, so as to promote 
sustainable management. 
The extent to which the RMA supports the managing of resources in such a way 
as to avoid effects that will result in decertification of an organic farm is the subject of 
the next enquiry. 
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VII. Using the RMA to protect organic farming. 
Support in principle for the avoidance of adverse effects  
 
Introduction: Outcome 1 – Non-organic farmer internalises adverse effects. Cost 
of internalisation falls on producer of effects. 
 
Outcome 1 is the position identified as producing the most favourable outcome for the 
organic farmer. The focus of this chapter is to determine whether the Act in principle, 
supports avoidance of adverse effects, where the presence of those effects would 
result in decertification of an organic farm. The focus of the chapter will be upon 2 
main threats – the incursion across the boundaries of an organic farm by 
agrichemicals and genetically modified organisms. Matters of principle could 
however extend to other categories of threat. 
 
7.1 Support in principle for a organic farm  
 
7.1.1  Purpose and Principles 
 
Numerous commentators have endlessly dissected s 5 of the Act since the time of the 
Act’s inception.587 Accepting that there is debate, this discussion will accept the 
overall broad judgement approach, acknowledging the approach currently favoured by 
the administering courts.588
Section 5 (2) enables people to manage, use and protect resources whilst meeting 
the combined requirements of s 5 (2) (a-c). Chemical and or GM farmers and organic 
farmers are each managing and using resources. A conflict arises when the use of 
those resources contaminates the organic farm with potential loss of organic 
certification. How far should the chemical or GM farmer be required to go in terms of 
limiting the adverse effects of their farming activities? 
                                                 
587 See supra n 452, and by way of further example Grundy, K “In Search of a Logic: s. 5 of the 
Resource Management Act” [1995] NZLJ 40; Fisher “Clarity in a Little ‘While” Terra Nova Nov 1991 
50; Harris B, “Sustainable Management as an Express Purpose of Environmental Legislation: The New 
Zealand Attempt” (1993) 8 1 Otago Law Review 51. 
588 Recent decisions reinforce the lack of priority between the competing factors of s 5 and remind of 
the need to examine the factual circumstances of each case in order to determine the relative weighting 
to be applied to each element. See for example: Kiwi Property Management Ltd v Hamilton CC, 
unreported, (A045/2003).  
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The definition in s 5 is geared towards the use and development of resources. At 
the same time the antithetical589 protection of resources is required. No one factor is 
given priority; competing forces are to be weighed.590 The definition affords no one or 
thing absolute protection. Even matters of national importance defined by s 6 may be 
set aside in the interests of a nationally suitable proposal.591 Moreover s 5(2)(c) allows 
for alternatives in dealing with adverse effects; mere mitigation of effects may be 
adequate as opposed to avoidance or remedying. Kenderdine J interpreted the 
consequence of this approach as follows:592
  
The idea of “mitigation” is to lessen the rigour or severity of effects. We have 
concluded that the inclusion of the word in s 5 (2)(c) of the Act, contemplates that 
some adverse effects from developments such as those we have now ascertained 
may be considered acceptable, no matter what attributes the site may have. To what 
extent the adverse effects are acceptable, is, however a question of fact and degree. 
 
The Act contains other indications that further support this view, such as rules relating 
to minimum water and discharge quality in ss 60 and 70, and allowances for best 
practicable options and for minimum standards in plans.593 The courts have 
interpreted the presence of an allowance for best practicable option, by way of 
resource consent condition, as an indication that the legislature clearly contemplated 
that there must be circumstances where the best practicable option will only minimise 
adverse effects on the environment. It will not obviate them entirely.594 The 
“acceptability of the effect” is a critical consideration for organic farmers. An initial 
question to ask is whether the effect is adverse or not. 
 
7.1.2 When will an adverse effect be acceptable? 
 
7.1.2.1 Adverse effect  
 
Case law has evolved which assists in identifying whether an effect is adverse or not. 
A related issue is whether an effect is sufficiently offensive, noxious, objectionable or 
dangerous as to give rise to a duty pursuant to s 17. Section 17 of the RMA creates a 
                                                 
589 Friends and Community of Ngawha Inc v Minister of Corrections [2002] NZRMA 412, 413. 
590 Skelton, supra n 239. 
591 New Zealand Rail Ltd v Marlborough District Council (1993) 2 NZRMA 449. 
592 Trio Holdings v Marlborough District [1997] NZRMA 97, 116. 
593 Williams, supra n 18 at 81. 
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general duty that requires all persons to avoid, remedy or mitigate adverse effects on 
the environment. Although not enforceable itself,595 the enforcement provisions 
provided for in Part XII of the RMA may be used to restrain an activity which is 
noxious, dangerous, offensive, or objectionable to the extent that it would have an 
adverse effect on the environment.596
In defining an adverse effect an initial issue is that it must be perceptible. To be 
perceptible Treadwell J, determined in Marlborough District Council v NZ Rail Ltd 
that the effect must not be the type of effect that one might normally experience in the 
day-to-day activities of society.597 In attempting to determine whether an effect is 
sufficiently offensive or objectionable, to such an extent that it is likely to have an 
adverse effect on the environment, a Court must take an objective approach.598 It must 
consider the relationship between the objector and the subject-matter and all other 
features of the case to justify the objector’s contention on the one hand or not justify it 
on the other.599 The Court must consider a range of issues as directed by statute, 
weigh up all the relevant competing considerations and ultimately make a value 
judgement on behalf of the community as a whole. 600 Issues of health and safety will 
be relevant as well as social, cultural and economic wellbeing.  
In considering all relevant factors, the nature of the environment will be germane 
as to whether an effect is adverse. Amenity standards in an urban area may differ from 
those in a rural area, where some noise and odour from farm animals may be 
considered part of the normal environment.601 For the organic farmer some amenity 
standards will be more important than others. Noise, odour, traffic and visual effects, 
whilst possibly troubling, do not affect certification of an organic farm in the same 
way that contaminant discharge does. Organic farmers, just like their non-organic 
counterparts are farmers. The issue for organic farmers does not extend to the whole 
of the rural environment, only those aspects that if not adequately controlled could 
cause decertification. Furthermore adequate control of contaminant discharge is not 
only an issue for organic farmers, but for any producer who has chemical or GMO 
                                                                                                                                            
594 Medical Officer of Health v Canterbury Regional Council, unreported, EC, (W109/94) 28. 
595 Section 17(2). 
596 Section 17(3). 
597 Marlborough District Council v NZ Rail Ltd [1995] NZRMA 357 at 370. 
598 Minhinnick v Watercare Services Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 294, 304 CA. 
599 Ibid, 305. 
600 Ibid. 
601 Darroch v Whangarei DC [1993] 2 NZRMA 637, EC. 
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residues scrutinized as part of an export or domestic production regime. Accepting 
that contaminant drift is part of the normal rural environment may have been a 
reflection of community tolerances in the 1950s, but it is unlikely to find universal 
favour in the twenty first century. The direction contained in s 105(1)(a) to consider 
the sensitivity of the receiving environment, when a consent authority makes a 
decision in relation to discharges, may also indicate support for differentiation in 
approach in relation to contaminant discharges. 
 Contaminant drift causing residues in excess of MRLs or general standards is 
likely to be considered adverse. Contamination below general standards is more 
difficult. In terms of a hazardous substance it could be argued that once the effect of a 
contaminant is below the level authorized by general law then it no longer constitutes 
an adverse effect. Thus the need to avoid remedy or mitigate it is obviated. Such an 
interpretation does not sit comfortably with the HSNO instruction that more stringent 
controls may be applied via other legislation. The Act envisages circumstances where 
more stringent controls will be necessary. This could imply that in certain 
circumstances, an adverse effect continues to exist regardless of the thresholds 
established by other legislation 
In considering the issue of adverse effect, it may also assist to reflect on when the 
law will deem a person as “affected” by an adverse effect. For the purposes of 
considering notification of resource consents, a line of jurisprudence developed in 
relation to determining whether an effect is minor or not.602 The Court of Appeal in 
Bayley v Manukau City Council distinguished between identifying whether an adverse 
effect upon the environment was minor and whether a person was affected by an 
effect in terms of the requirement to obtain consent pursuant to s 94(1)(c)(ii).603 For 
the former category the permitted baseline test was applied to ascertain whether or not 
the effect was minor. The Court accordingly made a comparison of the activity for 
which consent was sought with what was either being lawfully done on the land or 
could be done as of right.604 In terms of concluding whether or not a person was 
affected by an adverse effect the Court concluded it could only disregard such effects, 
as will certainly be de minimis. De minimis correlates to negligible, and an argument 
could be made that although organic standards set a threshold higher than the general 
                                                 
602See for example Bayley v Manukau City Council [1998] NZRMA 513, CA, Arrigato Investments Ltd 
v Auckland Regional Council [2001] NZRMA 481, CA. 
603 This is a reference to the Act prior to the 2003 Amendment. 
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standard, the effects regulated by the organic standard are greater than negligible, 
slight or trifling. The application of the concept of de minimis may have been useful 
to the organic farmer, in that only the truly inconsequential are excluded in that 
context.  
Later decisions extended the reach of the permitted baseline test to substantive 
decisions under ss 104 and 105, including applications for non-complying 
activities.605 This has since been altered by the introduction of the 2003 Amendment 
to the RMA. The amendment codifies the permitted baseline and applies it at 
notification stage, to determine not only whether an effect is minor, but also whether 
or not a person is affected. In this way the operation of the de minimis concept is 
obscured. 
The changes made by s 94B remove the distinction between considering whether 
an effect is minor and whether a party is adversely affected at notification stage. The 
permitted baseline may now be applied to both, and an adversely affected person may 
be treated as not being adversely affected if, in relation to the adverse effects of the 
activity on the person, the plan permits an activity with that effect.606 Attention will turn 
to the plan to assess exactly where the baseline is, and plan definitions will have a 
strong bearing on when a person is affected and what a court will consider minor. The 
implications of the permitted baseline call for careful development of plans with a 
view to avoiding unintended consequences. Tolerance of agrichemical drift in 
provisions in a plan may equate to the organic farmer being considered not adversely 
affected. In addition the operation of the permissive presumption in respect of 
agricultural discharges and use of land can create a similar standard of tolerance. Plan 
silence will constitute permission, and activities would then only be restrained by the 
operation some other form of regulation. In this way, other schemes such as that 
provided for by HSNO apply by default. If the restrictive presumption were at work, 
this can reduce the operation of the permitted baseline, due to the fact unless matters 
are expressly provided for they are not permitted without consent. 
If contamination below the general standard does not constitute an adverse effect, 
there is potential for the organic community to be marginalised because of their 
requirements for a higher standard than that tolerated by the general law. There are 
                                                                                                                                            
604 Bayley, supra n 602. 
605 O'Shea v Auckland City Council [2002] NZRMA 117, referring to Smith Chilcott Ltd v Auckland 
City Council [2001] NZRMA 24, CA. 
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some strong policy reasons not to support such an outcome, and these will be 
discussed in the context of internalisation at para 7.1.2.4. 
There are also some practical considerations. It has been said that the terms 
avoid, remedy or mitigate represents a continuum.607 When applied to an effect that 
continuum becomes obvious. A discharge could be progressively mitigated until it is 
avoided. At some points prior to avoidance, there exists the probability that an effect 
ceases to be adverse. Just where and when may in practical terms be difficult to 
ascertain or monitor. A requirement to avoid may represent a more certain and 
enforceable standard. Internalisation of contaminant discharge, with a flexible 
approach as to how the polluter achieves this, represents a solution that would enable 
the coexistence of all. Developments in the law to date will be examined to analyse 
compatibility with this approach. 
 
7.1.2.3 Extent of requirement to avoid remedy or mitigate adverse effect 
 
The case law establishes that the requirement to avoid adverse effects will turn on the 
circumstances of a case. Instances of resource consent applicants being required to 
avoid all adverse effects of a given class,608 whether actual or potential, are not 
uncommon and will continue to arise. The factors likely to influence decision makers 
to require avoidance of adverse effects include; a proposal’s compatibility with ss 6, 7 
and 8,609 other matters of national importance,610 the extent to which adverse effects 
can be avoided or mitigated by conditions,611 the economics of implementing such 
measures,612 Plan provisions and zoning,613 economic consequences for a region or 
nation,614 the duration of a consent and imposition of review conditions.615  
 
                                                                                                                                            
606 Section 94A(a) and s 94B(3)(a). 
607 Winstone Aggregates Ltd v Papakura District Council, unreported, EC, (A049/02), para 24. 
608 The decision by the Environment Court in Hill v Matamata Piako District Council, unreported, EC, 
(A065/99), confirmed the approach, when it required all objectionable odour emissions to be confined 
to the site. 
609 Trio Holdings v Marlborough District [1997] NZRMA 97, 111. 
610 For example in Trio ibid, 114, the anti-cancer properties produced by the sponge, or the Inter Island 
Ferry link in Marlborough District, supra n 597, 384. 
611 Royal Forest & Bird Protection Society v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council [1996] NZRMA 
241, 270. 
612 Winstone Aggregates Ltd v Papakura District Council, unreported, 14 August 1998, (A96/98) para 
40, Whiting J.  
613 Te Aroha Air Quality Protection Appeal Group v Waikato Regional Council (No.2) (1993) 2 
NZRMA  6. 
614 Canterbury Regional Council v Selwyn District Council [1996] NZRMA 25, EC. 
615 PVL Proteins Ltd & Anor v Auckland Regional Council, unreported, EC, (A61/2001).  
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7.1.2.4 Internalisation of adverse effects 
 
Avoidance of adverse effects will in many situations equate to internalisation of 
adverse effects.616 Recent cases have considered the extent to which the RMA 
requires internalisation.617 It has been argued that the RMA follows a “polluter pays” 
approach, requiring creators of adverse effects to internalise those adverse effects 
rather than forcing the rest of society and the environment to bear the burden of 
dealing with them.618 This position supports Outcome 1. The High Court, in an early 
decision under the RMA,619 discussed how the approach taken by the RMA in relation 
to sentencing was aimed at not only punishing offenders, but also at achieving 
economic goals: 
 
As to the economic aspect, the economic reason why society may not in the absence 
of regulation strike a proper balance between economic output and environmental 
quality is that the costs of pollution are not borne by polluters but by somebody else. 
As a result, these “external” costs will, not, in general be taken fully into account by 
those who cause pollution. Insofar as pollution costs are not borne by those who 
cause pollution, or by the purchasers of their products, some part of the total 
benefits resulting from economic activity in the community is wrongly redistributed 
away from the victims of pollution to other groups in society. In order to correct this 
market failure, the government must intervene to impose financial costs or penalties 
which bring the external costs back to the polluter. These concepts were discussed 
in the First Report of the United Kingdom Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution, Cmnd No 4585 at 4-6 (1971) and are now encapsulated in Principle 16 of 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development adopted at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro 3-14 June 
1992, [1992] International Legal Materials 876, 879. New Zealand has signed the 
Declaration. Principle 16 states:  
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into 
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of 
                                                 
616 There may however be situations where avoidance can be distinguished from internalisation in that 
choices made avoid the effect occurring, rather than the effect occurring and being controlled or 
managed so as to avoid an externality. 
617 The factors referred to above in terms of avoidance, have similar application to internalisation. 
618  ARC v ACC [1997] NZRMA 205, 214.The Court notes that in making the argument counsel for the 
Respondent, Mr Kirkpatrick, accepted that the approach described was not absolute. 
619 Machinery Movers Ltd v Auckland RC [1993] 2 NZRMA 661 (HC).  
 141
pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting 
international trade and investment. 
 
The court then went on to consider the ways in which the RMA explicitly recognises 
the importance of having laws that are economically efficient. These included the 
provisions in s 7(b) for efficient use and development of natural and physical 
resources, in s 24 for the use and development of economic instruments, in s 32 for 
cost-benefit analysis and in s 108 in relation to financial contributions.  
The discussion in Machinery Movers was in the context of illegal activities. 
However, reference to Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration clearly extends the scope of 
the discussion to include lawful activities. What is not immediately apparent from the 
discussion is the extent to which internalisation is required, and differentiation of 
those situations where risks or effects are to be socialised. 
Recent decisions of the Environment Court have tended to adopt a pragmatic 
approach to internalisation.620 Winstone Aggregates Ltd v Papakura District Council 
(“No.2”),621 concerned a reference to the Papakura District Plan, in relation to which a 
quarry owner addressed submissions in relation to the concept of internalisation. It 
was argued that a prior interim decision of the Environment Court622 had by referring 
to internalisation, added an unnecessary gloss to the requirement to avoid remedy or 
mitigate adverse effects in s 5 (2)(c). In the interim decision the court had concluded 
that territorial authorities should impose restrictions requiring activities to internalise 
adverse effects as much as reasonably possible. The appellant quarry owner had 
sought provisions, including buffer zones, in the plan to restrict the encroachment 
upon the quarry of incompatible activities. The court, in the interim decision had, 
found that such provisions should only be applied in situations where it was not 
reasonably possible for an activity to internalise effects it created. The court 
concluded: 
 
[98] We consider that in controlling undesirable effects, territorial authorities should 
impose restrictions to internalise adverse effects as much as reasonably possible. It 
is only where those effects cannot be reasonably controlled by restrictions and 
controls aimed at internalisation, that the sort of restrictions on other sites (as sought 
                                                 
620 See for instance Winstone (No 1) supra n 612, and Adams Landscapes Ltd v Auckland City Council, 
unreported, EC, 15 May 2002, (A108/2002) Newhook J. 
621 Winstone (No.2), supra n 607. 
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by the appellants) might be appropriate. Those are relatively rare circumstances and 
will vary from site to site. 
 
In the later decision the parties had submitted a consent order to the court, agreeing to 
plan provisions relating to the controlling of adverse effects, and others providing for 
the protection of the appellant’s operation. The Environment Court approved the 
order, yet took the opportunity to clarify its earlier comments in relation to 
internalisation. The court reviewed relevant cases and concluded that although the 
words avoid, remedy or mitigate appear to follow a continuum, they are in fact to be 
read conjunctively with equal importance. The court went on to consider the concept 
of internalisation and concluded: 
 
[33] In our view the avoidance of adverse effects by the imposition of conditions 
means that the cost of avoidance is borne by the organisation that generates them. It 
is a matter of judgment as to whether in a particular case the adverse effects are 
such that the cost of avoidance will be totally internalised. It is a question of what is 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
  
[34] While we have focused on avoidance there are many places where mitigation 
measures to reduce adverse effects are all that is required. There are many examples 
that include noise and dust mitigation measures as well as, of course many others. 
 
The court discusses the term reasonable internalisation as used in the interim decision, 
and concluded that the phrase did not create a separate duty or obligation, rather it 
represented a method of complying with the Act’s requirements to avoid, remedy or 
mitigate adverse effects. The court held: 
 
[43] The application of section 5(2)(c), therefore, must necessarily involve a 
consideration of all aspects of a proposal within the broader context of sustainable 
management dependent upon the factual matrix of each circumstance. This calls for 
an assessment to be made in terms of the scale and degree of those effects and their 
significance or proportion in the final outcome. It is a pragmatic approach to 
sustainable management, and also one that is designed to achieve an outcome that is 
fair and reasonable in each particular circumstance.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
622 Winstone (No.1), supra n 627. 
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The court applied a two-step process to evaluate whether or not a buffer zone to 
protect the quarry should be imposed: 
  
[46] …The first part of the consideration is to require emitters to take all reasonable 
steps to internalise effects. Only those effects which cannot be reasonably 
internalised provide the basis for constraints on nearby land-use activities. This 
method thus incorporates the ‘polluter pays” approach, in conjunction with a 
practical evaluation of who can reasonably mitigate. This is analogous to the duty to 
“avoid, remedy or mitigate”, in that if an effect cannot be avoided, then, the emitter 
must remedy or mitigate through conditions of consent. “Internalise” is not to be 
interpreted as “internalise at all costs”. 
 
In a subsequent decision, Adams Landscapes Ltd v Auckland City Council,623 
Newhook J considered the Winstone Aggregates Ltd v Papakura District Council 
decisions. The appellant sought an air discharge permit from the Auckland City 
Council in respect of its existing concrete crushing and recycling business in Mt. 
Wellington, Auckland. Two local territorial authorities actively promoted the use of 
the appellant’s products in roading and construction works as providing an alternative 
to disposal to landfill. The contaminant for which discharge consent was sought was 
dust, and extensive evidence was given in relation to dust effects. 
Those who opposed the application were in general neighbouring business 
operators, who had sought internalisation of the dust effects by the appellant. The 
court found that the adverse effects arising from the operation were similar to those 
generated by a quarry. The court indicated that there were a number of factors to be 
weighed, but declined to do so until such time as further evidence was provided in 
terms of recent “significant”624 efforts to mitigate the adverse effects and the success 
or otherwise of such measures. The court did however observe that it recognised the 
benefits625 of the operation. This indicates that these are factors to be weighed in 
making its decision. The court also concluded that past poor behaviour of the 
appellant would not be used to penalize the appellant. 
                                                 
623 Supra n 620. 
624 These measures included the operation of Nalfoam and Dust Ban systems, the operation of an 
anemometer-driven automatic sprinkler system, manual wetting systems, maintenance of stockpiles 
below bunker wall level, weekly street clearing operations and maintenance of detailed records [Para 
95]. 
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The recognition of benefits provided by the polluter, is a factor which should be 
treated with caution, and placed in the context of s 5 where the exercise of the overall 
broad judgement will see that factor weighed with all others. A recent decision of the 
Environment Court Bodle v Northland Regional Council626 considered the conflict 
between agrichemical users and organic farms in the context of a reference to the 
Regional Air Quality Plan for Northland. The decision related to a request by a 
referrer for the imposition of buffer zones to protect certified organic properties from 
agrichemical spray drift. Much of the argument related to the imposition of mandatory 
buffer zones and the impacts that would have on the Northland agricultural and 
horticultural communities. The court disallowed the request for the imposition of 
mandatory buffer zones and concluded that a properly constructed rule using NZ 
Standard 8409: 1999 (Agricultural Users’ Code of Practice) would be an appropriate 
tool for limiting harm to minimal proportions.627
In reaching its decision the court gave consideration to the need for 
internalisation of adverse effects under the RMA. The Court did not make a clear 
finding on the need to internalise agrichemical sprays, rather it chose application of 
the Standard as a method preferable to application of mandatory buffer zones for 
limiting harm to minimal proportions. It was the buffer zones that were at issue rather 
than the internalisation. However in discussing internalisation the Court recorded that 
it perceived an important difference between controlling the use of agrichemical 
sprays in Northland and controlling quarry activities in the Papakura District628 In 
this way it was inferred that the approach taken to internalisation in Winstone 
Aggregates Ltd v Papakura District Council would not necessarily be appropriate in 
relation agrichemical discharges in Northland. The extent of the land to be sprayed, 
the topography and the meteorological conditions were considered relevant. The 
Court felt bound to also consider expert evidence concerning relevant aspects of ss 5, 
6 and 7. It held: 
 
[25] We accept that in the context of the present case the avoiding, remedying, or 
mitigating of adverse effects on the environment is an extremely important aspect of 
                                                                                                                                            
625 Adams, supra n 620, para [90]. The Court recognised the fact that the demolition materials were 
recycled, the lower price attached to recycled materials, the enhancement of sustainable management of 
quarry stone and the saving in transport costs attached to the central location of the operation. 
626 Bodle v Northland Regional Council, unreported, EC, (A 225/2003) Newhook J. 
627 Ibid, 22. 
628 Ibid, 9. 
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s.5, especially given the nature of many agrichemical sprays which can be harmful 
to human and animal health, and to ecosystems. However we are also required to 
have appropriate regard for other aspects of Part II as we have said. 
 
[26] Our duty, having drawn together those matters, will then be to consider what 
form of rule will best achieve the sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources as defined. 
 
The Court however did not articulate the matters it weighed in considering all aspects 
of Part II, and relevant discussion tended towards disadvantages encountered by the 
application of mandatory buffer zones rather than internalisation by other means. At 
the end of the day the court simply viewed application of the Standard as the best way 
to limit harm to minimal proportions. Due to the finding on the Standard the court 
stated that it did not need to balance the interests and issues of the organic and non-
organic producers.629 Application of the Standard would appear to be the Court’s 
chosen method for avoiding, remedying or mitigating adverse effects of spray drift. It 
represents the yardstick in effects management. The parties have yet to finalise the 
wording of any rule. 
The requirements of the Standard in terms of minimising and avoiding spray drift 
are extensive. Certainly in many instances the practices designated will be sufficient 
to avoid damage to organic produce. Currently clause 5.8 of the Standard requires any 
person applying agrichemicals to minimise spray drift hazard taking into account 
amongst other things weather conditions and sensitive areas. It urges utmost care 
when applying agrichemicals. However in order to be of real effect in achieving 
protection of an organic farm, application of the standard should be tied to a rule in a 
Regional Plan requiring avoidance of contaminant drift.630 In this way certainty can 
be achieved, with appropriate methods attached. The Draft NZ Standard DZ8409 
(Management of Agrichemicals) appears to recognise this position by requiring in the 
section on Agrichemical Use: 
  
5.3.4.3 Sensitive areas 
Applicators shall identify any sensitive areas and describe any situations likely to 
result in a drift hazard on a property spray plan. The property spray plan shall 
describe the measures to be taken that will avoid the drift hazard. Class 6.1 A, B or 
                                                 
629 Ibid, 22. 
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C agrichemicals shall not be applied in such a way as to land on any other person 
not wearing the required protective clothing. (Refer Appendix H.) 
 
With the combined use of notification, spray plans and application techniques 
identified in the Standards, it is apparent that the Draft Standard accepts that spray 
drift is an effect that can and should be avoided where there is conflict with sensitive 
areas. This is a sensible approach, and one that would enable coexistence between 
chemical and non-organic farmers. 
Is such an approach reasonable and consistent with the promotion of sustainable 
management? The Judge in Bodle v Northland Regional Council seems to infer in the 
decision that agrichemical use should not be treated the same as quarries due to the 
fact that the use of chemicals is widespread. This may be a reason for the non-
imposition of mandatory buffer zones due to the extent of land that could effectively 
removed from production. But is not apparent that it constitutes a sound reason for 
requiring that a non-organic farmer not avoid adverse effects upon sensitive or 
vulnerable activities. What that achieves is the removal of land from organic 
production. This seems an unlikely goal for a nation presenting itself to the world as 
clean and green. 
The non-internalisation approach tends to represent entrenchment of the status 
quo. It takes support from the fact that chemical farming benefits the Northland 
Region by providing employment and contributing to the GDP. In terms of s 5 it 
would be argued that chemical using stakeholders in Northland provide benefits to 
social cultural and economic wellbeing.631 A purely utilitarian view may promote this 
argument, yet it fails to adequately consider the other elements of s 5. Supporting 
chemical farmers to the exclusion of organic farmers erodes the environmental and 
economic benefits that may be provided by a burgeoning sector. A sector that is 
actively promoted in other countries to provide social, cultural and economic benefits. 
We need to find an equitable solution where both types of farming can coexist, and 
the internalisation of contaminant discharge can achieve this. Where internalisation 
can be achieved (as accepted by the Draft standard and several Regional Plans), and 
the presence of a vulnerable activity is known, this option should be preferred.  
                                                                                                                                            
630 To be discussed in chapter 8. 
631 See for example, Te Kotahi Mahuta v Waikato Regional Council, unreported, EC, (A91/98), where 
the Environment Court took into account the positive contribution which the dairy industry makes to 
community well being.  
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The High Court in Ports of Auckland 632 has also given consideration to the 
interim Winstone decision,633 and the requirement that territorial authorities impose 
restrictions to internalise adverse effects as much as reasonably possible. 
Baragwanath, J in considering this issue identified 8 constraints on adjudication. 
These constraints included the inability to relocate the port, the need to operate the 
port 24 hours per day, and the removal of the railway yard buffer as a result of 
rezoning. As a result of the constraints the Court considered it unreasonable for the 
port to be expected to reduce or internalise its noise.634 A similar approach was taken 
in Wellington International Airport v Wellington City Council,635 which recognised 
that benefits provided by a regionally significant resource, such as an airport, may call 
for costs to be imposed on the public, in order to maintain the resource. 
The approach taken in the Ports of Auckland case has led some commentators636 
to conclude that key physical resource such as ports, airports and quarries, unable to 
contain all effects, require protection via the application of reverse sensitivity 
principles. They argue that a requirement for all activities to internalise adverse 
effects would require a substantial re-think and re-draft of the RMA. 
These decisions indicate that there may be times when complete internalisation is 
required in order to fulfill the requirements of s 5(2)(c), that rather than being a 
separate concept, internalisation is a method or tool to be used to achieve sustainable 
management. The extent of internalisation will depend upon the circumstances of 
each case and what is “reasonable in the circumstances”. Benefits provided by the 
activities may also be considered, and key physical resources may require added 
protection in situations where factual constraints render it unable to internalise effects. 
Such situations do not however constitute the norm, and should be regarded as rare. 
Whether or not the current approach to internalisation under the RMA can secure 
Outcome 1 for organic farmers will depend entirely upon what a court views as 
“reasonable in the circumstances”. This deference to reason has shades of the 
common law, but may introduce an element of uncertainty. When considering these 
                                                 
632 Ports, supra n 348 at 609. 
633 Winstone (No.1), supra n 612. 
634 Ibid, 611. 
635 Wellington International Airport v Wellington City Council, unreported, EC, 19 November 1997, 
(W102/97) Kenderdine J., and for further discussion see Ghaemaghamy, S Reverse Sensitivity-the 
interface between public and private law in the context of the Resource Management Act 1991, (1999) 
LLM Thesis, Auckland University.  
636 Nolan, D and Somerville, R “Reverse sensitivity” in Papers Presented at the NZ Law Society 
Resource Management Act Update Seminar (2001) Hamilton. 
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issues it is helpful to bear in mind the words of Judge Whiting in Winstones that is 
only where effects cannot be reasonably controlled by restrictions and controls aimed 
at internalisation, that other measures be considered appropriate. Such circumstances 
will be relatively rare circumstances and will vary from site to site. In this way there 
is a presumption of internalisation that can be rebutted in the face of reasonable 
inability to control. There are some who disagree with such an interpretation. It is 
therefore important to consider principle or policy within and beyond the RMA that 
supports this interpretation. 
Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the RMA define principles to be applied in the pursuit of 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources. Where internalisation of 
adverse effects enhances the quality of the environment and amenity values ss 7(c) 
and (f) will have application. The same is so in respect of kaitiakitanga and the ethic 
of stewardship defined in ss 7(a) and (aa). In terms of the efficient use and 
development of resources,637 operation of the polluter pays mechanism is recognised 
as an efficient method of resolving environmental externalities. The mechanism 
recognises that where internalisation is not achieved, compensation for harm suffered 
from the pollution should be paid. This supports an outcome whereby the “victim” of 
pollution is not required to take the burden of another’s pollution. We have seen that 
economic efficiency is bound to exclusivity. Allowing contaminant drift erodes 
exclusivity. It could be argued that according to the Coase theorem, either the organic 
or the non-organic farmer bearing the cost of the externalities produced by the non-
organic farmer could achieve economic efficiency. Yet this approach fails to 
incorporate the concept of polluter pays, Making the organic sector bear the cost of 
another’s pollution effectively hobbles the organic industry and will impede progress 
of an sector capable of bringing not only economic, but also environmental gains.  
In terms of efficiency it has been suggested that organic agriculture does not 
represent an efficient option for food production. Such claims have utilitarian 
overtones in terms of the search for optimum returns. However, as the organic sector 
gains commercial strength and productivity matches non-organic, these claims 
become less supportable. Such claims also need to be placed in the context of 
international initiatives. A recent review of European Union pesticide policies 
revealed that Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, France and Italy had each 
                                                 
637 Section 7 (b) 
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initiated active research on integrated and biological farming, and provided economic 
support to convert to organic farming.638 Denmark and Germany had gone one step 
further to provide economic support for spray free zones.639 Recognising the benefits 
of organic farming does not mean that other forms of farming cannot continue. 
However to enable the organic industry to develop other forms of farming may need 
accept restraints on the extent to which they can contaminate another person’s 
property and the environment in general. The rise of IPM shows that there are many 
in the agricultural and horticultural communities who accept this fact.  
Property ownership conveys basic rights, some of which are recognised with little 
abrogation by the RMA. The existence of the right to manage a thing is inherent in the 
definition of s 5, and limited to the extent consistent with the purpose. The right to 
compensation is constrained by the operation of s 85 in respect of the imposition of 
plan provisions.640 Accordingly compensation for property used or taken in any other 
way may be justified, and where necessary formalized by way of easement or 
restrictive covenant. The right to exclude is apparent in the requirement to avoid 
adverse effects upon the environment. That right is reduced by the alternative 
requirements to remedy or mitigate. The extent of the reduction should be measured 
with the nature of the basic right in mind. A requirement for internalisation respects 
underlying property rights, and where conditions of foreseeability and avoidability 
exist, can be justified on the basis of outcome responsibility. It is also potentially 
consistent with the evolving common law doctrine in relation to known vulnerability.  
Where provision is made in a plan for internalisation, a s 32 evaluation will 
consider efficiency, and the benefits of the provision will be weighed against the costs 
resulting from imposition of the provision. Loss of the ability to farm organically is a 
significant reduction of the right to choose how to manage property owned. Protection 
of that right provides environmental, social and economic gains. Permitting a non-
organic farmer to produce contaminants, which cause decertification of an organic 
farm, would require strong justification. Furthermore, it is reasonable that any such 
allowance be accompanied by a right for compensation accruing to the organic 
                                                 
638 Wossink, G and Feitshans, T “Pesticide Policies in the European Union” (2000) 5 Drake 
J.Agric.L.223 14.
639 Ibid. 
640 Section 85 removes the right to claims for compensation in respect of controls imposed on land by 
plan. Where the control renders any land incapable of reasonable use, and places an unfair and 
unreasonable burden on any person having an interest in the land deletion of the particular provision 
may be sought. 
 150
farmer, for the loss of the use of the property. A less complicated approach is to 
require polluters to order their activities and choose locations, to ensure such effects 
are internalised. 
The directions contained in s 105 to consider the sensitivity of the receiving 
environment, in relation to discharges can also be applied to support avoidance of 
adverse effects on an organic farm. The extent of the restrictions imposed would be 
assessed on the basis of whether they represented the bpo. The pervasive use of 
agrichemicals in rural areas, frequency of application, potential for environmental 
harm, and general non-natural nature are all reasons to support internalisation.641
To the extent that internalisation of effects would be consistent with recognising 
and providing for the relationship of Maori with the environment, s 6 (e) may offer 
support. In addition where internalisation is consistent with principles established 
pursuant to the Treaty of Waitangi, s 8 would have application. Evidence of alignment 
in principle with organic methods, and of widespread adoption or acceptance by 
Maori of the organic ethic may trigger protection pursuant to the Treaty. In particular 
courts would need to consider whether anything less than full internalisation in terms 
of chemicals and GMO would be consistent with the duty of active protection or 
recognition of rangatiratanga. 
There are many reasons to support internalisation of adverse effects. It is also true 
that there will be some situations where effects cannot be internalised. The Ports of 
Auckland activity642 is a good example. Where an activity would experience difficulty 
avoiding adverse effects generated by it, the concept of the reverse sensitivity effect 
has developed to protect that activity.643 A reverse sensitivity effect is one that arises 
when the existence of a sensitive activity may lead to demands for restraints upon a 
pre-existing activity.644 The concept has been the subject of much debate.645 Some 
                                                 
641  Ravensdown Growing Media Ltd v The Southland Regional Council, unreported, EC, (C194/2000) 
17, where bog particulate emission was mitigated due to the effect’s short and infrequent duration, 
natural quality of the emission and the absence of evidence of adverse or environmental health effects. 
642 As described in Ports, supra n 348. 
643 For instance as in: McQueen v Waikato District Council, unreported, PT, 20 June 1994, (A45/94), 
ARC v ACC [1997] NZRMA 205.  
644 ARC v ACC, ibid, 206. 
645 For discussion see Casey, M “Backing off Reverse Sensitivity” in Papers Presented at the Resource 
Management Law Association Conference (1998) ; Pardy, B and Kerr, J, “Reverse Sensitivity - The 
Common Law Giveth, and the RMA Taketh Away” (1999) 3 NZELJ 93; Ghaemaghamy, S, Reverse 
Sensitivity-the interface between public and private law in the context of the Resource Management Act 
1991, (1999) LLM Thesis, Auckland University, Nolan, D and Somerville, R “Reverse sensitivity” in 
Papers Presented at the NZ Law Society Resource Management Act Update Seminar (2001) Hamilton; 
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have viewed it as an erosion of common law rights, in particular of the established 
principle that claiming the plaintiff came to the nuisance is no defence.646 They argue 
that, for instance, a requirement to establish buffer zones on lands other than the 
established use constitute the grant of de facto rights over that land in favour of the 
polluter.647 Not only would this compromise the use of the buffer land, the value of 
that land may also be reduced without compensation. In response to such concerns 
other commentators have quoted the Coase theorem and argued that we should not 
necessarily prefer the rights of the “victim” of adverse effects above the rights of the 
source of the adverse effect.648 However the lack of reciprocity in such a relationship 
creates inequity. That is not to say that the concept of reverse sensitivity does not have 
a place. Rather, any place it does occupy should be utilised with caution, and with 
recognition of the consequences upon those against whom it is wielded. Kenderdine J 
in Wellington International Airport Limited v Wellington City Council described the 
situation in this way:649
 
…But, like any other “effect,” reverse sensitivity needs to be considered in the 
context of all effects. 
 
In general the concept has been used to protect “key physical resources”,650 such as 
quarries and ports. The latter two examples are unlikely to cause a serious threat to the 
integrity of an organic farm. A far greater problem arises where the concept is used to 
protect those discharging contaminants from agricultural or horticultural activities. In 
McQueen v Waikato District651 the concept, in one of its earlier expressions, was 
applied to prevent a nudist camp from receiving resource consent, where the camp 
would be adjacent to an orchard from which chemical sprays could emanate. 
Sheppard J held: 
 
We find that there would be a potential effect on the environment, including people 
engaged in orchards as part of the ecosystem, of allowing the proposed activity. 
                                                                                                                                            
Thomas, P, Foster, C and Van Voorthuysen, Managing Rural Amenity Conflicts Ministry for the 
Environment, (2000) Wellington . 
646 Pardy, supra n 662 at 96. 
647 Ibid, 100. 
648 Nolan, supra n 662 at 87. 
649 Wellington International Airport Ltd v Wellington City Council, unreported, EC, 19 November 
1997, (W102/97) 44. 
650 Nolan, supra n 636 at 79. 
651 McQueen v Waikato District Council, unreported, PT, 20 June 1994, (A45/94).   
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That effect would be that those orchardists in the vicinity would be restrained from 
managing their orchards with chemical sprays at the times and in the ways that they 
might otherwise do, because of the risk of harm to people using the applicant’s 
property for recreation. 
 
The rationale behind this finding appears to relate to zoning and place. The 
orchardists in the vicinity are fulfilling a legitimate role in a rural zone, whereas the 
nudist camp is considered recreational. The inferential policy intent aligns with policy 
in relation to right to farm laws; the need to protect legitimate rural industry. 
Application of the concept to the organic sector could thereby be distinguished. The 
organic sector fulfils a role similar to the orchardists. Hence any rationale for 
protection is weakened. In addition McQueen v Waikato District was decided 10 years 
ago, and is now potentially out of step with general tolerance of spray drift. Most 
Regional Plans now reflect the change in attitude and regulate spray drift from 
commercial operations. 
As well as offering protection to legitimate industry the concept of reverse 
sensitivity carries with it the notion of “first in time first in right”. The common law 
rejects this notion as a legitimate defence to an action in nuisance. So too does the 
RMA to the extent provided by the operation of s 17 in circumstances where the 
activity is sufficiently noxious, dangerous, offensive, or objectionable so as to 
constitute an adverse effect on the environment. The notion “first in time first in 
right” is however recognised by the RMA to the extent consistent with the existing 
use rights established by ss 10, 10A, 10B and 20A. Existing use rights are used to 
balance interests between conflicting activities and protect the investment of those 
who have at some earlier time established the activity lawfully. The right is subject to 
proof that the activity continues to operate with the same or similar character, 
intensity, and scale as when initially permitted. Interestingly in terms of discharges,652 
the rights provided by s20A, are less extensive than that offered by the shield of 
reverse sensitivity, operating via zoning provisions or by way of submission in 
opposition to resource consent application. Pursuant to s 20A, upon a Regional Plan 
becoming operative, any protection of a discharge “right” is dependent upon resource 
consent for the activity being obtained within a period of six months.653 This contrasts 
                                                 
652 Section 20A applies to all resources regulated by a Regional Plan.. 
653 Section 20A(2). 
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with the rights afforded to land use activities pursuant to s 10A that are independent 
of an application for resource consent.654 The fact that the legislation takes a more 
restrictive and regulated approach to activities covered by a Regional Plan may 
underscore the need for caution in the application of the concept of reverse sensitivity 
with regard to discharges. Such a conclusion is reinforced by the statutory direction 
contained in s 105(1)(a) to consider the sensitivity of the receiving environment. As 
stated by Kenderdine J in Wellington International Airport Limited v Wellington City 
Council:655
 
…the use of the term “reverse sensitivity” should not obscure either of two things. 
First, it is not a term which is used in the Act or given any particular status. Second, 
it is no more than a description of a class of effect – the sensitivity of a person quite 
lawfully creating adverse effects to pressure from people potentially affected by 
those effects. 
 
Regarding the concept as one which has no special status accords with the ruling of 
Whiting J, in Winstones that situations where full internalisation is not required will 
be reasonably rare.656 It has been suggested that where the concept is considered, 
adoption of the “dominant use” approach may offer a “common sense alternative”.657 
The approach would require consideration of what is the dominant use in the area 
with the result that more weight would be accorded to the concerns of the dominant 
use. While this approach may be of benefit in some situations, it does not present an 
attractive option for the organic sector. Such an approach would enable established 
rural activities to exclude another legitimate rural activity on the basis of arriving first, 
regardless of the impact of either upon the environment. It tends to accord more 
importance to recent use, than historical, and to an extent obscures consideration of 
obligations to future generations. It is an approach that would to a degree entrench the 
status quo and work against change. 
Interestingly in terms of GMO the position is initially reversed. Application of a 
first in time rule or dominant use approach would likely benefit the organic sector in 
                                                 
654 Section 10(1). 
655 Wellington International Airport Ltd v Wellington City Council, unreported, EC, 19 November 
1997, (W102/97) 44.  
656 Winstones (No.1), supra n 612 para 98. 
657 Ghaemaghamy, S supra n 662 at 39, Duncan-Sittlington, E "Rural Amenity Conflicts: Reverse 
Sensitivity, Existing Use and the Common Law/RMA Interface in the Context of Odour Nuisance-A 
Case Study" (2003) 5 BRMB.  
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respect of GMO. Western Australia is likely to take this approach, as is the European 
Union.658 Despite its initial attraction, such an approach has its difficulties, 
particularly as time passes and time lines become obscured. A more certain and 
enforceable approach is found in a requirement for internalisation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
By application of the purpose of the RMA, activities can be required to avoid adverse 
effects on the environment. Case law establishes that internalising adverse effects is a 
method of attaining avoidance and should occur wherever reasonably possibly. Strong 
justification for avoidance of adverse effects, which would cause decertification of an 
organic farm, exists within and beyond the RMA. Provided those administering the 
Act adopt a cautious and restrained approach to allowing exceptions to internalisation 
of adverse effects, the organic industry will have a good chance of coexisting with its 
neighbours. In this way all opportunities are preserved, including the opportunities of 
all to cater for their social, cultural and economic wellbeing.  
                                                 
658 Supra, 32. 
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Chapter VIII – Overview: protection of organic farms.  
The importance of the plan 
 
8.1 The importance of the plan 
 
This thesis has made a number of findings in pursuing its main purpose of examining 
the extent to which New Zealand law enables effects to be controlled for the purpose 
of preserving the integrity of an organic farm. Chapter 4 identifies theoretical 
justification for preserving the integrity of organic farms. Chapter 5 discloses that 
common law remedies offer a degree of protection to the organic farm, however in 
order to recover for loss suffered, it is necessary first to overcome the obstacle of 
being termed a sensitive activity. Application of the evolving concept of known 
vulnerability may assist the organic farm recovering for loss suffered. The right of 
recovery is improved where the loss was foreseeable, and in respect of recovery for 
economic loss in negligence, where the actions of the defendant were illegal. The 
action of a resource management plan may strengthen the right to recovery by first, 
making the presence of an organic farm known, through the use of spray plans or map 
notation, and secondly by making contaminant drift illegal by virtue of a rule in a plan 
requiring avoidance of contaminant drift. In this way the provisions of resource 
management plans acquire significance in terms of protecting organic farms at 
common law. 
 In their own right however, plans offer a significant opportunity to manage 
resources and protect the organic farm from the incursion of unwanted contaminants. 
The analysis in chapter 6 discloses that the RMA has the potential ability to protect 
organic farms.659  In particular the use of Regional and District Plans can, and in some 
cases do, provide a range of measures to assist in preserving the integrity of an 
organic farm. There is also some prospect for national standards and policies to be 
promulgated to this end. The research in chapter 7 shows that internalisation of 
adverse effects so as to avoid effects on vulnerable activities is a measure consistent 
with the purpose and principles of the RMA. Administering agencies need to 
recognise potential benefits provided by organic farming methods, and the 
consequences of failing to afford adequate protection. Pathways that encourage and 
                                                 
659 Although as noted there are unresolved issues in relation to the use of plans and GMO. 
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support diversity need to be forged. Internalisation of adverse effects is one such 
pathway. The organic farming sector needs to recognise the potential protective 
strength of District and Regional Plans and capitalize upon it. In conclusion, this 
chapter will discuss practical measures available via resource management plans to 
offer preservation of the integrity of the organic farm.  
 
 
8.2 Land use controls 
 
Territorial authorities have primary responsibility for the control of any actual or 
potential effects of the use, development, or protection of land.660 Through the 
mandatory District Plan, controls upon land can be effected by zoning, performance 
and development standards and plan notation recognising features such as sacred sites 
or heritage trees. Non-regulatory methods such as education and incentives may also 
feature in a plan in addition to or in substitution for regulatory controls. Although the 
control of discharges is not a function of a territorial authority, land use controls in 
District Plans aimed at segregating or separating conflicting activities, can provide 
protection for the organic farm. 
 
8.2.1 Zoning 
 
Distinguishing activities by zone is a common technique applied in resource 
management in order to group like activities, and segregate those that are 
incompatible. Zoning controls can move beyond mere segregation of activities to 
contemplate specific environmental protection. In New Zealand, zones that protect 
distinct ecological areas and landscape are commonplace. Internationally countries are 
moving ahead to promote the protection of environmentally sensitive areas. Pesticide-
free zones are becoming prevalent.661 Many of the measures are imposed with a view 
to improving drinking water quality, and the habitats of endangered fish and 
animals.662 In some instances the retirement of land receives fiscal support from the 
                                                 
660 Section 31(1)(b) RMA. 
661 Wossink supra n 638; Danish Ministry of Environment and Energy "Pesticide Action Plan II" 
[March 2000] <http://www.mst.dk >. 
662 See for instance pesticide-free zones imposed by judicial ruling along extensive waterways on the 
west coast of the United States to protect threatened salmon and steelhead habitat, reported by Bernton, 
H in the Seattle Times, August 15, 2003, and Pesticide control regulations in the State of Alaska 
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Government.663 Whilst initially attractive as a means of protecting an organic farm 
from pesticide use, differentiated zoning, such as a pesticide free zone, may also have 
drawbacks. When considering the issue, it is important to bear in mind the basic 
attributes of organic farming. Census information shows that organic farming occurs 
across New Zealand in patterns similar to non-organic farming. Farm location is 
chosen based on climate, soil type, topography and access to market. Organic farms 
may be grouped in some situations and dispersed in others. Although pesticide free 
zones could be beneficial to organic farms if applied widely, they could have an 
exclusionary effect if applied on a limited basis. In a theoretical situation where 
pesticide use was uncontrolled in general areas, with specific areas set aside as 
pesticide free, organic farming would have to operate within the locational limitations 
of the free zones, or weather the storm in the general zone. If the reverse were 
promoted with the greater part of a district being pesticide free and with the special 
zones reserved for chemical use, non-organic farmers would suffer the limitations of a 
stand-alone zone. Although chemical use is lessening, chemical dependence is 
unlikely to disappear altogether. Widespread pesticide free zones would deliver to 
chemical farmers, including those practising IPM methods, a lack of choice similar to 
that which the organic farmer currently faces. A more flexible option is represented 
by plans that enable activities to coexist by requiring avoidance of chemical or GMO 
contamination at the boundary, and this will be discussed in the context of Regional 
Plans. Such a position is also likely to find favour with export fruit and vegetable 
growers, where a growing regime requires that a grower use sprays, but export 
requirements strictly police the presence of inadvertent chemicals. Cross boundary 
avoidance is the appropriate technique in this situation. In this way the spectrum of 
farmers represented by chemical, IPM and organic methods, can with care, share the 
same land resource. 
Avoidance of spray or fertilizer drift to a neighbouring property is readily 
achievable. The draft New Zealand standard recognises this by requiring avoidance of 
spray drift.664 The situation is less clear with GMO. GE Free zones could be used on a 
widespread basis to protect a district or a region from GE contamination. Regions and 
                                                                                                                                            
creating pesticide-free areas around any surface or marine water body: 
http;//www.state.ak.us/dec/deh/pestcomment.htm 
663 Danish Ministry, supra n 661, Wossink, supra n 638 at 14. 
664 Standards New Zealand "Draft Standard for the Management of Agrichemicals - Draft Number: 
DZ8409" [2003] <http://shop.standards.co.nz/drafts/ .> 
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districts around the world are exercising this choice.665 The choice to become GMO 
free is not however without difficulty. The Provincial Government of Upper Austria 
intended to create what would be Europe’s first statutory GM-free farming zone. The 
reasons for the zone were the belief that the risks of genetic manipulation were not yet 
fully researched, and the need to avoid pollution of land with genetically modified 
plants. Upper Austria is a region with high numbers of organic farmers, a very high 
ecological culture and has gained international recognition for its organic and GM-
free produce. It had been planning with Regions in Italy and in Slovenia to create a 
large GE free zone. As the creation of the zone ran counter to EU directives on GMO 
and was in derogation of harmonization measures, Upper Austria was required to 
notify the national legislation under Article 95(5) of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community. The European Commission on 2 September 2003, made a 
decision banning the State from creating the free farming zone, on the basis that no 
new scientific evidence was available to justify the prohibition.666 Despite the ruling 
Upper Austria intends to persist and has given notice that it will take the issue to the 
European Court of Justice. Although the ruling is no doubt a set back for Upper 
Austria and those other European districts or regions which have declared themselves 
GE free, the matter is far from resolved. GMO moratoria continue in Europe in 
respect of GMO,667 and the United States has begun a challenge to the World Trade 
Organisation to have them lifted. The moratoria are viewed by the United States as 
barriers to trade, as GE free zones could potentially be. 
The rationale behind opposing GE Free zones appears to be that opportunities to 
farm with GMO need to be preserved. It is assumed that controls placed upon the 
release of GMO will be sufficient to protect the organic farmer. A conservative view 
of the ability to control GMO does not yet promote full confidence, particularly where 
the science is new and the risks not yet fully established. It may well be that in time 
the risks associated with GMO can be fully established and controlled. Nevertheless, 
it must be sensible to entitle a conservative community or region to seek a higher 
degree of protection in any interim period. Where an area is characterized by non-GM 
farms, including organic, which depend upon attaining a GE free standard to trade, the 
                                                 
665 For example in Europe see: Kruszewska I "Slovenia - A GMO-free zone. The Only Way to Protect 
Biodiversity and ensure Organic Agriculture can Thrive." [2001] <http://www.anped.org > 35, and in 
Australia see: < http://www.green.net.au/gefreetasmania >. 
666 The Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision, 2 September 2003  
(2003/653/EC) OJL L230/43. 
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opportunity to do so should be most carefully preserved. For it is an opportunity that 
once lost may be difficult or impossible to recover. A GE free zone adds legitimacy to 
those who produce within it. Provided the zone was not universal it would not operate 
as a barrier to trade in any way different to the introduction of widespread cultivation 
of a GMO crop in a given area.  
An alternative is the creation of a zone where production of specified types of 
GMO crops was a prohibited activity. Creating a zone in this manner could exclude 
crops that would pose a risk of contamination to crops currently and traditionally 
grown within the area. Internalisation of effects, which cause crop contamination or 
failure, would be a prerequisite. Although such an approach may pose limitations in 
respect of potential future crops, it offers greater flexibility. A zone such as this 
applied on a broad basis could protect non-GMO growers whilst still offering the 
GM-grower the opportunity to grow alternative crops in the same area. It would more 
clearly define constraints upon the use of GMO on an area, making enforcement of 
the provisions less onerous than a blanket ban. The District Plan process is a sensible 
mechanism for consideration of these issues. Clear pathways for public participation 
are established and the plan process creates the opportunity for those involved with 
local resources, and who know them intimately, to shape the use of the resources. The 
territorial authority, as the agency regulating land use, has ready access to information 
regarding the characteristics of a district. Using the District Plan to manage GMO, 
enables a long-term view of all land use and a chance to weigh the interests of all in 
an equitable manner. 
 
8.2.2 Performance standards and development controls 
 
In addition to zoning, a District Plan can employ a range of mechanisms aimed at 
reducing land use conflict.668 A common tool employed via rules in a plan, or 
pursuant to conditions for a resource consent is a requirement for separation distance 
between activities where conflict may occur. The separation distance can be achieved 
via a requirement of set back of buildings from a boundary. Alternatively buffer zones 
may be used to create space between activities such as forestry or horticulture to 
                                                                                                                                            
667 Kruszewska, supra n 663. 
668 For discussion of a range measures available for reducing rural amenity conflict see: Thomas, P, 
Foster, C and Van Voorthuysen, R Managing Rural Amenity Conflicts, Ministry for the Environment, 
(2000) Wellington, 57 and for managing spray drift see: ATMAC, supra n 513 at 26. 
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reduce the risk of conflict.669 Buffer zones may simply constitute spatial separation 
between activities, or may have the additional protection of vegetative or artificial 
barriers. Requirements for buffer zones between activities producing contaminants 
and organic farms will be useful in stemming the threat of contamination. However 
spatial measures do not necessarily address the specific effects in question, and as 
such may serve merely to reduce rather than avoid adverse effects. Where physical 
separation measures are used, the integrity of the organic farm will be more securely 
preserved if supported by a rule in a Regional Plan requiring avoidance of 
contamination by agrichemical or GMO drift.  
Buffer zones can shield and protect the organic farmer. Many will choose to erect 
their own forms of shelter to protect produce. Non-organic farmers also grow 
shelterbelts to protect their own crop from the elements. That in turn has the added 
advantage of reducing liability in terms of a claim for damage from spray drift. 
However, there may be situations where shelterbelts or artificial barriers are 
unnecessary and unwanted due to shading and moisture loss impacts. A requirement 
for avoidance of spray drift in a Regional Plan, without requirement for buffer zones 
in either plan, offers flexibility. The farmer applying the contaminants remains under 
an obligation to avoid spray drift, but retains the ability to choose the method of 
avoidance. Another option is for the District Plan to detail alternative methods of 
spatial separation, any of which would constitute a permitted activity. In terms of 
protecting the organic farm, the most important issue is the internalisation of the 
adverse effect, how this is done, whilst important is not critical. Furthermore, reliance 
upon the Regional Plan reduces the impact of an existing use right argument by virtue 
of the operation of s 20 as opposed to s 10. 
Where Plans do require separation, in order to secure Outcome 1, the requirement 
for separation should fall upon the activity creating the effects. This is consistent with 
the Polluter Pays approach, and with underlying property rights. Consistent with the 
theory of outcome responsibility, any obligation is strengthened where the damage is 
avoidable and the loss foreseeable.  
The measures examined thus far have been introduced as mechanisms to protect 
organic farms. District Plans may also include provisions that work counter to the 
interests of organic farms. Provisions that protect existing activities from reverse 
                                                 
669 See for example Proposed Tasman District Resource Management Plan, 2002, Rule 17.4.8.  
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sensitivity effects are one example. Generally such provisions are applied to prevent 
sensitive activities locating in the vicinity of an activity that is unable to contain 
adverse effects. Policies, objectives and methods allied to this intent have the ability 
to seriously constrain the location of organic farms, with or without the specific 
intention of so doing. In terms of sustainable management of the land resource a 
better option is represented by requirement for internalisation of effects. 
 
8.2.3 Notice 
 
A final matter of importance in relation to territorial authorities is the issue of notice. 
Knowledge of the existence of an organic farm is a critical prerequisite in terms of 
managing the resource. At common law knowledge of a vulnerable activity is vital in 
terms of foreseeability, avoidability and also in relation to contributing to a 
defendant’s state of mind in terms of causing appreciable harm. In practical terms, 
lack of awareness of an organic farm’s presence has implications for neighbouring 
farm practices, and also in relation to government pesticide applications. Notice of 
presence may also impact upon plan preparation and the grant of resource consents. 
The organic industry has long recognised the importance of notice, and standards 
reinforce the need to give notice to neighbours. However as the industry grows and 
the potential for conflict intensifies, so does the need for an effective, comprehensive 
and accessible means of identifying organic farms. Territorial authorities have the 
capability in conjunction with Regional Council to establish a register of organic 
farms, or vulnerable activities. This information could be noted on plans, via a 
schedule in a similar manner to that commonly used for protected trees. Geographical 
Information Systems could be used to collate and access the data. In addition, the 
information could be made available pursuant to Land Information Memoranda issued 
pursuant to the Building Act 1991. A comparable approach has been applied to 
contaminated sites in the Waikato Region. A register would greatly benefit integrated 
management of the resources of a district or region, and would act as additional 
protection for the organic farm. 
 
8.3  Regional Plans 
 
Land use controls, via a District Plan can provide measures to arrange the location of 
activities so as to reduce or avoid conflict. To control the specific effects which 
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threaten the organic farm requires the intervention of the Regional Council via a 
Regional Plan. A Regional Council may prepare a Regional Plan in response to any of 
its functions, including control of discharges or water. The desirability of preparing a 
plan should be considered in a range of circumstances, including whether there exists 
any significant conflict between the use, development, or protection of natural and 
physical resources or the avoidance or mitigation of such conflict.670 It is common for 
Regional Plans to consider agricultural point source and non-point source discharge. 
Regulation of spray drift occurs in the majority of Regional Plans.671 A close analysis 
of these provisions reveals that some are more likely to secure Outcome 1 for the 
organic farmer than others. 
 
8.3.1 Avoidance 
 
The best option for achieving Outcome 1 is represented by a plan that requires that 
there be no discharge into the air of sprays beyond the boundary of the premises 
where the activity is currently being undertaken.672 This approach requires the 
avoidance of the effect of spray drift by requiring internalisation, and could equally 
apply to GMO contaminant discharge. The Proposed Auckland Regional Plan: Air 
Land and Water673 requires internalisation as a condition to a general permitted 
activity rule in relation to discharge to air of agrichemicals.674 The Plan records that 
this approach relies strongly on the provisions of NZS 8409:1999 (Code of Practice 
for the Management of Agrichemicals, which like its draft successor, requires the 
avoidance of spray drift. Extensive consultation with industry and other stakeholders 
is a reason given in the Plan for the adoption of the Code.675 Other plans adopt a 
similar requirement,676 whilst some require avoidance where the drift would impact 
upon a vulnerable activity such as a school or organic farm.677  
 
                                                 
670 Section 65(3)(a). 
671 ATMAC, supra n 513 at 28. 
672 This approach will also contribute to recovery in negligence for economic loss, by rendering all drift 
illegal. 
673 Proposed October 2001. 
674 Rule 4.5.1. 
675 Auckland Regional Council, Proposed Auckland Regional Plan: Land Air and Water (October 
2001) 4.1.10. 
676 ATMAC, supra n 513 at 28. 
677 Nelson City Council, Proposed Air Quality Plan (August 2003) AQ7.1 (g), and Waikato Regional 
Council, Proposed Waikato Regional Plan as Amended by Decisions (February 2002) Policy 6.2.3 and 
Rule 6.2.4.9. 
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 8.3.2 Provisions for vulnerable activities 
 
For organic farmers the strongest approach is that represented by a requirement for 
full internalisation of all contaminant discharge that would result in decertification of 
an organic farm. Special provisions for vulnerable activities, whilst better than 
nothing, can be complicated in terms of interpretation and enforcement. Some of the 
definitions of an organic farm are restrictive678 and exclude farms beyond the 
definition. The Waikato Regional Plan, whilst offering greater protection than some, 
permits a discharge of agrichemicals to the air by widespread application, provided no 
significant adverse effect of off target drift occurs beyond the boundary of the 
property being sprayed.679 Significant adverse effect is defined to include:680
 
iii)  damage to crops and other plants to the point where the agrichemical has 
affected the growth and quality of the crop, or contaminates the crops to levels 
where residues exceed limits for safe human consumption. 
 
Difficulty with this definition arises where drift residue exceeds organic Standards, 
but is within general tolerances. Organic farmers would need to prove that the quality 
of their organic crop has been damaged. This could be the subject of argument, 
especially as the provision continues to expressly contemplate and render non-
permitted, situations where the general residue level has been exceeded. Where a 
provision in a plan is unclear, a court may look at related objectives, policies and 
methods in determining the meaning.681 It may even go beyond the Plan to look at the 
general purpose and scheme of the Act that authorized the provision. The Proposed 
Plan shows an intention to provide protection from spray drift for sensitive 
activities.682 Certified organic farms are explicitly contemplated as a sensitive area.683 
It may be of assistance that the policy expresses an intention to protect certified 
organic farms, but other related statements obscure this intention by the stating that 
not all off-target effect need be avoided, only those which are significant adverse 
                                                 
678 Nelson City Council, ibid, AQ7.1 (g). 
679 Waikato Regional Council, supra n 677 at Rule 6.2.4.9. 
680 Ibid, 6.2.3. 
681 MacKenzie District Council v Glacier v Southern Lakes Helicopter, unreported, EC, (C083/97).  
682 Waikato Regional Council, supra n 677 at Policy 3 and associated explanation. 
683 Ibid, Policy 3(g) 
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effects.684 The ambivalence expressed in the plan weakens the protection that it 
avowedly intended to provide.  
Reliance upon the definition of significant adverse effects may, but does not 
automatically, provide protection for farmers whose organic crops are subject to spray 
drift. It is even less likely to provide protection where livestock is subjected to spray 
drift so as to cause decertification. To qualify as a significant adverse effect it would 
be necessary to prove death or illness of fauna.685 In cases of spray drift relating in 
decertification, this may be difficult to prove. The limitations of such provisions are 
mitigated to a degree by associated requirements for applicator training, notification, 
adherence to Code of Practice requirements and spray plan and record keeping 
requirements.686 Clearer protection for the organic farmer would be provided by a 
straightforward rule to avoid, tied to similar implementation measures.  
A separate but related issue is whether or not the rules capture fertilizer drift 
within agrichemical drift. Some definitions of agrichemical in plans include fertilizer, 
whilst others do not. For the organic farm the consequences of contamination by a 
prohibited input are the same, whether fertilizer or pesticide by origin. Initiatives to 
control fertilizer applications via a Regional Plan are becoming more common.687 Any 
rule which controls rates of application, timing and method of application and creates 
buffer zones around waterways is likely to assist in restricting contamination of an 
organic farm by aerial drift and via contamination of waterways.  
Strong, clear rules in a Regional Plan controlling contaminant discharge benefit 
not only the organic sector, but also other farming producers and the natural 
environment in general. 
 
Final Conclusion 
 
The protection of organic farms is a matter of contemporary importance. This thesis 
discloses strong justification in principle for laws that preserve the integrity of an 
organic farm. The RMA is a regulatory means by which effective protection can be 
obtained against the threats represented by agricultural contaminant discharge. A 
                                                 
684 Ibid, Policy 3 and associated explanation. 
685 Ibid, 6.2.3.c.v. 
686 Ibid, 6.2.4.9. 
687 See for instance Auckland Regional Council, Proposed Auckland Regional Plan: Land Air and 
Water (October 2001) 5.5.38 Agrichemical and Fertiliser Use. 
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District Plan through zoning and performance measures can segregate conflicting 
activities. Rules in a Regional Plan aimed at avoiding contaminant discharge effects 
are critical to preserving the integrity of an organic farm. As such they will also 
enhance a right of recovery for pure economic loss at common law. To be fully 
effective in terms of promoting integrated management of natural and physical 
resources the ability of the RMA to regulate GMO should be unfettered. In this way 
we can hope for a future where all opportunities are truly preserved.  
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